

UN-OCHA



Afar National Regional State



Livelihoods-Based Flood Emergency Response Project in Afar Regional State External Evaluation Report

 <p>Project: LBFERP Livelihood Based Flood Emergency Response Project Afar</p> <p>Woreda: _____ Kebele: _____ Village: _____ CAHW: _____</p> <p>OCHA CARE</p> <p>VALID UNTIL: 31.05.2011</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>ብር 35</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	ብር 35									X						X					X			
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A joint Project Implemented by



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UN – OCHA



Afar National Regional State



Livelihoods-Based Flood Emergency Response Project in Afar Regional State

External Evaluation Report

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Asmelash Kebede.

Evaluation Consultant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.....	2
List of Tables.....	3
List of Figures	4
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	5
Executive Summary.....	6
1. Introduction and Project Background	10
1.1 Introduction.....	10
1.2 Project Background	11
2. Summary of Project Objectives, Outputs and Components.....	12
2.1 Project Objective	12
2.2 Project Components	12
3. Evaluation Methodology.....	13
3.1 Objectives of the Evaluation	13
3.2 Methodology and Approach	14
4. Findings of the Evaluation	16
4.1 Analysis of the Design of the Project	16
4.2 Efficiency.....	21
4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation	26
4.4 Effectiveness and Impact.....	26
4.5 Relevance and Coherence	42
4.6 Voucher/Cash Transfer Approach.....	44
5. Sustainability.....	51
6. Crosscutting Issues.....	52
7. Lessons Learned	53
8. Conclusions.....	54
9. Recommendations.....	55
9 Bibliography	58
10. Appendices.....	60
Appendix 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR)	60
Appendix 2: Sample Data Collection Instruments	66
Appendix 3: People and Institutions Contacted/Interviewed	71

LIST OF TABLES

Table 0-1 implementing agencies by woreda and project component	12
Table 2-1 summary of project components and activities	13
Table 4-1 Proportion of Direct Costs (in usd): Planned Vs Actual Expenditure	24
Table 4-2 Comparison of Direct Costs (Budget in usd) for Animal Health Component among Implementing Agencies	25
Table 4-3 Amount of Direct Cost per Household Unit by Implementing Agency	26
Table 4-4 Number of Beneficiaries of Crop-related Component of the Project.....	30
Table 4-5 Land Cultivated by Crop-seed Support in hectares.....	31
Table 4-6 Quantities of Maize and Forage Seed Distributed: Plan Vs Actual	31
Table 4-7 Number of Beneficiaries of Farm hand-tools.....	32
Table 4-8 Major Sources of Food before and after the Intervention	34
Table 4-9 Number of Disease Related Livestock Deaths per HH Before and After Intervention, (N=145).....	35
Table 4-10 Number of Disease Related Deaths in Milking Animals per hh Before and After Intervention, (N=145).....	35

Table 4-11 Maize Harvested from Seed Support (Kg).....	38
Table 4-12 Benefits of the LBFERP as Perceived by Beneficiaries	39
Table 4-13 Summary of Trainings Planned and Delivered by Implementing Agencies	41
Table 4-14 Possible advantages and disadvantages of cash transfer schemes	45
Table 4-15 comparison of Features of the Vouchers used by Implementing Agencies.....	48
Table 4-16 Responses to Voucher Related Questions of HH Survey, by Woreda.....	50
Table 4-17 Summaries of Strengths and Weaknesses of Voucher Approach in LBFERP	50

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: FGD with community leaders and elders (Deho kebele, awash fentale woreda).....	28
Figure 2: irrigation canal maintenance by community labour (assayita woreda)	33
Figure 3: mean disease related livestock deaths: before & after intervention (ci=95%)	36
Figure 4: mean daily milk production in hh before & after intervention by woreda	37
Figure 5: denominations of vouchers used by care-ethiopia for veterinary service provision (LBFERP)	46
Figure 6: cahw DAILY REPORT format (care ethiopia, lbferp).....	47
Figure 7: fgd with women's only group (assayita woreda)	53

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AHA	Animal Health Assistant
AHT	Animal Health Technician
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
APMP	Afar Prosopis Management Project
ARLBFERP	Afar Region Livelihood Based Flood Emergency Response Project
CAHWs	Community Animal Health Workers
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CBO	Community Based Organization
CBPP	Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia
CCPP	Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia
CDC	Community Development Community
DA	Development Agent
DPPFSB	Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Food Security Bureau
DRC	Disaster Response Committee
FAO	Food & Agricultural Organization
FARM-Africa	Food & Agricultural Research Management-Africa
FDG	Focus Group Discussion
FERP	Flood Emergency Response Project
GTP	Growth & Transformation Plan
HHS	House Hold Survey
HIV	Human Immune Deficiency Virus
HRF	Humanitarian Relief Fund
IP	Implementing Partners
KII	Key Informant Interview
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guideline and Standards
LS	Livestock
LSD	Lumpy Skin Disease
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MWARC	Melke Werer Agricultural Research Centre
NCE	No Cost Extension
NGO	Non Government Organization
PARDB	Pastoral Agriculture and Rural Development Bureau
PARDO	Pastoral Agriculture and Rural Development Office
PAs	Pastoral Associations
PCU	Pastoral Coordination Unit
PLI	Pastoral Livelihood Initiative
PPR	Peste des Petits Ruminantus
SCUK	Save the Children United Kingdom
Shoat	Sheep and Goat
SMART	Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound
TOT	Training of Trainers
TVET	Technical & Vocational Education and Training
UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Livelihood-based Flood Emergency Response Project (LBFERP) which was implemented in six woredas of Afar Regional State was a response to the 2010 floods that have caused serious and widespread damages and distress to pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in terms of: loss of livestock, inundated standing crop fields, damage to infrastructures (such as roads, bridges, irrigation systems, dwellings) in Mille, Dubti, Adaar, Ayssaita, Amibara, Gewane, Awash Fentale, Dallol, Teru and Telalak woredas. The impacts of the flood affected the livelihoods of an estimated 67,000 people in 46 kebeles¹.

Following a joint assessment and problem analysis, the LBFERP was designed through a participatory approach (involving intended project beneficiaries, woreda and regional government bodies, donors and three international NGOs (namely: Save the Children-UK, CARE and FARM Africa)). FAO was involved at the planning stage of the project, but it later withdrew before implementation started. The project's main objective was protecting the livelihood assets and speed up the recovery of 35,275 flood affected vulnerable pastoral and agro-pastoral households in six of the affected woredas, namely, Mille, Ayssaita, Amibara, Buremudaitu, Gewane, and Awash Fentale woredas, through livestock and crop related interventions.

The LBFERP was funded by UN-OCHA (HRF), which allocated total budget of 1,224,385.80 USD; the planned project period was six months (from mid October to mid April, 2011); however a no-cost extension was made twice to compensate for delays at project start-up time (first up to June 30 for all woredas, and next up to Aug 20, 2011 for Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas).

At the end of the project, the three implementing agencies floated a bid to conduct a joint evaluation. ABCON Plc. Was awarded the job. The objectives of this evaluation are, therefore, to assess the effectiveness, relevance, and impact of the LBFERP; to document lessons learned across the three implementing agencies; to document experiences gained in implementing the voucher transfer approach for the first time in the project area; to draw conclusions and forward recommendations for future programming.

The methodology employed for the evaluation was a participatory one; and data was collected from different sources for the purposes of ensuring data validity and accuracy (triangulation). The evaluation team consulted all key stakeholders including beneficiary community members, DAs, CAHWs, woreda and regional government officials, as well as relevant staff of field- and head-offices of the implementing agencies (SC-UK, CARE and FARM Africa). In addition, the evaluation reviewed and analyzed secondary data from project proposals, monitoring & terminal reports, guidelines (LEGS, National Guideline for Livestock Emergencies in Pastoralist Areas etc.), previous assessments, surveys and other relevant documents. A household survey was also conducted covering 180 HHs in three sampled woredas (Awash Fentale, Buremudaitu and Assayita). Focus Group Discussions comprising a total of 112 beneficiaries (Women's only groups, Mixed groups, and Community/clan leaders' groups) were conducted in 9 kebeles, and a total of 35 key informants from local government offices, implementing agencies and other stakeholders were interviewed through semi-structured questionnaires.

Summary of Findings of the Evaluation

Design Issues: Emergency responses need to take into account the livelihoods of the affected populations – not just 'saving human lives' but also protecting and strengthening livelihoods – because this approach not only helps the immediate recovery of those affected by an emergency, but also can increase their long-term resilience and reduce their vulnerability to future shocks and disasters. Food aid alone will neither protect livestock assets in the event of a flood-triggered livestock disease outbreak, nor does it enable agro-pastoralists to plant their fields following crop damage. Therefore, the livelihoods-based response (rather than food-aid) and, considering the Afar region's livelihoods context, the greater emphasis given to the livestock-related component was appropriate.

On the other hand, despite the commendable initial successes in jointly designing the LBFERP which offers many advantages, the failure to fill the void left by FAO's unfortunate withdrawal before implementation started was the one major issue of the design. Consequently, there was an obvious need for redesigning the initial project plan in many ways than one (e.g. in terms of coverage and beneficiary targeting, prioritizing components, revising the initially expected project results and their indicators, etc.). In light of the original spirit of the design which, apparently, was intended to cause the optimum impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries by taking advantage of the 'complementary' nature of the different

¹ (Save the Children - UK, 2010) Terms of Reference, Evaluation of LBFERP in Afar

components of the intervention, failure to address the issue of redesigning and/or revising the original project plan is considered a weakness in project design.

There were also some issues with regard to budget allocation that might have been overlooked during project design. In this respect, for instance, FARM Africa's planned-budget for hand-tools' procurement (66,720.00 USD) was significantly higher than that allocated by SC-UK's (8,731.00 USD); and this is despite the significantly smaller number of beneficiary HHs targeted by FARM Africa (1,668 HHs) than those targeted by SC-UK (3,000 HHs).

Efficiency: In the initial stages of the project, implementation efficiency was challenged by different factors, mainly the long processes in proposal development and approval procedures, delayed procurement of project inputs and deployment of technical staff to the respective project sites.

From the time the floods occurred, it took about six months to complete the official processes/paper works before actual implementation of the project finally began in February 2011. On top of this, other activities (procurement of project inputs – relief items, staff deployment, voucher printing etc.) had to be completed before the intended support reached the flood affected communities. Therefore, in spite of the benefits derived from the different components of the project, for the actual beneficiaries, the timeliness of the intervention was questionable as it reached them at a time when all the effects of the flood were fading and another hazard (drought) was looming in the project area (a delay of 6 – 10 months

However, if the efficiency of LBFERP is disaggregated into the two periods, i.e., pre-implementation versus during implementation periods, another picture emerges – a delayed and slow start-up (pre-implementation) followed by a speedy and counterbalancing efficiency (during implementation).

The level of coordination among the implementing agencies was generally good during the initial stages of project start-up, but this cooperation seemed to have waned during the later stages of the project. For instance, the implementing agencies missed an opportunity which could have been exploited to foster inter-agency cooperation and collaboration and to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the project. A case in point is the voucher transfer approach. Notwithstanding the challenges that may have to do with agency-specific modes of operation, the service provision through the voucher approach could have been better coordinated, made more economical (in terms of, among other things, reducing design and printing costs, improving quality of service, saving time, avoiding duplication of efforts, etc.), thereby creating better chances of improved levels of successes (in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and impact).

Cost-wise, in view of its coverage and the final results achieved, the LBFERP project was generally cost efficient in economically converting available resources to intended results. In terms of plan versus accomplishment, after the intervention, a total of 31,419 households (89.07% of the target) were reported to have benefited from the project. The project utilized 88.32 % of the planned overall project budget. When costs are broken down in terms of cost-per-household the planned average cost per HH was 34.71 USD; and at the end of the project the actual average costs per HH amounted to 36.01 USD per HH (i.e. the project managed to deliver the services at a slightly higher cost per HH than planned). Again, assuming that the average household size in the project area to be 5 (CSA, 2007), the project's total cost per-person was about 6.88 USD (the planned cost was 6.94 USD/person). On the other hand, if we consider direct-costs only, while the planned average direct cost per household was 22.24 USD, the actual average direct cost per household was estimated at 21.27 USD (i.e. 95.66 % is accomplished). Therefore, in terms of budget utilization, it can be said that the project has generally been cost efficient.

Effectiveness:

Livestock related component:

The provision of veterinary services is considered the most important subcomponent of the livestock-related interventions that was designed to protect the livelihoods of the flood-affected HHs targeted by the LBFERP. As livestock is the main stay of the communities in the project area, the intervention had a significant contribution in terms of reducing their vulnerability through protecting (and thereby help rebuilding) their assets.

While the project is considered generally successful, the effectiveness of the veterinary services sub-component was particularly impressive. The number of disease-related livestock deaths has significantly reduced, livestock productivity has improved (increased milk production and consumption at HH level), and the looming danger of the occurrence of a

widespread disease outbreak (which, otherwise, were highly probable as it has been the case in similar situations) have been averted.

During the project period, all three agencies followed similar approaches in implementing the veterinary service provision. The major activities performed in all project woredas were: i) Provision of voucher based treatments against endo-parasites, ecto-parasites and other infectious livestock diseases; ii) Provision of vaccination against PPR, CCPP, LSD and blackleg, including ring-vaccination at possible sites of anthrax outbreak in adjacent woredas; and iii) Support to public sector veterinary functions through capacity building measures (provision of various types of trainings, supply of veterinary drugs).

The project targeted 35, 275 households (of which 30% were to be female headed HHs) and a total of 711,661 heads of livestock (Cattle - 212,818, Shoats - 410,419 and Camels - 88,424). During project implementation, a total of 31,419 households (89.07% of the targeted, and 28.62% are female headed) benefited from the animal health support; and a total of 705,513 heads of livestock (99.14% of the targeted) were vaccinated and/or treated (which, when disaggregated by species, constitute: 205,975 Cattle, 390,496 Shoats, and 109,042 Camels).

However, there were variations (both in the type and level of coverage) among the implementing agencies during their implementation of the veterinary services that were planned to be provided in the targeted project woredas. For example, while all types of vaccinations and treatments planned by the project were provided in Awash Fentale, Gewane, Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas, the level of performance in covering targeted number of livestock was lower in the later two woredas. On the other hand, vaccination was provided only against Pasterullosis in Mille woreda, and this was provided only for sheep and goats. Again, in Assayita woreda, the only vaccination service provided was against Blackleg, and this was only for cattle.

Crop-related component

The 2010 flood had inundated standing crops belonging to agro-pastoralists residing in the project area; it had also damaged their irrigation infrastructure. Therefore, to help protect the livelihoods of the affected agro-pastoralists, the LBFERP included a crop-related component as a proper response.

This component was implemented only in four woredas - Amibara, Buremudaitu (by FARM Africa), and Assayita and Mille woredas (by SC-UK); with the envisaged result being: agro-pastoral households whose standing crops and properties devastated by flood resume growing crops through maintenance of water canals, provision of improved seeds (mainly maize) and farm tools. The project's plan indicates that 2344 hectares of land will be planted to crops from seeds provided by the project, and that 4668 agro-pastoralist HHs (of which 30% were to be female headed) will benefit from this component.

Targeted HHs in all the four woredas received crop seeds (mainly maize) and farm tools (hoe, pitch fork, machete and shovel). However, in Assayita and Mille woredas, in addition to the above supports, the support included maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and provision of forage-seed for livestock. At project level, 4451 HHs (95.4% of the total targeted HHs by this component) benefited from the crop-related component, of which about 25.3% were female headed.

However, there were variations among the four woredas in terms of both the type and the level of support provided (i.e. planned versus actual). While, in Assayita and Mille, only 450 Quintals of local maize seed were distributed to 2783 HHs (92.8% of the targeted), the coverage was much better in Amibara and Buremudaitu – 98 Quintals of improved maize seeds were distributed to 100% of the targeted 1668 HHs. Moreover, as a result of shortage of the improved variety of maize at the time, while SC-UK decided to purchase and distribute the local variety of maize seed (for fear of missing the cropping season), FARM Africa insisted on getting the improved seed, and because of this decision, provision of seed support was much delayed – nearly 10 months had to elapse (since the floods) before beneficiaries in Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas could get the improved seed support. Because of the frustration that arose due to this delay, the Woreda Administration suspended the project office for about two weeks.

Regarding provision of farm hand tools, while FARM Africa distributed (as planned) a set of 6 hand tools each to all of the 1668 targeted HHs, SC-UK barely managed to distribute 2 to 3 tools to 1212 HHs (only 40.4% of the targeted). The low

performance by SC-UK regarding farm tools was reported to be due to shortage of funds; however, it could also be attributed to lack of proper budget allocation at the planning stage.

As part of the crop-related component of the project, irrigation canal maintenance was done by SC-UK; a 2.8 Km long irrigation canal was de-silted in Mille, and a 2 km long bush was cleared through (cash-for-work) community labour. However, SC-UK's project office faced serious challenges when it first attempted to accomplish the irrigation canal maintenance work. It starts with the issue of budget allocation, at the planning stage, for the proposed maintenance work. In the project plan, a lump sum of 75,000 USDs was allocated, without any specifications regarding the quality (and quantity) of the maintenance work to be implemented. As such, the project office's several attempts to solicit providers who will do the required maintenance work for the budgeted amount failed, mainly due to the high costs asked by the providers. For instance, the region's Water Resources Bureau proposed more than 5 million ETB to do the job. The issue was finally settled when the project office decided, after consultations with its head office and the woreda PARDO, that the irrigation canal maintenance work is to be done using community labour ((cash-for-work); and the de-silting of canals and bush-clearing was done by community labour. However, some key informants in Assayita told the evaluation team that there were some parts of the damaged canal that needed more technical maintenance work; and as such, water does not reach to some parts of the canals at the time.

The lesson that may be learned from this experience is that: in similar humanitarian interventions, while using community labour to do certain infrastructure works has its own merits and benefits (and may cost much less), it is also probable that the quality of the work so accomplished is compromised; this is particularly the case when the quality of inputs (materials, level of technical expertise, etc) required for the work are higher and/or more sophisticated.

Impact:

Beneficiaries of the intervention consider both the veterinary services and crop-related support of the project as the major contributors to observed improvements in their livelihoods.

Identified benefits through participatory approaches and HH survey include: improved physical conditions of their livestock, reduction in disease related livestock deaths, higher prices of livestock, increased livestock productivity (milk production and consumption), etc. Furthermore, even though the overall volume of crop production from the seed support is low, as compared to the traditionally agricultural areas, it is expected to increase owing to the fact that the tangible benefits will enhance the replication of crop cultivation not only in the intervention areas but also in adjacent woredas where irrigation is applicable.

1. INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Afar region is one of nine administrative regions of Ethiopia located within the north eastern lowlands, bordering Djibouti to the east and Eritrea to the north. The area is characterized by a harsh climate with temperatures up to 40°C, highly variable average precipitation between 5 and 600 mm annually, and recurrent droughts and floods. Most of the 1.4 million Afar people, who are the main inhabitants of the region, depend on mixed stocks of camels, cattle, sheep and goats (CSA, 2007). Afar is a marginal crop producing region, depending more on pastoralism than crop production. The population mainly depends on sales of animals to highlanders for the funds to buy grain and pulses. The major crops grown in this region are maize, sorghum and *teff*, which are also grown in some parts of the region, planted during the cropping season that begins in July under both rain-fed conditions and with supplementary irrigation.

FLOOD HAZARDS IN AFAR REGION

In recent years, flood hazards in Ethiopia have become more frequent and of increasing severity. For instance, floods in 2006 have battered huge portions of eastern, southern and northern Ethiopia. Floods that have also occurred in 2007 and 2008 have caused huge havoc on the livelihoods of many rural people. Recently, repeated flash floods in the northern and eastern parts of Ethiopia have led to the loss of many lives and the destruction of household property and environmental resources.

The flood hazards in Afar are the combined result of its topography, land cover, runoff from highland and intensive torrential rainfall conditions. Generally, the increase in the destructive nature of floods in the Afar Region can be partly attributed to climate change/variability and unsustainable practices from increased population (livestock and human) pressures on the environment. The vulnerability of the population living along the Awash River and in the marshlands has also been exacerbated due to seemingly inappropriate settlement patterns in these flood prone areas in recent years. During the dry season the riverside areas are the only places with grazing land and are essential for the survival of humans and livestock.

In August and September 2010, high rainfall over the Awash catchment and the Amhara and Afar regions has led to flash flooding which has washed away bridges, residential places, destroyed crop fields, killed animals, destroyed schools (example Galifage School) and displaced people².

In response to the flood damages in August of 2010, and following a joint emergency needs assessment, the “Livelihoods-based Flood Emergency Response Project in Afar Regional State” (LBFERP) was initiated to implement a number of emergency interventions that ultimately aimed to saving livelihoods in the short term and strengthening the capacities of the community with regard to flood mitigation in the longer term. The LBFERP was implemented jointly by three international NGOs namely, CARE Ethiopia, Save the Children – UK and FARM Africa, and was funded by the UN HRF. The intervention was implemented in six woredas of the Afar Regional State: in Awash Fentale & Gewane woredas by CARE Ethiopia, in Assayita & Mille by SC-UK and in Amibara & Buremudaitu by FARM Africa.

This document is a report of the independent terminal evaluation conducted by a local consulting firm (ABCON Plc. Consulting). The specific objective of the evaluation was to assess the impact of the ALBFER Project, and the extent to which the project’s objectives and targets have been achieved. This includes an assessment of the lessons that can be drawn from the project and its implementation to serve as a guide for similar projects in the future. This report also includes sections covering the main findings including impact assessment, lessons learned and major recommendations.

² (Environmental Protection Authority, 2010)

1.2 PROJECT BACKGROUND

In Aug 2010, the extremely heavy rainfall in the highland areas coupled with significant rainfall in the low lands of Afar increased the volume of water in the perennial and seasonal rivers to Afar region from the highlands of Ethiopia. This resulted in the flooding of Mille, Dubti, Adaar, Ayssaita, Amibara, Gewane, Awash Fentale, Dallol, Teru and Telalak woredas, especially towns and villages along the riverbanks. The livelihoods of more than 67,000 people (in 46 kebeles) were affected. Although there was no report of loss of human life, there were considerable loss of livestock, damage to more than of 3,000 hectares of standing crop, and loss of other assets like shelters and home utensils (Save the Children - UK, 2010).

In response to the flood disaster, several preliminary assessments (both joint and agency-specific) were conducted to assess the extent of the damage caused, the threats to the livelihoods and the needs of communities in the affected woredas. The joint assessments were made with the participation of representatives of the implementing agencies, relevant bodies of the Afar regional government and other stakeholders. Accordingly, among the needs identified were: livestock feed, animal health, crops seeds, WASH and rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure. Experience also shows that the likelihood of the occurrence of water- and soil-borne livestock diseases is higher in flood-affected areas, causing deaths and loss of assets, and thus undermining the resilience of the inhabitants.

Following the needs assessment, a project, called the *“Livelihood-based Flood Emergency Response in Afar Regional State”* (LBFERP), was designed jointly by Save the Children UK - Ethiopia, Farm Africa, CARE Ethiopia, and FAO (though FAO later withdrew before implementation started). According to the project’s plan, the main objective of the project was *“to protect the livelihood assets and speed up recovery of the flood affected vulnerable pastoral and agro-pastoral households through livestock and crop related interventions”*.

The project planned to provide the support through a number of sub-components that are designed to be livelihoods based, and to be complementary in nature. The livestock related component aimed to restore household milk production through provision of veterinary services (vaccination and treatment), forage seed (feed) support and rehabilitation of water points; whereas the crop-related component aimed at enabling affected agro-pastoralists to resume crop production through the provision of improved crop seeds, farm hand-tools and maintenance of irrigation canals. Capacity building measures: trainings in flood mitigation, crop management, etc for beneficiary HHs; trainings in basic animal health for Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs); and other trainings such as LEGS for woreda government staff, etc were also part of the planned project activities.

A total of 35,275 pastoral and agro-pastoral households were targeted to benefit from the project; and the intervention was implemented in six woredas of the Afar Regional State: in Awash Fentale & Gewane woredas by CARE Ethiopia; in Assayita & Mille by SC-UK; and in Amibara & Buremudaitu by FARM Africa. Originally, it was planned that two collaborating agencies may provide assistance to flood affected communities but on separate interventions. For instance, in Awash-Fentale, Amibara, Gewane, and Buremodayitu woredas FAO was to be responsible for the livestock feed intervention while FARM Africa and CARE intervene on animal health needs. However, after FAO’s withdrawal, the Afar LBFERP was implemented by the three remaining NGOs. The project was funded by UNOCHA-HRF, which allocated a total budget of 1,224,385.80 USD, and the planned project period was six months (from mid October to mid April, 2011); however a no-cost extension was made twice to compensate for delays at project start-up time (first up to June 30 for all woredas, and next up to Aug 20, 2011 for Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas). The project was the first of its kind in the project area in that it employed the voucher-transfer approach for the animal health sub-component, which is increasingly being used as an alternative and viable approach in similar emergency situations.

Apart from the three agencies involved in LBFERP in Afar, other humanitarian organizations which were actively involved in the response jointly with the regional government are Project Concern International /PCI/ (in Mille, Ayssaita, Afambo and

Dubti), APDA (Gewane and Buremodaytu), MSF-Spain (in Dubti and Aysaita) and World Vision (part of Aysaita and Afambo)³.

TABLE 0-1 IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES BY WOREDA AND PROJECT COMPONENT

Agency	No. of Woredas	List of Intervention Woredas	Intervention Type	Remark
CARE Ethiopia	2	Awash Fentale, Gewane	Animal Health	
FARM Africa	2	Amibara, Buremodaitu	Animal Health, crop-related	
Save the Children - UK	2	Assayita, Mille	Animal Health, crop-related	
FAO	16	Awash-Fentale, Amibara, Buremodaiyitu, Gewane, Dubti, Ada'ar, Dewe, Telalak, Dalifage, Awra, Teru, Koneba, Megale, Berhale, Afdera, Abala	Animal health, Feed, Crops, Water Dev.	FAO withdrew before project implementation started

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES, OUTPUTS AND COMPONENTS

2.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The overall goal of the LBFERP in Afar is to *“Protect the livelihood assets and speed up recovery of flood affected vulnerable pastoral and agro-pastoral households through livestock and crop related interventions”*.

Furthermore, the project aimed to achieve four measurable outcomes/results (as stated in the project’s log-frame), which are

1. Lactating cattle and shoats belonging to the most vulnerable flood victims kept alive and produce milk through complementary animal health supports
2. Morbidity and mortality of livestock in flood affected areas reduced through provision of curative and prophylactic treatments
3. ⁴Acute water shortage in areas severely hit with flood reduced through rehabilitation of water points
4. Agro-pastoral households whose standing crops and properties devastated by flood resume growing crops through maintenance of water canals and provision of seeds and farm tools

The project aimed to impact the livelihoods of the beneficiaries in that the assets of the most vulnerable pastoral and agro-pastoral households are protected; nutrition of children, women, the sick and the elderly are improved through increased availability of milk and capacities of local institutions (government/CBOs) are improved to respond to livestock disease outbreaks and related crises.

2.2 PROJECT COMPONENTS

The components of the LBFERP were designed in such a way that they are complementary in nature. The main components of the intervention were livestock-related and crop-related, together with a capacity building measures to help ensure sustainability. The different subcomponents are summarized in the following table (Table 2.1)

³ (Afar National Regional State, 2011)

⁴ This result is stated in the HRF plan, but not in the agreements signed between agencies and regional PARDB & DPFSB

TABLE 2-1 SUMMARY OF PROJECT COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES

Major Components	Subcomponents	Specific services	Remarks
Livestock related	Livestock Feed	Provision of MNBs	Later dropped after a reassessment of needs
		Provision of fast growing forage seed	
	Animal health	Vaccinations against Anthrax, PPR and CCPP	
		Primary clinical veterinary treatment service against infectious diseases and parasites	
	Water points rehabilitation		Later dropped after FAO's withdrawal
	Capacity building	Trainings on :Early warning and flood mitigation; LEGS; Refresher training on basic animal health for CAHWs	
Crop Related	Crop seed provision	Improved seed provision (mainly maize)	
	Farm hand tools provision	hoe, pitch fork, machete, shovel	
	Irrigation canal maintenance	Canal maintenance	
	Capacity building	Trainings on Crop management; Early warning and flood mitigation	

3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

3.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

the overall purpose of the terminal evaluation (as stated in the terms of reference (ToR) for this evaluation) is to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, and impact of the Livelihoods-based Flood Emergency Response project which was implemented by the three implementing agencies (SC-UK, CARE and FARM Africa) in the six woredas (Assaita, Mille, Awash-Fentale, Gewane, Amibara and Buremodaitu) of Afar National Regional State.

The specific purposes of this terminal evaluation are:

- To conduct a joint final evaluation of the Livelihood-based Flood Emergency Interventions in Afar Region, implemented by CARE, FARM-Africa and SCUK;
- To document lessons learned across agencies, assess the project implementation modalities, relevance and identify areas to scale up for future programming;
- To assess the intervention's achievements against planned objectives and document the impact of the interventions;
- To assess and document the experience of voucher based approach (cash transfer) employed during implementation, as well as assessing the strengths, limitations and opportunities of the voucher approach and document lessons from this approach for future implementation;
- To make specific conclusions and recommendations to inform future programming.

Therefore, inline with the ToR, the assessment was done by focusing on the project design, efficiency, effectiveness, relevance & coherence of the project, as well as a SWOT analysis of the voucher approach.

3.2 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The assessment of the LBFERP began with two consultative meetings made with representatives of the three implementing agencies (CARE Ethiopia, FARM Africa and SC-UK); the outputs of which were the fine-tuning of data collection tools and field guidance notes.

The methodology employed for the evaluation was a participatory one; and both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from different sources for the purposes of ensuring data validity and accuracy (triangulation) households. The evaluation team consulted all key stakeholders including beneficiary community members, DAs, CAHWs, woreda and regional government officials, as well as relevant staff of field- and head-offices of the implementing agencies (SC-UK, CARE and FARM Africa). In addition, the evaluation reviewed and analyzed secondary data from project proposals, monitoring & terminal reports, guidelines (LEGS, National Guideline for Livestock Emergencies in Pastoralist Areas etc.), previous assessments, surveys and other relevant documents. A household survey was also conducted covering 180 HHs in three sampled woredas (Awash Fentale, Buremudaitu and Assayita). Focus Group Discussions comprising a total of 112 beneficiaries (Women's only groups, Mixed groups, and Community/clan leaders' groups) were conducted in 9 kebeles, and a total of 35 key informants from local government offices, implementing agencies and other stakeholders were interviewed through semi-structured questionnaires. Finally, data collected using different tools and from all sources were analyzed and the findings are used to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

The evaluation also assessed compliance of the project to the minimum standards as stipulated in the (LEGS, 2009) document, and gave due emphasis to the issues of participation, initial assessment, response and coordination, targeting, monitoring and evaluation and livelihoods impact.

Specifically, data and information that contributed to the evaluation were obtained as follows:

Sampling: In order to get a sample that could best represent beneficiaries of the LBFERP, a multistage stratified sampling method was adopted. At the first stage three woredas (out of the six) were sampled purposively (Awash Fentale, Buremudaitu and Assayita) as these can adequately represent almost all the livelihood zones in which the six project woredas are found. Moreover, each of the three implementing agencies have long been operating in these woredas (CARE Ethiopia in Awash Fentale, FARM Africa in Buremudaitu, and SC-UK in Assayita) and their field staff could assist in kebele selection and facilitation of interviews and focus group discussions.

At the second stage, 10 kebeles were selected purposively from the three woredas. The kebeles were selected in consultation with project focal persons of the implementing agencies and woreda PARDO officials based on their representativeness of all targeted kebeles and their accessibility at the time of the evaluation.

At third and final stage, using beneficiary lists of the implementing agencies as sampling frames, a total of 180 households (29% of which are Female headed HHs) were randomly selected from 10 kebeles of the three sampled woredas. The number of households selected from each woreda was made to be proportional to the number of targeted beneficiary HHs in the woreda. Even though a sample size of 180 households may not (and was not intended to) be statistically representative of all the beneficiaries from all the project woredas, it was agreed beforehand that it will serve the purpose of the evaluation.

Data Collection Methods: In order to collect and analyse as much relevant primary and secondary data and additional information from as many sources as possible, and to ensure accurate and comprehensive collection of the necessary primary data, the following data collection methods were used⁵:

⁵ Prior to the start of data collection, the data collection tools were discussed with the implementing agencies to ensure the incorporation of their comments and suggested modifications. Copies of these tools are included in Appendix 2 of this report.

- 1) *Document Review*: This entailed a critical review and analysis of data and information on the project, including: project proposals (plans), final reports, quarter/annual reports, day to day activity reports and formats, LEGS, the National guidelines on livestock emergency responses and other relevant documents that could make the evaluation representative;
- 2) *Household Survey*: A structured questionnaire consisting of three parts a) questions for all sampled beneficiary HHs, b) questions related to animal health intervention and c) questions related to crop-related intervention. The questions were developed based substantially on the intermediate result indicators stated in the log-frame of the LBFERP
- 3) *Focus Group Discussions*: Checklists were used to conduct FGDs in 9 kebeles selected from the sample woredas (3 from each). Selection of Kebeles for the purpose of the focused group discussion took into account their accessibility and the differences in the intervention's components. These FGDs involved three types of groupings based on the group's compositions: namely: Group 1) mixed (men and women beneficiaries); Group 2) women only; and Group 3) village elders and community leaders. Discussions with all three types of groups were held in each sample woreda to ensure thorough coverage of all issues related to the main project outcomes.
- 4) *Key Informant Interviews*: Checklist and semi-structured questionnaires were used In order to gather the views and opinions of all key stakeholders about the planning, implementation and impact/effectiveness of the project. As such, Meetings and discussions with relevant SC-UK, CARE Ethiopia and FARM Africa staff both in Addis Ababa, and the project sites were held. KIIs were also held with the relevant Woreda PARDO heads/representatives, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Desk officials, woreda Administration, regional PARDB & DPFSB officials; Key community informants including members of various Community Development Committees (CDCs), DAs, AHT/AHAs, CAHWs, woreda veterinary practitioners, Kebele chairpersons, local men and women were also interviewed.

Field Work: Field work was conducted in October 2011. After the initial preparatory stages, the core evaluation team was divided into two groups to conduct the field work, and each group covered all the thematic issues of the evaluation in the specific woreda it was assigned to. While the two teams conducted the field assessment in the project area, a central information management group conducted desk review of the secondary data, and started processing the incoming field data. A joint one-day field visit by the core evaluation team to some sample kebeles provided useful insights to each member of the evaluation team about the approach and field methodology to be adopted for successfully carrying out the survey.

Training of Survey Enumerators/Assistants: A total of 15 Enumerators and assistants, and 3 supervisors were selected from all woredas for the HH survey. The assistants were involved in similar HH surveys before. The enumerators and assistants were then given a half-day (intensive) training. Issues discussed during the training included: purpose of the evaluation, interviewing techniques, data quality and a detailed questionnaire briefing.

Data Analysis and Triangulation: The questions in the HH survey were coded prior to data entry, filled questionnaires were checked for inconsistencies and errors before proceeding with data entry. Quantitative data was entered into a database at ABCON Head Office in Addis Ababa, and analyzed statistically using SPSS 16 statistical software. Data cleaning and exploratory analysis was done after data are entered in to the computer and before the actual data analysis exercise.

During quantitative data analysis, a number of standard descriptive and analytic methods were employed to discover the changes in livelihoods of the beneficiaries with respect to the indicators measured. Methods used included 1) Simple Aggregation: for single variable analysis including frequencies, standard deviations, averages and percentage distributions, 2) Examination of differences to identify whether there are significant differences between or among two or more variables and to compare before and after intervention scenarios. In this regard, use is made of parametric methods whenever possible, and non-parametric methods whenever there were concerns about violation of method-assumptions; and 3) Measures of Association (cross-tabulations with Chi-Square tests) were used to determine statistically whether there exists association between variables.

On the other hand, methods used for analysis of qualitative data include: 1) Situation analysis - to have an understanding of the whole picture of the intervention including what happened in the project areas, how stakeholders have perceived the intervention, and in what situation specific activities or events were implemented; and 2) Classification and examination of relationships were done to logically classify qualitative information obtained from different sources according to issues of processes and effects of the intervention.

The evaluation team also carried out multiple triangulations throughout the entire process of the evaluation. Comparison of data between sources including HHs surveys, FGDs, interviews with key informants, and secondary data helped to improve the quality (validity and reliability) of information obtained by the evaluation team, while the use of checklists on key evaluation issues helped to improve the process of information gathering.

Challenges of the Evaluation; Limitations: The evaluation team faced some challenges both at the beginning of the evaluation and during field work which made the evaluation work somewhat difficult. The most notable ones are discussed below.

Lack of Adequate Monitoring and Evaluation Plans and Baseline Data: It is often difficult to assess the impact on people's livelihoods of many emergency responses. One reason for this is that the M&E part of emergency relief projects is often not fully considered during project design, poorly implemented or not properly funded. Apart from lack of baseline data, one of the major constraints the evaluation team faced was that, although all implementing agencies had formats for collecting monitoring data on many of the planned outputs, these were *not* designed for monitoring *results/outcomes* (as opposed to activities and outputs). Moreover, several of the formats used by the implementing agencies differ from one to the other. This made it difficult to collate/aggregate the data at the project level.

Possible bias in the HH Survey Data: Even though the selected enumerators are neutral to the implementing agencies, they had been recruited from the project area and most of them are Animal Health Assistants and Technicians working in government offices in the woredas (PARDOs); and these government offices were major partners with the implementing agencies, at least during the project period. It is therefore possible that several of the enumerators had been involved (either directly or indirectly) with the intervention during the implementation phase (e.g. in the vaccination campaigns and veterinary service provisions by the implementing agencies). As such, the enumerators may have some degree of direct interest in the outcomes of the evaluation.

4. FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the data and information obtained through a combination of methods which include review of literature and secondary data, key informant interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD's), direct observations in project areas, interviews with project managers, staff and beneficiaries together with woreda and regional government officials. The evaluation also used the minimum standards stipulated in the National and LEGS guidelines as a basis to assess the project's conformity with acceptable standards of emergency aid (involving livestock related components). As such, due attention is paid to the issues of participation, initial assessment, response and coordination, targeting, monitoring, and evaluation of livelihoods impact.

The various findings of the evaluation are discussed in the different sections below (classified on the basis of the areas of focus as outlined in the ToR for the evaluation), namely: project design, efficiency, effectiveness/impact, relevance and coherence, coverage and the voucher transfer approach.

4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN OF THE PROJECT

RATIONALE OF THE PROJECT: WHY A LIVELIHOOD BASED EMERGENCY RESPONSE?

There is growing understanding that non-food responses are usually the most effective way of protecting livelihoods in the event of shocks. Food aid will not protect livestock assets in the event of a flood-triggered livestock disease outbreak nor does it enable agro-pastoralists to plant their fields following damages to crops. As documented in LEGS, there is increasing recognition that emergency responses need to take into account the livelihoods of the affected populations – not just ‘saving human lives’ but also protecting and strengthening livelihoods. This not only helps the immediate recovery of those affected by an emergency, but can also increase their long-term resilience and reduce their vulnerability to future shocks and disasters. Taking a livelihoods approach to emergency response also helps to harmonize relief and development initiatives, which historically have been mutually separate and at times contradictory. It is now acknowledged that some emergency responses have saved lives in the short term but have failed to protect, and at times have even destroyed, local livelihood strategies, undermined existing development initiatives, and had a negative impact on local service provision. Whilst it is recognized that development can also have negative impacts, and that there may be benefits in some cases in maintaining a level of independence between emergency and development responses, it is nonetheless important that relief efforts understand and take into account local development activities, particularly those that aim to strengthen local livelihoods.

Many woredas in the Afar Region went through major hazards from floods originating from the overflow of the Awash River and its tributaries. The different needs assessments conducted following the 2010 floods made it clear that a proper response, which includes veterinary services, seed provision and water and sanitation interventions would be required in order to save lives and livelihoods. The veterinary intervention was very essential for the livestock based pastoral economy, and the need to provide improved seeds was seen as one of the priorities for the emergency response for the agro-pastoralists who depend, partially, on agriculture as a means of their livelihoods.

It was on the basis of this rationale that the implementing agencies jointly designed a response that is a livelihoods-based one and, therefore, comprised of components relevant to the livelihoods of the affected communities (livestock-related and crop-related).

Finally, while the rationales for similar emergency responses may be well-justified, the assumptions that sometimes underlie such responses – that emergency responses will ensure viable livelihoods, remain controversial. Repeated and multiple hazards (flood, drought and conflict in the Afar case) increase the costs of recovery, leading to diversion of development budgets to emergency responses and ultimately resulting in inefficient growth. Appropriate emergency responses should generally be seen as *necessary but not sufficient* conditions for maintaining or enhancing livelihoods.

GEOGRAPHIC AND BENEFICIARY TARGETING

From the outset, the processes that led to the design and implementation of the Afar LBFERP signalled that the processes adopted would adhere to the minimum common standards (LEGS, 2009) required of similar emergency responses; that prior to such responses, initial assessments that provide “... an analysis of the nature and extent of the emergency and an appraisal of appropriate interventions...” should be conducted (LEGS, Common Standard 2). Specifically, a series of joint and agency-specific field assessment missions, which took place in August and September 2010, were conducted with the involvement of key stakeholders including: Afar Disaster Prevention and Food Security Bureau, Afar Pastoral, Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau, Afar Water Resources Bureau, FAO, CARE, SC-UK and Farm Africa.

Geographic Targeting: The region’s Emergency and Response Plan (Afar DPFSB, Feb 2011 - Jan 2012) identified Mille, Dubti, Aysayta, Afambo, Abala, Dallol, Gewane, Buremudaytu, Amibara, Dulecha, Awashfentale, Teru, Gulina and Yallo as potentially flood affected woredas. Recurrent shocks forced poor people living in these areas to descend into chronic food insecurity, and the 2010 flood aggravated the situation. Moreover, the six woredas targeted by the LBFERP (namely: Mille, Aysayta, Gewane, Amibara, Buremudaytu and Awash Fentale) were continuously affected by flood in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010.

Moreover, from the operational point of view, at the time of disaster the three implementing agencies (CARE, SC-UK, and FARM-Africa) had ongoing projects/programs in the target (or adjacent) woredas and hence were very much familiar with existing conditions in the disaster area, each agency had their own respective and already established field offices that could provide the initial basic human and logistical resources required to launch the envisaged emergency response.

In light of these assessments and conditions, the geographic targeting of the LBFERP could not have been more appropriate.

Beneficiary Targeting: All three implementing agencies followed similar approaches and processes to identify target beneficiary households and intervention kebeles. The evaluation team also confirmed that, in almost all sampled Kebeles, the criteria and methods of selection of beneficiary households adopted by all implementing agencies generally adhered to the standard guidelines and procedures stipulated in the LEGS and National guidelines for livestock relief interventions in pastoral areas of Ethiopia.

The already established Community Development Committees (CDCs) along with woreda government officials identified target beneficiaries with the support of the implementing agencies. In places where such CDCs did not exist, other committees called Flood Response Committees (or FRCs) were established at Kebele levels, and these FRCs were composed of clan leaders, women and youth representatives, Kebele chairpersons, and development agents (DAs) and Animal Health Technicians/Assistants (AHTs/AHAs). These committees (CDCs and FRCs) carried out the screenings of beneficiaries based on agreed criteria which, among other things, would address issues of gender, number of children (aged less than 5), degree of flood damage sustained by the HH, and livestock and farm land ownership. In all intervention woredas, women-headed households and those HHs with chronically sick or disabled members, as well as those with small number of livestock received the top priority.

Moreover, learning from experience that establishing selection committees and agreeing on selection criteria may not be enough to ensure proper targeting, project staff of all three implementing agencies of the LBFER project were involved in the facilitation of selection of beneficiaries, and (as reported by key informants) maintained close follow-up of the selection processes.

Despite these findings, however, it is important to point out here that establishing an appeals committee (which investigates and addresses grievances and to which people can go and place their appeals) is normally one mechanism of ensuring equitable participation and adherence to agreed criteria during selection of beneficiaries of a humanitarian assistance. In this respect, the evaluation team found no evidence of the establishment/availability of such committees in all sampled kebeles. To be fair, officials from the woreda PARDO (in Awash Fentale) reported that they did not have any reported cases of grievances during their regular monitoring visits to the targeted kebeles. Moreover, in some areas (e.g. Awash Fentale), every HH in the each Kebele (regardless of their wealth status) received the veterinary support.

One other issue that may have been overlooked during the design stage of the intervention was the fact that there are practically no private veterinary service providers in the intervention areas, and the majority of pastoralists in those areas have no or little experience of paying for modern veterinary services on cash basis. Despite this fact, the LBFERP planned that poorer households would freely get the (voucher-based) veterinary services, while those households who can afford it would be made to pay for the services (though prices would be set on the basis of cost-recovery). Considering the facts on the ground, the evaluation team believes that planning to provide veterinary services on cash basis (in areas where people are not accustomed to paying for such services) is not recommended, regardless of the existence of households which can afford it.

DESIGN CHANGES

There were some incidents that ought to have necessitated revision of the original joint proposal of the LBFERP as these incidents could affect the initially intended outcomes of the project. The first incident occurred even before project implementation started – FAO withdrew from the consortium of implementing agencies after only participating in the planning stage. This may not be helped; but as a result, some components of the project were dropped (namely the water

points development and feed components) thereby affecting at least one intended outcome of the project – increased milk production⁶.

To be more specific, in their joint proposal, the consortium of implementing agencies of the LBFER project made it clear that the primary goal of the project is to protect the livelihood assets of flood affected pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and speedup their recovery through *complementary* livestock and crop related interventions. However, due to FAO's withdrawal some components of the project namely, rehabilitation of water points (in Mille, Gewane and Buremudaitu woredas) and emergency livestock feed support (in Awash Fentale, Gewane, Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas) were dropped.

Thus, given that the different components of the intervention were supposed to be complementary, there was an obvious need to redesign/revise the project so as to ensure that the stated objectives and results still remain relevant, realistic and that they actually represent the real effects of *only the remaining/active components/sub-components* of the intervention (i.e. the stated results and indicators should have been revised or scaled down to reflect the changes). However, there were no changes made either in the objective or the intended results (outcomes) of the project to account for the changed circumstances. A case in point is "increasing milk production by 50%" stated as one of targeted results in the joint proposal/plan. Alternatively, if the stated outcomes were to remain realistic, the other remaining agencies (or another body) could take up the implementation of those components dropped as a result of FAO's withdrawal. A monitoring report of the regional DPFBSB indicated that, during a field visit by a team of experts to the project area, some pastoralists in Awash Fentale raised the issue of the provision of supplementary livestock feed (hay and concentrates) in addition to the veterinary service.

In conclusion, despite the commendable efforts made in designing the appropriate response at the time of preparation of the project plan, the LBFERP did not adequately respond flexibly to changing circumstances over time. Considering the fact that pre-intervention joint assessments identified the different project components as urgent needs of the target beneficiaries, and in light of the original spirit of the project's design which, apparently, intended to cause the optimum impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries by taking advantage of the '*complementary*' nature of the different components, failure to address the issue of redesigning the joint project plan to either incorporate these components (feed and water points development) or to revise the stated outcomes to make them realistic, is considered a major downside of the project's design.

Another change to the original plan occurred during implementation. Due to several reasons (e.g. short cropping season left, and given the emergency nature of the intended support), SC-UK decided to purchase and distribute the local variety to its beneficiaries instead of the planned improved variety. This decision probably had its justifications; nevertheless, the change to local variety might have affected another outcome of the project – increasing crop productivity by 50%.

Finally, there were some discrepancies⁷ between the joint proposal sent to UN-OCHA HRF and the separate project agreement documents that each of the implementing agencies individually signed with the relevant bodies of the Afar region (ADPFBSB and APADB). As such, the evaluation team found it difficult to evaluate the achievement of originally planned results, knowing that there may have been some changes made to the plans.

ISSUES ON INDICATORS

In defining indicators for results during the planning stage of a project, good practice requires that the selected indicators should satisfy a set of criteria; that the indicators have to be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound ("S.M.A.R.T" indicators). The indicators stated in the log-frame of the LBFERP in Afar, fail short of some of these criteria. In addition, even for the relatively better indicators, the targets set seem to be quite unrealistic.

For instance, the LBFERP sets targets such as '*increasing milk production by 50%*' and '*increasing crop-productivity by 50%*' during the project period. These two targets seem a bit ambitious. On the one hand, even the rather ambitious (as seen by some) national Agricultural Growth and Transformation Plan (AGTP) predicts that, at the national level, crop-productivity

⁶ For example, the log-frame in the joint HRF proposal indicates that one of the project targets is "increasing milk production by 50%"; however, there is no such target in the project agreement signed between CARE Ethiopia and Afar PARDB/DPFSB.

⁷ Ibid.

(for cereals/maize) will increase by about 18% only in the year 2011 (Using 2009 as the base year). Given that Afar is a marginal crop producing region, planning to increase crop productivity by 50% (through only the provision of improved seed and maintenance of irrigation canals components) is quite unrealistic; not to mention that this was planned to be accomplished within such a short project period (6 – 7 months). Instead, for instance, “Increasing *total production* by 50%” would have been a better target as it may be achieved by substantially increasing the size of land to be cultivated, and even this may require more inputs than the mere availability of such cultivable land.

On the other hand, there are other indicators/targets stated in the project’s log-frame which state only the absolute numbers of targeted beneficiary HHs (or number of heads of livestock). Such indicators are considered weak in measuring changes in the livelihoods of beneficiaries because absolute numbers do not show the *proportion* (%) of HHs or livestock which were affected by the flood and are to be supported by the project. For example, one of the indicators in the log-frame states that “1210 agro-pastoral households in woredas severely hit by flood grow and use fast-growing forages”. Here, the absolute number “1210” may be small, or large for that matter, as compared to the total number of affected agro-pastoralists in the project area. A better indicator would have been, for example, “75 % of flood affected agro-pastoral households in woredas severely hit by flood will grow and use fast-growing forages during the project period”. Another example of a better indicator is: “During the project period, on average 50% of the crop land under production which has been damaged by the flood will be reinstated for enhanced crop production through improved seed provision and irrigation infrastructure maintenance”.

LINKAGE OF LBFER WITH THE WIDER REGIONAL GROWTH

LINKAGES WITH FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMS & OTHER RISK MANAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS

One of the major goals of government interventions in the region is promoting sustainable development in general, and ensuring food security in particular. It can be seen that the different components and activities included in the LBFER are in line with the objectives of the regional government’s ongoing GTP activities and those of other NGO programs in the region.

Particularly, the regional Bureau of Pastoral Agricultural and Rural Development aims at ensuring food security for the people of the region through improving the production and productivity of animals and crops, strengthening extension services, and maintaining natural resource bases. This goal has strong linkage with the outcomes of the LBFER intervention.

The regional Disaster Preparedness and Food Security Bureau identified the potentially flood affected woredas as Mille, Dubti, Aysayta, Afambo, Abala, Dallol, Gewane, Buremudaytu, Amibara, Dulecha, Awashfentale, Teru, Gulina and Yallo. The LBFER project targeted six of these woredas affected by the 2010 flood, namely: Mille, Aysayta, Gewane, Amibara, Buremudaytu and Awash Fentale. These areas were continuously affected by flood in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010.

Moreover, the Regional Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (Afar DPFSB, Feb 2011 - Jan 2012) summarizes the total net emergency sectoral requirements/appeal to amount to Birr 90,368,082.00. The contribution of LBFER to this requirement was 21,251,553.97 Birr (or 23.52% of the total required appeal amount); and this appeal period generally coincides with the time when actual implementation of the LBFER began.

ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES

The key issue here is empowering women in all perspectives. Information collected through FGDs and key informant interviews show that the LBFER project was gender sensitive throughout the stages and processes of its implementation, and has particularly addressed women's involvement in all its project activities aimed at protecting and restoring their livelihood assets. In addressing the gender issue, some of the steps taken by the project include: women’s representation in beneficiary selection committees (CDCs/ FERCs) and that about 30% of beneficiaries were female headed HHs. The project generally has contributed to minimizing social, cultural and economic barriers undermining women's life. For instance, in Assayita woreda, the forage seed that was distributed for beneficiaries has been purchased from a local Women Cooperatives, which is just another aspect of the emphasis that was given to women by the project.

However, because important activities such as ‘rehabilitation of water points’ were dropped (due to FAOs withdrawal before project implementation), the original plan of ‘reducing the workload of women’ on routine activities (e.g. caring for children, the sick, fetching water etc.) have not been adequately addressed.

In general, considering the linkages made with different development issues, and as supported by beneficiaries (during key informant interviews and FGDs), one can safely conclude that the LBFERP had direct and strong linkages to the sector, and that there was strong synergy between this project and the government's ongoing development activities.

4.2 EFFICIENCY

Efficiency describes how economically resources are converted to results. These include the institutional arrangements and collaboration mechanisms employed and how efficient were these systems in fulfilling the envisaged tasks of relevant stakeholders.

DELAYED START-UP

During the initial stages of the project, implementation efficiency was challenged by different factors including long project planning, delayed and/or lengthy procurement procedures of relief items (crop and forage seeds, agricultural hand tools, and veterinary drugs) as well as deployment of technical staff to the respective project sites.

The sequence of important events and activities that took place since the occurrence of the floods and the subsequent appeal issued by the regional government were:

- Flood occurred in August/September 2010
- Joint Assessment of damages and needs conducted (by Implementing agencies, partners & government) August-September 2010.
- Agencies developed joint project proposal (SC-UK, CARE Ethiopia, FARM Africa, FAO) – October/November 2011
- Cluster review -
- Approval and release of funds by donor (UNOCHA – HRF) – December 2011
- Agencies signed project agreement with Afar PARDB/DPFSB and familiarization workshop conducted – January/February 2011

From the time the floods occurred in (August 2010), it took about six months to complete the official processes and paper works before actual implementation of the project finally began (January 2011). On top of this, other activities had to be completed (procurement of project inputs – relief items, staff deployment, voucher printing etc.) before the intended support reached the flood affected communities, and these activities also took their own time.

According to the Afar region's monthly Food Security Update (February 2011), even seven months after the floods, those woredas affected by the heavy flooding were not assisted yet and were still suffering from lack of agricultural inputs (crop and vegetable seeds, canal rehabilitation inputs, hand tools and pesticides). The actual delivery of vaccination and treatment services (for livestock) interventions began at different times in the project woredas (CARE in February 2011, SC-UK in April 2011, FARM Africa in June, 2011) or 7 - 10 months after the occurrence of the floods.

Results of the analysis of the qualitative data collected through FGDs in 9 kebeles also showed that, given that the flood had caused serious and widespread damages on nearly all kinds of livelihood assets of the affected households and the communities in all project areas, most of the targeted beneficiaries agree that the response (LBFERP) was very much delayed. FGD participants in all the sampled woredas also said that there had been disease related livestock deaths during the time interval between the occurrence of the floods and the project start-up; and some said that they probably could have saved some of their livestock had there been such veterinary services earlier or on time.

Therefore, in spite of the benefits derived from the different components of the project, for the actual beneficiaries, the timeliness of the intervention was questionable, as it took place at a time (at least 6 months, and for some components in Amibara and Buremudaitu, up to 10 months later) when all the effects of the flood were fading and another hazard (drought) was looming in the project area.

However, if the efficiency of LBFERP is disaggregated into the two periods, i.e., pre-implementation versus during implementation periods, another picture emerges – a delayed and slow start-up (pre-implementation) followed by a speedy and counterbalancing efficiency (during implementation).

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, COORDINATION AND HARMONIZATION

The principle of participatory development requires the full involvement of the relevant stakeholders at all the stages of the intervention, which is what the LBFERP did. Involving the key stakeholders has been one of the key activities which contributed to its successful implementation. To ensure ownership of the project, the agencies adopted participatory approaches by involving all key stakeholders in the initial problem analysis, planning and implementation of the project.

COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENT BODIES

Soon after the occurrence of the 2010 floods in Afar, the regional government sent out appeals to aid organizations for support. A joint flood damage assessment was carried out with the involvement of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the flood affected areas. A series of joint and agency-specific field assessments were conducted with the involvement of Afar DPFSB, APRDB, Afar Water Resources Bureau, FAO, CARE, SC-UK, Farm Africa and other stakeholders. Then, after funds were secured from the donor (UNOCHA-HRF), all three implementing agencies signed Operational Project Agreement with the regional PARDB and DPFSB in which the roles and responsibilities of each party were defined.

Experts from the regional DPFSB Bureau paid several monitoring visits to all project woredas; and during these visits they discussed with project office staff, inspected warehouses to monitor the specifications of relief items being distributed; they also interviewed beneficiaries regarding utility of items provided by the project. Reports of the findings of these monitoring visits were compiled and disseminated to key stakeholders. The regional Agricultural Task Force (ATF), which is chaired by the regional PARDB and FAO's field office, also conducts monthly coordination meetings and these provide forums for the different partners to discuss issues related to humanitarian assistance in the region and the LBFERP in particular. The implementing agencies participated in these meetings (especially CARE).

During implementation, the levels of coordination and collaboration between implementing agencies and woreda government bodies were also very strong; and the implementing agencies did all key project activities in close collaboration with (and through) the respective woreda PARDOs in the intervention area.

However, in some occasions, the agreements signed with the region were not fully accompanied by actions, as a result of which it was not easy for the DPFSB to monitor the agreed tasks based on the time frame and the activities detailed in the implementation plan. During a key informant interview, the Afar DPFSB mentioned that there were some weak links between implementing agencies and the relevant Regional Bureaus with regard to monitoring and reporting tasks. For instance, It was reported that FARM Africa had issues with regard to communications and submitting regular reports to the region (as per Sub-Article No. 5 of Article II in the project agreement), and did not regularly participate at the ATF's coordination meetings.

With regard to collaboration with other partners in the project area, the project had been working with some actors like the ATVET College in Gewane, Women's Cooperative Association in Assayita (in the purchase of forage-seed). FARM Africa had also collaborated with Melke Werer Agricultural Research Centre in the provision of the training on Crop Management. However, the originally envisaged linkage with private veterinary practitioners was not successful because of the unavailability of such providers in the project area.

COORDINATION AMONG IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

During project planning (and at the beginning of the implementation) stages of the intervention, there were evidences of strong coordination and collaboration among the implementing agencies. This was shown during the joint project plan, and following securing of funds, the joint project launching/inception workshop which was organized at Semera, capital of Afar Regional State, with the participation of all stakeholders from the woreda to regional levels. At the beginning of the implementation process, all the implementing agencies followed similar modalities in mobilizing and sensitization of the community. Another evidence of collaboration was observed later on during the training programs organized by FARM Africa; when experts from CARE Ethiopia provided the trainings on LEGS to relevant woreda officials and veterinary workers.

The fact that this evaluation itself is done with the participation and involvement of the all three agencies is also a commendable experience which should be replicated for projects implemented by a consortium of two or more agencies. Despite some issues such as complexity and management, joint evaluations can provide broader scope, acceptance, efficiency, coordination and capacity building (ANLAP, 2007). Thus, the level of coordination among the implementing

agencies was commendable during initial stages of project start-up, but this cooperation somehow waned during the later stages of the project, until the end when they again joined hands to conduct this evaluation.

However, there were also evidences of little or no coordination (and experience sharing) among the implementing agencies. For instance, the implementing agencies missed an opportunity which could have been exploited to foster inter-agency cooperation and collaboration thereby enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the project. A case in point is the voucher-based veterinary service, for which all the three agencies designed and printed their own separate vouchers (of differing qualities). Notwithstanding the challenges that may have to do with agency-specific modes of operation, the veterinary service provision through vouchers could have been better coordinated and made more economical (in terms of, among other things, reducing design and printing costs, improving quality of service, saving time, avoiding duplication of efforts, etc.).

Another example of the lack of coordination between implementing agencies was the different decisions made by SC-UK and FARM-AFRICA in solving a common/similar problem they faced during implementation. They were faced with a supply problem of the improved variety of maize seed. To solve this problem, SC-UK (in consultation with the woreda and regional PARD offices) immediately purchased the local variety of maize seed from local sources in Assayita and distributed it to its beneficiaries. On the other hand, in the case of FARM-Africa, which insisted on getting the improved seed despite the apparent unavailability at the time, the planting season had long passed before improved seeds could reach its beneficiaries (in June 2011). Disappointed by this delay, the woreda administration decided to close FARM Africa's project office for three weeks. As LBFERP was an emergency intervention, perhaps FARM Africa would have done better if they adopted a similar strategy that was employed by SC-UK.

Finally, although the LBFERP was supposed to be a single project (jointly designed by three agencies), its implementation was such that it gave the impression that there were three separate projects being implemented by three agencies. The agencies had no common monitoring and data collection formats. For example data on vaccination were aggregated (or disaggregated) in a given way by one agency and another way by the other agency, which makes it difficult to collate the data at project level. There were also issues in reporting where some data contained double counting of beneficiaries as well as livestock vaccinated/treated.

One lesson which may be learned from this experience is that when a given project is to be implemented jointly by two or more humanitarian agencies, it is recommended that a responsible body be formed (e.g. a steering committee with members from implementing agencies) to actively lead, coordinate and monitor the overall implementation of the project activities as well as track progress towards achievement of intended results in proper time. It is also recommended that this leading body has operating mandates for a duration spanning from inception to completion of the project.

BUDGET UTILIZATION

In view of its coverage and the results achieved, the LBFERP project was generally cost efficient in economically converting resources to intended results. The total planned cost of the project was 1,224,385.80 USDs; and at the end of the project, a total of 1,081,372.16 USDs (or 88.32% of the planned project cost) has been utilized; and it reached a total of 31,419 households (which is 89.07 % of the targeted households).

However, at the planning stage, there were issues with respect to the proportions allocated to direct and indirect costs. Of the total planned project cost, the shares of indirect and direct costs were 35.93% and 64.07% respectively. Considering the amount that is usually allocated for indirect costs in other projects of a similar nature (humanitarian assistance) with which the evaluation team is familiar, the amount allocated for indirect costs of the LBFERP seems a bit high. Again, agency-wise comparison shows that the proportion of indirect costs (planned) is higher in the case of CARE Ethiopia, where, out of its total project cost, 41.73% is the share of indirect costs; while the shares of indirect costs (out of their respective total costs) were 37.45% for SC-UK and 30.92% for FARM Africa.

When the total costs are analyzed in terms of cost per household, at project level, the planned average cost per HH was 34.71 USDs; while at the end of the project, the actual cost was 34.42 USD/HH. Considering direct costs only, on the other hand, while the planned average direct cost per household was 22.24 USD; the actual cost per household was estimated at

20.33 USD (i.e. 91.43% accomplished). Thus, in terms of budget utilization (plan versus actual), once again, the data show that the project has generally been efficient.

TABLE 4-1 PROPORTION OF DIRECT COSTS (IN USD): PLANNED VS ACTUAL EXPENDITURE

Proportion of Direct Costs to Total Project Cost (in USD): Planned Vs Actual								
Implementing Agency	Total project cost			Direct project cost			Proportion of Direct Costs to Total Project Cost (%)	
	Planned	Actual	% accomplished	Planned	Actual	% accomplished	Planned	Actual
SCUK	379,233.00	365,473.00	96.37	237,200.00	202,978.00	85.57	62.55	55.54
CARE	337,998.80	292,813.16	86.63	196,937.05	156,767.89	79.60	58.27	53.54
FARM-AFRICA	507,154.00	423,086.00	83.42	350,347.00	279,073.00	79.66	69.08	65.96
Total	1,224,385.80	1,081,372.16	88.32	784,484.05	638,818.89	81.43	64.07	59.07

Comparison of Direct Costs by Project Component

Of the total planned direct cost of the project (which was 784,484.05 USD), the crop related components constitute 32.47% (or 254,704.00 USD); while the livestock related component constitutes the balance 67.53% (or 529,780.00 USD). Considering the socioeconomic context of the Afar region and in view of the impending livestock disease outbreak after the 2010 floods, it was appropriate that the LBFER allocated a greater proportion of its budget to the livestock related component of the project.

Crop-related Component (Comparison of Direct Costs: Plan Vs Actual)

The crop related component of the project was planned and implemented by both FARM Africa and SC-UK. However, there were significant differences in the ways they allocated budgets for direct costs of this component. FARM Africa targeted 1668 households and allocated a total of 110,407.00 USDs (which amounts to 66.19 USDs per household); while SC-UK targeted 3000 households but allocated a total of only 144,297.00 USDs (i.e. 48.10 USDs per household). Apparently, this implies that a targeted household in Assayita or Mille was to receive 18.09 USDs less (worth of assistance) than that would be received by a household in Buremudaitu or Amibara woredas, despite the fact that these households are both beneficiaries of the same project (and have probably been similarly affected by the 2010 floods), the only possible difference being that they were to get the assistance through a different agency.

TABLE 4.2 DIRECT COSTS PER HOUSEHOLD BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCY: CROP RELATED COMPONENT

Direct Costs (USD) per Household by Implementing Agency: Crop Related Component									
Implementing Agency	Targeted Households			Total Direct Costs			Average Direct Costs per HH		
	Planned	Actual	% Accomplished	Planned	Actual	% Accomplished	Planned	Actual	% Accomplished
SC-UK	3000	2783	92.77	144,297.00	121,226.00	84.01	48.10	43.56	90.56
FARM-Africa	1668	1668	100.00	110,407.00	81,854.00	74.14	66.19	49.07	74.14
Total	4668	4451	95.35	254,704.00	203,080.00	79.73	54.56	45.63	83.62

The differences in budget allocation may also be broken down in to subcomponents. When planning budgets for the purchase of improved variety of maize seed, FARM Africa allocated 26,720.00 USDs for just 1668 beneficiaries while SC-UK's budget was only 8,731.00 USDs for 3000 beneficiaries. Again, for the purchase of farm hand-tools (and for the same numbers of their respective beneficiaries), FARM Africa allocated 66,720 USDs, while the budget by SC-UK was only 22,669.00 USDs.

Livestock-related Component (Comparison of Direct Costs: Plan only)

With regard to the planned budget allocation for the Animal Health sub-component, comparison of direct unit costs among the implementing agencies is done using direct costs per heads of livestock targeted (instead of costs per household units). The result showed that there is only a relatively small difference between SC-UK and CARE in planned unit cost per animal

(0.60 and 0.45 USD per animal respectively). However, in the case of FARM Africa, the plan allocates a significantly higher cost per animal (2.04 USD/animal) than the other two agencies.

The major reason for this difference is that, out of the (planned) total direct project costs (529,780.00 USD) for the animal health component, the share of FARM Africa was the highest 45.29% or 239,940.00 USD, while the shares of SC-UK and CARE were 17.54 % and 37.17 % respectively; and this is despite the fact that FARM Africa's share of the total number of livestock targeted by the project is the smallest (which is 16.56% or only 117,661 livestock) as compared to those of the other two implementing agencies (the shares in targeted livestock being of 21.92% and 61.52% for SC-UK and CARE respectively).

Very interestingly, the smallest budget is allocated for the agency (CARE) which targeted the largest number of livestock (See Table 4.2 below). This may be indicative of a lack of coordination during budget allocation exercises at the planning stage of the joint project.

TABLE 4-2 COMPARISON OF DIRECT COSTS (BUDGET IN USD) FOR ANIMAL HEALTH COMPONENT AMONG IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

Agency	Number of heads of livestock targeted	% Share of total livestock targeted	Total budget for Animal Health (Direct Costs)	% Share from total AH budget (Direct Costs)
SC-UK	156,000	21.92	92,903.00	17.54
CARE	437,800	61.52	196,937.00	37.17
FARM Africa	117,861	16.56	239,940.00	45.29
Total	711,661	100.00	529,780.00	100.00

The actual expenditure per heads of livestock was calculated only for CARE Ethiopia. Accordingly, for CARE, the coverage was 106.79% of the total number of targeted heads of livestock; the average actual (direct) cost per animal was 0.34 USD (which is 74.54% of the planned 0.45 USD/livestock).

A similar analysis could not be done for SCUK and FARM-Africa for two reasons:

- The actual (direct) costs for the animal health component reported by these agencies include the costs of veterinary drugs which were not directly utilized during the project period but were transferred to the respective woreda PARDOs at the end of the project. As such, the evaluation team did not wish to consider this transfer when analyzing issues of efficiency.
- In their reports, the data on expenditures were not disaggregated. In the case of FARM Africa, in the final report, the data on actual expenditures were not disaggregated by project component. And in the case of SC-UK, the final report does not clearly show the actual total number of animals vaccinated and/or treated (disaggregated by animal species) for both Assayita and Mille woredas. In addition, disaggregated data (by animal species) on veterinary treatment is presented only for Assayita woreda; the report does not contain such data for Mille woreda. Again, only the number of vaccinations against pasteurization (for shoats) was reported for Mille woreda, while only the number of vaccinations against black-leg (for cattle) was reported for Assayita.

Comparison of Costs per Household Unit: Planned Vs Actual

Comparison of the planned direct costs per household shows that FARM Africa allocated the highest budget per HH unit at 25.95 USD/HH, while costs per HH for CARE and SC-UK were 20.15 and 19.77 USDs, respectively. However, the actual (direct) costs spent per HH unit were: 18.51 USD/HH by SC-UK, 19.74 USD/HH by CARE and 22.30 USD/HH by FARM Africa.

TABLE 4-3 AMOUNT OF DIRECT COST PER HOUSEHOLD UNIT BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

Implementing Agency	Direct Costs per Household (in USD): Planned Vs Actual								
	No. of HHS			Total project cost per HH			Direct cost per HH		
	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%
SCUK	12,000	10,965	91.38	31.60	33.33	105.47	19.77	18.51	93.65
CARE	9,775	6,551	67.02	34.58	44.70	129.27	20.15	23.93	118.78
FARM-Africa	13,500	12,512	92.68	37.57	33.81	90.01	25.95	22.30	85.95
Total	35,275	30,028	85.13	34.71	36.01	103.75	22.24	21.27	95.66

% = percent actually accomplished

4.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

In interventions of a similar significance to that of the LBFERP, proper monitoring, evaluation and livelihoods impact analysis should be carried out to check and refine implementation as necessary and draw lessons for future programming. Moreover, the M&E system of an intervention (emergency or otherwise) should be regarded as a long-term effort, as opposed to a periodic effort for a short period or for the duration of the specific project/program. As such, setting up adequate mechanisms for M&E purposes should be a key activity of humanitarian interventions.

A review of the documents of the LBFERP revealed that the issue of monitoring the achievement of planned project *outcomes/results* was not given sufficient attention. Even though the plan contained a logical frame work where project targets are stipulated, the project documents signed with the regional bureaus (DPPFSB and PARDB) did not include a proper *Results Monitoring Framework* to guide project implementers as to what *results/outcomes* should be monitored.

Even though all the implementing agencies have agency-specific tools and formats for monitoring project activities, these are designed to monitor processes or activities, and are not adequate for monitoring outcomes or results in real time throughout the implementation period. For example, there was no systematic way of tracking/monitoring the level of progress towards achieving the project outcomes (increasing milk production by 50%, or crop production by 50%) by the.

Moreover, as the reporting formats of all the implementing agencies differ from one another it is impossible, in some cases, to collate the data and perform project level analyses so as to measure the level of achievement in terms of meeting the project targets as they are stated in the project log-frame (e.g. number of livestock treated and vaccinated; production from seed support, etc).

However, the evaluation team also observed that the project office at Gewane (CARE Ethiopia) maintained a relatively well developed documentation and record keeping system, and data and information are kept in such a way that it is easier to store, retrieve and maintain. The project office developed clear formats for monitoring day to day activities, and project related information were properly stored in computers. The evaluation team couldn't say the same for project offices of the other two agencies.

4.4 EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT

This section of the evaluation report describes the effectiveness/impact of the project; i.e. the extent to which the planned results specified in the project's log-frame are achieved; and as much as possible the contribution made by the project towards the objective of protecting/improving the livelihoods of the targeted beneficiaries.

The main benefit of the LBFERP was its contribution in the improvement of the livelihoods of targeted pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the project woredas. Focus group discussions as well as analysis of the HH survey data revealed that many

beneficiaries of the intervention attributed the changes in their livelihoods to the two principal components of the project – animal health service and crop-related (seed & farm tools) provisions. The observed changes, as defined by the beneficiaries themselves, include improvement in the body conditions of their livestock, reduced disease-related livestock deaths, higher prices for livestock, improved milk production and consumption, reduced expenditure (on seeds, farm tools and livestock health services). The data also revealed that there are evidences of improvement in terms of access to diversified food sources (or decreased dependency in purchases and food-aid); as well as some indications of attitude change in favour of agro-pastoralism in areas where hand tools and crop seed supports have been provided (although there is a possibility that these may be isolated cases).

The effectiveness of the project was particularly impressive for the animal health sub-component, as a result of which the number of disease related deaths of livestock was significantly reduced, livestock productivity improved and the looming dangers of widespread disease outbreaks and livestock deaths that otherwise were likely to occur were averted (livelihoods assets protected). Another remarkable change observed was that the increased awareness and acceptance of modern veterinary services which was probably due to the introduction and use of the voucher approach (95% of respondents preferring the voucher-based approach to other forms of assistance).

The evaluation team believes that the LBFERP can generally be rated as effective based on the level of achievement of its main objective, which was protecting and rebuilding the livelihoods of the flood affected pastoralist and agro-pastoralists residing in the six intervention woredas through livestock and crop related interventions.

4.4.1 ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS BY PROJECT COMPONENTS

VETERINARY SERVICES

As livestock is the main stay of the targeted pastoral and agro-pastoral households living in the project area, the animal health component was believed, from the very beginning, to have a significant contribution in reducing vulnerability through the protection of their livestock assets.

In the aftermath of the 2010 flood, there were large crowds of livestock on wet ground for lack of dry land, and there was an impending danger of the occurrence of flood related diseases such as anthrax, blackleg and other contagious diseases. The likely occurrence of water and soil borne diseases was also very high, as it has been the case during previous floods that occurred in the region. The provision of animal health services was, therefore, the most important subcomponent of the livestock-related interventions designed to achieve the objective of the intervention – protecting key livelihood assets.

While implementing the animal health component, despite some differences which will be discussed in subsequent sections, all three implementing agencies (SC-UK, CARE and FARM Africa) followed similar modalities (approaches). The major planned activities to be implemented in all project woredas were the following:

- Provision of voucher-based treatments against endo-parasites, ecto-parasites and other infectious diseases
- Provision of vaccination against PPR, CCPP, Shoat Pox, Ovine pasteuriosis, Bovine pasteuriosis, CBPP, LSD and blackleg, including ring-vaccination in anthrax outbreak sites in adjacent woredas
- Support to public sector veterinary functions through capacity building of veterinary professionals and related technical staff in government line departments and assist in strengthening of livestock disease surveillance systems

The total number of households targeted to benefit from the veterinary services, in all the six project areas, was 35,275 (of which 30% are female headed HHs). At project level, a total of 711,661 heads of livestock (Cattle- 212,818, Shoats-410,419 and Camels- 88,424) were targeted for vaccination and treatment.

In terms of achieving these targets, after the intervention, a total of 31,419 households (89.07% of the targeted) were reported to have benefited from the animal health support; out of which 8992 of them (28.62%) were female headed HHs.

And a total of 705,513 heads of livestock (99.14% of the targeted) were vaccinated and/or treated. When disaggregated by species, these were Cattle – 205,975, Shoats – 390,496 and Camels – 109,042).

However, further analysis of the secondary data collected revealed that, during the implementation, there were differences in both the type and coverage of vaccination and treatment services provided by the implementing agencies in their respective targeted woredas. In Awash Fentale and Gewane woredas, all the planned vaccinations and treatments (vaccinations against Anthrax, Blackleg, Pasteurellosis, CCPP and LSD, and voucher based treatments against endo-/ecto-parasites and infectious diseases) were provided. Similarly, although the level of coverage against the plan was lower, all types of planned vaccinations and treatments were provided in Amibara and Bouremudaytu woredas.

SC-UK's final report lacks complete data on the number of animals vaccinated/treated in Mille and Assayita woredas. From the report, in Mille woreda for instance, it seems that vaccination was provided only against Ovine Pasterullosis; similarly, in Assayita woreda, the only vaccination provided was against Blackleg. Again, SC-UK's report does not include data on the number of animals receiving the voucher-based treatment for Mille woreda, except stating that the treatment was given in both woredas.

Moreover, it was revealed during FGDs in the sample woredas that some beneficiaries did not exhaustively use the vouchers distributed. In Assayita, some beneficiaries told the evaluation team that they still hold onto their unused vouchers hoping to get service through the vouchers (even after the completion of the project). The HH survey conducted in the sampled woredas also showed that, at project level, 31 (25.2%) of the 123 sampled HHs (who responded to the question relating to the issue of unused vouchers) said that there had been some vouchers which were left unused at the end of the project. Disaggregated by sampled woreda, 12.0%, 40.7% and 13.6% of these respondents with unused vouchers were from Assayita, Buremudaitu and Awash Fentale woredas, respectively. During the FGDs, one explanation mentioned for the unused vouchers was that "project period was short to exhaustively use the vouchers". A monitoring report (DPFSB, 2011) also mentioned complaints regarding timing of the treatment service (in Gewane) which could also be another explanation. (See section 4.6 for more voucher related analysis).

In general, however, most of the beneficiaries in all sampled Kebeles expressed their appreciation for the project's support, saying that they were more than satisfied (delighted) with the effectiveness of the animal health services rendered, during the project period. Most of the discussants of FGDs also said that they had never received a similar support before, that the voucher-based based veterinary service is preferable to other types of support.

FIGURE 1: FGD WITH COMMUNITY LEADERS AND ELDERS (DEHO KEBELE, AWASH FENTALE WOREDA)



CROP-RELATED COMPONENT

In Afar region, the livelihoods of agro-pastoralists (who account for about 10% of the population) partly come from irrigation and rain-fed crop production. The 2010 flood had inundated standing crops belonging to agro-pastoralists in the project area and damaged the infrastructures of their irrigations systems. Therefore, the second component of the LBFER in Afar was a crop-related support in four woredas – by FARM Africa in Amibara, Buremudaitu woredas, and by SC-UK in Assayita and Mille woredas. The project support included provision of crop seeds (mainly maize) and farm tools in all woredas; and forage seed and maintenance of flood-damaged irrigation canals in Assayita and Mille woredas.

The expected result of this component was that agro-pastoral households whose standing crops and properties devastated by the flood resume growing crops; and it targets that 2344 hectares of land will be planted to crops (mainly maize) from seed provided by the project, and that a total of 4668 agro-pastoralist HHs in the four project woredas will benefit from this component. Like the other components of the project, 30% of the beneficiaries of the crop related support were to be female-headed households.

Regarding the project's achievements against the planned targets, analysis of secondary data showed that, at project level, 4451 HHs (95.4% of the targeted HHs for this component) benefited from the crop-related component, of which about 25.3% were female headed HHs. When disaggregated by woreda, the percentage of targeted beneficiaries served is greater or equal to 100%, with the exception of Assayita woreda for which the percentage served is only 89%.

The above numbers, however, do not clearly show performance of this component, because the data are aggregated for all recipients of the different supports in all four woredas. A further scrutiny of the data revealed that, in Assayita and Mille woredas a total of only 1351 hand tools (of 3 types: shovel, machete, hoe) were distributed to 1212 HHs; while in Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas, a total of 10,008 hand tools (of 6 types: shovel, hoe, machete, cultivating hoe, mattock and fork) were distributed to only 1668 beneficiaries (a set of 6 tools for each beneficiary). Those beneficiaries in Assayita and Mille received differing numbers (1 to 3) of hand tools, and in some cases only one tool was given for two or three HHs to be used commonly; and targeted beneficiaries in one kebele (called *Romayitu*, in Assayita woreda) even refused⁸ to receive the hand tools for fear of disputes that may arise among them if the number of tools provided is not enough or is not uniform for all beneficiary households.

When SC-UK's project office faced shortage of funds to purchase enough hand tools to its beneficiaries, it transferred some of the budget for seed to purchasing of hand tools, which still was not sufficient to purchase enough hand tools. As a result, the maximum number of tools received by a household in Assayita or Mille was three, and there were many households who did not receive any hand tools at all (despite their being targeted); while each targeted household in Amibara and Buremudaitu received a set of six farm tools.

It is clear that the difference in the number of hand tools distributed by SC-UK and FARM Africa is due to the hugely disproportionate allocation of budgets for hand tools as compared to the number of targeted beneficiaries. If, for any reason, the agencies developed their own separate financial proposals during the joint planning, they should have taken the time to check for inconsistencies (or lack of coherence) rather than simply merging their plans.

Furthermore, during implementation, local variety of maize seed (instead of the planned improved variety) was distributed in Assayita and Mille woredas. SC-UK's project office decided to purchase the local variety after discussions and consultations with woreda PARDO and representatives of targeted kebeles who preferred the local variety. The main argument forwarded by kebele representatives (CDC members) who favored the local variety was that farmers in the area had bad experiences with the previously supplied improved variety which they said was not suitable to conditions in the

⁸ Monitoring report of SC-UK, May 2011

project area (probably due to low soil moisture); and that the local variety is known to be resistant to the local climatic stresses. Moreover, as the cropping season was slipping away, it was feared that there was not enough time to purchase improved variety in time (considering the usually long procurement procedures and the apparent shortage of improved variety in the market); and purchasing local variety also had the additional advantage of enhancing local economy and capacity.

However, FARM Africa insisted on sticking to the plan and (due to shortage in the market) waited until June 2011 to finally purchase and distribute the improved variety of maize seed in Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas. By the time seed was distributed in these woredas, the previous cropping season has long passed; but fortunately (according to FARM Africa's project office) it was just in time for the next (longer) cropping season. Of course, their preference for improved seed would have been justified basically on two accounts: first is its high productivity per unit area as well as longitudinal replication in the intervention areas for future use; and secondly its latitudinal replication in other adjacent areas where improved seed has not been used before. However, FARM Africa's particular experience highlights the need, during the planning stage, for checking the availability of the appropriate inputs for such kind of interventions.

One finding, during the evaluation, is worth mentioning here to show the effect of the different levels of support provided by the two agencies in terms of impacting livelihoods. During a focus group discussion conducted in one kebele of Buremudaitu woreda, one participant explained the benefits he got as a result of the project's support as follows:

"I own a plot of land, but for many years I did not cultivate it myself, instead I used to rent it to others (share-cropping basis) and received only a share of the harvest. But now, after I received the six farm tools and crop seeds support from the project, I was so motivated (encouraged) that, instead of renting it to others, I decided to cultivate the plot of land myself; and I have now planted the seeds and am expecting a good harvest. From now on I will not rent my plot of land to anyone, and I will grow my own food to support my family".

This change in attitude may be just an isolated case; however, it is also possible that other beneficiaries share his enthusiasm, and is worth further investigation.

More over, although it has not been initially planned by the project, FARM Africa reported that 252 kg of onion seed (Bombay red) and watering cans were distributed to 168 beneficiaries in Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas (of which 25% are female headed HHs, and that each HH received 1.5 kg of onion seed together with a watering can). Field office staff informed the evaluation team that this was done in response to requests from the community (through the woreda PARDO) for onion seed support.

TABLE 4-4 NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES OF CROP-RELATED COMPONENT OF THE PROJECT

Crop-related Component			
Woreda	Number of Beneficiary HHs		% Accomplished
	Planned	Actual	
Assayita	2400	2133	88.9
Mille	600	650	108.3
Subtotal 1	3000	2783	92.8
Amibara	834	834	100.0
Bouremudaitu	834	834	100.0
Subtotal 2	1668	1668	100.0
Total	4668	4451	95.4

TABLE 4-5 LAND CULTIVATED BY CROP-SEED SUPPORT IN HECTARES

Cultivated Area by type of Seed Support (hectare)									
Woreda	Area Planted to Maize			Area Planted to Forage/Panicum			Area Planted to Onion Seed		
	Planned	Actual	% accomplished	Planned	Actual	% accomplished	Planned	Actual	% accomplished
Ayssayita	800	503	62.88	400	NR	NR	NA		
Mille	200	172	86.00	100	NR	NR	NA		
Subtotal 1	1000	675	67.50	500	NR	NR	NA		
Amibara	353	NR	NR	NA			0.00	31.5	NA
Bouremdaytu	481	NR	NR	NA			0.00	31.5	NA
Subtotal 2	834	792	95.0	NA			0.00	63	NA
Total	1834	1467	80.0	NA			0.00	63	NA

*NR = Data Not Reported (but implemented); NA = Not Applicable

Regarding production from seed support, the maize crop production from seed (local variety) support started in early February, 2011 in Assayita and Mille woredas; however it started in June 2011 in Amibara and Buremudaitu due to the delay in purchase of the improve variety. All seven kebeles in Assayita and three of the five kebeles in Mille⁹ planted the maize seed they received from the support. However, the level of crop production was below expectation due to a number of factors including: most agro-pastoralists used broadcast method for sowing, they planted too much in small area (about 40kgs of seed per hectare (because they intended to thin it out when the plant reaches “knee” level or a height of about one-meter and use it for livestock feed), shortage of irrigation water, in some kebeles crop land was still covered by flood water, even the dried land after flood was hard and needed extra land preparation for which many agro-pastoralists did not have the time, and labour.

TABLE 4-6 QUANTITIES OF MAIZE AND FORAGE SEED DISTRIBUTED: PLAN VS ACTUAL

Quantity of Seed (Quintals)						
Woreda	Maize*			Forage crops/Panicum		
	Planned	Actual	% accomplished	Planned	Actual	% accomplished
Ayssayita*	320	320	100.00	20	19.15	95.75
Mille*	80	130	162.50	5	4.05	81.00
Subtotal 1	400	450	112.50	25	23.2	92.80
Amibara**	83.4	98.1	117.63	Not Applicable		
Bouremdaytu**	83.4	99.9	119.78	Not Applicable		
Subtotal 2	166.8	198	118.71	Not Applicable		
Total	566.8	648	114.33	25	23.2	92.8
* Local variety of seed distributed						
** Improved variety of seed distributed						

⁹ In the two kebeles in Mille, the small water pump (used to draw irrigation water) was damaged by the flood and was not repaired or replaced. As such, the beneficiaries did not plant the seed (from the project support) during the cropping season.

TABLE 4-7 NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES OF FARM HAND-TOOLS

Woreda	Number of HHs Receiving Hand Tools			Quantity of Hand tools Distributed		
	Planned	Actual	% accomplished	Planned	Actual	% accomplished
Ayssayita	2400	1051	43.79	2400	1051	43.79
Mille	600	161	26.83	600	300	50.00
Subtotal 1	3000	1212	40.40	3000	1351	45.03
Amibara	834	834	100.00	834	834	100.00
Bouremdaytu	834	834	100.00	834	834	100.00
Subtotal 2	1668	1668	100.00	1668	1668	100.00
Total	4668	2880	61.70	4668	3019	64.67

Based on the FGDs with beneficiaries in Assayita, the targeting of HHs for provision tools was made based on criteria set by local kebele leaders: to the neediest households and those who live in the targeted Kebeles and have access to irrigable land. Despite the variation in the number (2 to 3 per HH) and type of hand tools provided, beneficiaries appreciated the type of tool provided for their appropriateness to the working culture of the target area.

IRRIGATION CANAL MAINTENANCE

During the project period, SC-UK conducted irrigation canal maintenance work in Mille and Assayita woredas using cash-for-work (community labour). In Mille, 2.8 Km long irrigation canal was de-silted, and a 2 km long bush (in and around the canal) was cleared; and in Assayita, 43,121 cubic meters of silt was removed and a total of 7,247 meters long irrigation canal was maintained at Kerdura and Gelalo Kebeles through community labour. According to SC-UK's final report, the canal work at Assayita woreda was started from selection and prioritization of specific Kebeles and canals. Assayita PARDO and the project team decided to employ community labour and signed an agreement that depicted roles and responsibilities to execute the canal maintenance work. The project office argued that using community labour provides dual advantages: it maintains the irrigation structure and injects additional funds to augment community livelihood efforts.

The effectiveness of SC-UK's irrigation canal maintenance work in Assayita and Mille woredas was difficult to assess. In the project's plan, the budget for the irrigation canal maintenance work was allocated as a lump sum (of 75,000.00 USDs) without clear specifications regarding the quality (and quantity) of the maintenance work. When SC-UK's project office first tried to implement the canal maintenance work, it approached different organizations and professionals to technically assess the damage and propose a viable design and cost for the required maintenance work. However the project office's several attempts to hire professionals for the job failed due to the high costs they offered and which were way above the project's budget for the job (e.g. Afar region's Water Resources and Construction Bureau estimated the cost to be Birr 5,700,000.00).

Given the fact that community representatives stressed (during the initial familiarization workshops at woreda level), that their main problem was the damage to irrigation canals and that its maintenance was essential to avoid further flooding during the next rainy seasons, the issue of quality was of paramount importance. Therefore, when it was decided that community labour (cash-for-work) would be used the irrigation canal maintenance work, which cost much less, it probably compromised the quality of work¹⁰ and its sustainability. Experience on cash-for-work schemes have shown that when

¹⁰ A study (conducted by an irrigation engineer to estimate the amount of work required for the irrigation infrastructure maintenance in two kebeles in Assayita) shows that the important maintenance works required to train the river (lower Awash) are stabilizing and training the river along a certain alignment with suitable water way; and river training covers all those engineering works constructed on a river so

planning cash-for-work schemes for projects requiring technical expertise, agencies have to make sure that the expertise needed do not exceed the agency’s capacity (Paul Harvey, 2011).

Moreover, a key informant (an official from the woreda PARDO in Assayita) told the evaluation team that, in some kebeles, the irrigation canal has not started functioning (or was not opened for use because of remaining maintenance work); and agro-pastoralists had to schedule their use of the irrigation water to coincide with that of a private investor who owns the canal, and this left them at the mercy of the investor (the investor decides as to when the canal is opened or closed), reducing the agro-pastoralists’ access to irrigation water to cultivate their land.

Furthermore, in two kebeles (Asmahamedkuda/Ka’aylu and Harsis/Beda’alu) of Mille woreda, agro-pastoralists did not plant the maize seed provided by SC-UK because the small pump they use for drawing irrigation water was damaged by the flood and it needed maintenance; as a result beneficiaries of the seed support in these two kebeles missed the already late cropping season due to shortage of irrigation water. Perhaps SC-UK’s project office should have taken the responsibility to repair the damaged pump (or find an alternative solution) because, after all, one of the purposes of the intervention was to help all flood affected agro-pastoralists in the project area to resume their crop production.

One lesson that can be learned from this experience is that: in interventions involving more technical work (e.g. the maintenance of damaged infrastructure such as irrigation canals), allocating only a lump-sum amount (at the project design stage) is not sufficient. Usually, infrastructure works, by their very nature, require special sets of skills and material inputs, and are often outside the normal operating functions of implementing agencies. As such, a project involving such infrastructure maintenance components may face unforeseen shortage of funds, thus compromising effective implementation and intended project results/impacts. Therefore, from the outset, budget allocation for similar work should be based on a reasonably detailed set of specifications for the envisaged work, the required expertise and other inputs to be used during implementation.



FIGURE 2: IRRIGATION CANAL MAINTENANCE BY COMMUNITY LABOUR (ASSAYITA WOREDA)

4.4.2 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF HH SURVEY DATA

Using beneficiary lists of the implementing agencies as sampling frames, a total of 180 households (29% of which are Female headed HHs) were randomly selected from 10 kebeles of the three sampled woredas. Even though this sample size may not (and was not intended to) be statistically representative of all the beneficiaries from all the project woredas, it was agreed

as to guide and confine the flow of the river channel, and to control and regulate the river bed configuration thus ensuring safe and effective disposal of floods and sediment loads. (Yonatan G/yesus., Irrigation engineer, February 2011).

beforehand that it will serve the purpose of the evaluation. A structured questionnaire consisting of three parts was then administered (general questions on household economy in all sampled woredas; questions on animal health component only in Awash Fentale; and questions related to both animal health and crop-related components in Buremudaitu and Assayita woredas). The questions were designed based substantially on the intermediate result indicators stated in the log-frame of the LBFERP.

In addition to questions about their incomes, expenditures and main food sources before and after the project, beneficiary HHs were also asked to describe the changes they observed in their livelihoods that can be attributable to the different project components. Analyses of the data are summarized in this section. However, the results may not be generalized to all target beneficiaries in the six woredas and care should be exercised in interpreting the results.

CHANGE IN FOOD SOURCES

The sampled households were asked to mention their main food sources (both before and after the intervention). The analysis of the data revealed the main sources of food mentioned were: *own production, livestock products, purchase and food-aid*; and each of these were mentioned as food sources both *before* and *after* the project (showing that the main food sources mentioned did not change). However, in all the sampled woredas, after the project, the proportion of HHs mentioning *own-production* and *livestock-products* as their main food source increased. On the other hand, the proportion of those HHs mentioning *purchases* and *food-aid* decreased. Non-parametric tests (two-tailed) showed that these changes in proportion are significant at $\alpha=0.05$ (with p-values of 0.041, 0.022, 0.048 and 0.003 for own-production, livestock products, purchase and food-aid).

Therefore, one possible way of interpreting the decrease in the proportion of households mentioning purchases and food-aids as the main food sources after the project is that beneficiaries are now getting more food from other sources. The question is what 'other' sources? The increases in the proportion of households mentioning 'own-production' and 'livestock-products' might explain that these 'other' sources of food are own production and livestock products (See Table 4.8 below).

TABLE 4-8 MAJOR SOURCES OF FOOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE INTERVENTION

Food Sources Before and After Project by Woreda Crosstabulation													
		Before							After				
		Woreda							Woreda				
		Assayita	Buremudaitu	Awash Fentale	Total			Assayita	Buremudaitu	Awash Fentale	Total		
Sources of Food Before Project	own production	Count	14	48	0	62	Source of Food After Project	own production	Count	23	48	0	71
		% within Woreda	50.00%	81.40%	0.00%				% within Woreda	82.10%	87.30%	0.00%	
	Milk & LS products	Count	16	53	44	113		Milk & LS products	Count	22	52	49	123
		% within Woreda	57.10%	89.80%	89.80%				% within Woreda	78.60%	94.50%	100.00%	
	Purchase	Count	19	28	41	88		Purchase	Count	8	25	44	77
		% within Woreda	67.90%	47.50%	83.70%				% within Woreda	28.60%	45.50%	89.80%	
	Gift	Count	13	4	6	23		Gift	Count	2	3	1	6
		% within Woreda	46.40%	6.80%	12.20%				% within Woreda	7.10%	5.50%	2.00%	
	Aid	Count	10	25	28	63		Aid	Count	12	15	16	43
		% within Woreda	35.70%	42.40%	57.10%				% within Woreda	42.90%	27.30%	32.70%	
	Total	Count	28	59	49	136		Total	Count	28	55	49	132
		% of Total	20.60%	43.40%	36.00%	100.00%			% of Total	21.20%	41.70%	37.10%	100.00%

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

REDUCED DISEASE-RELATED LIVESTOCK DEATHS

A two-sided Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (at $\alpha=0.05$), was done on the data from the HH survey to compare the average number of disease-related livestock deaths in the sampled kebeles before and after the intervention. The results showed that the mean number of livestock deaths after the intervention is significantly less than that before the intervention (with a p-value of 0.000). This result corroborates the information obtained from other sources (FGDs, KIIs and data on disease

surveillance from the woreda PARDOs. As such, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the animal health component of the project (vaccination and voucher-based treatment) had significant contribution to the reduction in disease-related livestock deaths in the project woredas.

TABLE 4-9 NUMBER OF DISEASE RELATED LIVESTOCK DEATHS PER HH BEFORE AND AFTER INTERVENTION, (N=145)

All Animals	Deaths After		Deaths Before	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Camels	0.29	0.848	1.70	2.590
Cattle	1.36	4.339	5.12	8.491
Shoats	3.43	6.425	17.36	27.682

TABLE 4-10 NUMBER OF DISEASE RELATED DEATHS IN MILKING ANIMALS PER HH BEFORE AND AFTER INTERVENTION, (N=145)

Lactating Animals	Deaths After		Deaths Before	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Camel	0.11	0.40	0.53	1.00
Cows	0.29	0.69	1.27	1.81
Shoats	0.73	1.67	3.52	4.07

On the other hand, respondents in all the sampled woredas were also asked the number of livestock they owned before and after the intervention. Wilcoxon's Signed Rank tests (5% confidence level) done on the data showed that that the median number of total livestock owned per HH were significantly higher before the intervention than they are after.

The apparent decrease in total livestock size per HH may be explained in several ways. The evaluation team learned that, immediately after the floods occurred, there was widespread shortage of livestock feed in the area; and one of the coping mechanisms employed by many pastoralists in the project area was resorting to the sale of some of their livestock, especially the weaker ones.

Moreover, the February 2011 edition of the Afar region's Monthly Food Security Update bulletin states that, in order to fill their food gaps, communities in the project area were forced to sell more number of livestock in non-formal markets with cheaper price while staple foods prices increased (Afar National Regional State, 2011).

Another possible explanation for the observed decrease in the number of livestock per HH may be due to bias introduced in the data; as observed in several humanitarian interventions all around the world, beneficiaries generally tend to exaggerate their losses in anticipation of more aid, and pastoralists in the project area are no exception.

Nonetheless, in light of all the supporting data from HH survey, FGDs and key-informant interviews, the evaluation team concluded that the animal health component of the project (vaccination and voucher-based treatment) had significant contribution to the reduction in disease-related livestock deaths in the project woredas.




FIGURE 3: MEAN DISEASE RELATED LIVESTOCK DEATHS: BEFORE & AFTER INTERVENTION (CI=95%)

IMPROVED MILK PRODUCTION (LIVESTOCK PRODUCTIVITY)

Many livestock related humanitarian interventions are aimed at increasing the production and productivity of livestock and livestock products; and change in milk production per animal per day is an important indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of these interventions.

The original plan of LBFERP included provision of preventive and curative veterinary services, animal feeds and rehabilitation of water-points components, all of which were (complementarily) aimed at increasing availability of milk at HH level. However, following FAO’s withdrawal, the later two components were dropped. Furthermore, one of the planned targets was increasing milk production by 50%; and apparently this target has not been revised after FAO’s withdrawal (as it would be almost impossible to reach this target through the animal health component only).

Nevertheless, during this evaluation, the HH survey contained questions related to HH milk production (before and after the intervention) to assess if there is any change in milk production. The amount of milk obtained from an animal depends on a number of factors (e.g. breed, age at first calving, lactation stage/length, feeding schemes, season of the year etc.). However, due to difficulties in obtaining reliable data to accurately measure the amount (e.g. in litres) of milk production at HH level, the analysis of the survey data focused (for the purpose of this evaluation) on estimating ‘changes’ in milk production (instead of amount in litres), before and after the intervention.

Accordingly, the sampled households were asked to describe the changes in milk obtained from a single animal per day (e.g. how much milk did you get from a lactating cow before the intervention? And how much are you getting now, after the

intervention?). They were also asked to report the number of milking animals owned by the HH, again for both the periods before and after the intervention.

Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank tests (at $\alpha=0.05$) were conducted on the data collected from the sampled HHs in all the three woredas. The results showed that, in the sampled kebeles at least, there was an improvement in the amount of milk production per HH after the intervention than before.

On the other hand, further analysis of the data showed that the median number of *total livestock* size per HH were significantly higher before the intervention than they are after; while the median number of *milking animals* in HH before the intervention was *not* significantly different from that after the intervention. The later finding (on milking animals) is probably more reliable than the first (on total livestock size), as it is believed that respondents better remember the number of milking animals they owned than the total number of livestock owned.

Obviously, apart from other factors such as availability of better feed and water (and considering that there was no significant change in the number of milking animals per HH), one possible explanation for the increase in milk production observed in the sampled HHs is that they are getting more milk from their livestock as a result of improved livestock health conditions and productivity.

FGDs conducted in all sampled kebeles also identified *improved livestock productivity* and *improved milk production* (and consumption at HH level) as important benefits they got from the intervention. As such, it is possible to conclude that the project contributed to the identified improvement in livestock productivity and milk production. However, after identifying (and agreeing) these benefits as derived from the intervention, when they were further asked to rank the two factors: “better availability of feed and water” and “better livestock health after the intervention”; the focus group discussants in most of the sampled kebeles found it hard to agree on the issue of ‘which factor contributed more to the improvement in milk production?’. As such, it was difficult to estimate how much of this result is directly attributable to the animal health component of the project.




FIGURE 4: MEAN DAILY MILK PRODUCTION IN HH BEFORE & AFTER INTERVENTION BY WOREDA

CROP PRODUCTION:

Production of maize from the seed support by the project in the sampled kebeles has been minimal as compared to yields in traditionally agricultural areas. There was also high variation in the level of production among kebeles and woredas, mainly due to differences in amount sown (seed rate), timing, variety of seed used, and probably due to other factors like differences in irrigation access, land preparation and methods of farming.

For instance, in Assayita and Mille woredas, maize crop production from seed support (local variety) started in early February 2011 (however in Amibara and Buremudaitu woredas, it started much later, in June 2011, due to the delayed distribution of the improve variety seed). All seven kebeles in Assayita, and only three of the five kebeles in Mille¹¹, planted the maize seed they received from the support. However, the level of crop production was below expectation due to a number of factors some of which are (according to a monitoring report, SC-UK'S project office): most agro-pastoralists used broadcast method for sowing, they used a seed rate of about 40 kg/hectare because they intended to thin it out when the plant reached “knee” level (or a height of about one-meter) so as to use it for livestock feed, and there was also shortage of irrigation water.

Data collected during the HH survey, on the amount of maize produced from the seed support in some of the sampled Kebeles in Assayita and Buremudaitu woredas are shown in Table 4.12 below. However, these data may not be reliable due to the high variation in the data and possible bias (errors by respondents in estimating and reporting the amount of production from seed support by the project).

TABLE 4-11 MAIZE HARVESTED FROM SEED SUPPORT (KG)

Woreda/Kebele	Maize Seed Amount (kg) received			Maize Harvested from Project Seed		
	Count (N)	Mean	Median	Count (N)	Mean	Median
Buremudaitu						
Debel	13	25.00	25.00	13	.	.
Gefirem	27	12.50	12.50	27	35.80	15.00
Beidaforo	25	11.18	12.00	25	2009.52	1800.00
Subtotal Buremudaitu	65	14.73	12.50	65	1629.96	1500.00
Assayita						
Galifage	12	14.73	15.00	12	1836.36	1700.00
Keredura	0	.	.	0	.	.
Handeg	18	15.00	15.00	18	570.59	480.00
Subtotal Assayita	30	14.90	15.00	30	1067.86	720.00
Total	95	14.79	12.50	95	1338.50	1000.00

4.4.3 IMPACT – IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS

Analyses of all the information from the different sources support the conclusion that the LBFERP has significantly contributed to the improvement of the livelihoods of the target beneficiaries in the target woredas. Focus group discussions as well as analysis of the data from HH survey revealed that beneficiaries of the intervention consider both the veterinary services and crop-related support of the project as the major contributors to the observed improvements in their livelihoods in terms of the improved physical conditions of their livestock, reduced livestock deaths, higher prices of livestock, increased milk production and consumption. Interviews with beneficiaries of seed and hand-tools provision also revealed that, the intervention helped in improving crop cultivation practices as well as expansion of irrigated crop cultivation not only through

¹¹ In the two kebeles in Mille, the small water pump (used to draw irrigation water) was damaged by the flood and was not repaired or replaced. As such, the beneficiaries did not plant the seed (from the project support) during the cropping season.

the distribution of seeds and hand tools but also through the provision of appropriate training on agriculture—opening up new means of livelihood for them.

In addition, although the intervention was meant to be an emergency response aimed at primarily protecting livelihoods, the support from the crop-related intervention have the potential of being transformational as many pastoralists and agro-pastoralist are enthusiastic about practicing crop cultivation as an additional and viable means towards improved livelihoods. While these were encouraging contributions of the LBFERP, the effects may be localized and do not remove all the constraints in the livelihoods of all the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in the project area as a whole. Currently, the share of crop-production in the livelihoods of communities in the area is minimal vis-à-vis livestock production. However, taking into account the perceived benefits from the crop-related support of the intervention, and as analysis of secondary data and information from key informant interviews indicate, there is very high potential for irrigated crop cultivation along the Awash River.

Both major components of the project (livestock and crop related) are necessary and relevant, but they are not sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods. Taking into consideration the usual possibilities of discontinuation of the emerging livelihood strategies after the termination of such kind of short-lived interventions, there is a need for ensuring continuity and enhancement of similar activities through development intervention by the government and its development partners.

The changes attributable to the different components of the project, as perceived by the beneficiaries themselves, have been compiled and presented in the table below.

TABLE 4-12 BENEFITS OF THE LBFERP AS PERCEIVED BY BENEFICIARIES

Perceived Benefits from Intervention	Woreda				
		Assayita	Buremudaitu	Awash Fentale	Total*
Decreased expenditure on tools and seed	Count	28	43	NA	71
	% within Woreda	100.0%	76.8%	NA	
Decreased expenditure on Livestock Health	Count	28	51	47	126
	% within Woreda	100.0%	91.1%	97.9%	
Able to send children to school	Count	17	11	6	34
	% within Woreda	60.7%	19.6%	12.5%	
Improved HH nutrition	Count	6	25	NA	31
	% within Woreda	21.4%	44.6%	NA	
HH health protected	Count	9	25	25	59
	% within Woreda	32.1%	44.6%	52.1%	
Able to save for agricultural inputs	Count	3	23	13	39
	% within Woreda	10.7%	41.1%	27.1%	
Increased milk consumption	Count	23	37	40	100
	% within Woreda	82.1%	66.1%	83.3%	
Stronger constitution of Livestock	Count	27	45	36	108
	% within Woreda	96.4%	80.4%	75.0%	
Increased HH income	Count	9	27	17	53
	% within Woreda	32.1%	48.2%	35.4%	
Helped me recover what was lost during flood	Count	27	39	NA	66
	% within Woreda	96.4%	69.6%	NA	
Total	Count	28	56	48	132

Percentages and totals are based on respondents in Woreda

* Even though the total sample size is 180, the number of respondents for a given question varied among the different woredas and/or kebeles depending on the type of support they received.

4.4.4 CAPACITY BUILDING

The project planned capacity building activities which are intended to enhance the sustainability of project results. These activities include: supporting public sector veterinary functions through capacity building of veterinary professionals and related technical staff in government line departments, and assisting in strengthening of livestock disease surveillance systems and helping to improve the capacity of local structures like customary institutions and CAHWs to respond to livestock and related crises.

The information gathered by the evaluation team confirmed that most of the planned activities of the capacity building component of the project were efficiently implemented, training topics were highly relevant, and were participatory in terms of composition of participants. Key informant interviews and analysis of secondary data also confirmed that all the planned trainings were delivered in all woredas and that the trainings were very much relevant. Notable among them were the refresher trainings offered to the already existing Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), and the LEGS training given to concerned woreda officials and focal persons.

Seven types of trainings, which are related to the different components of the intervention, were planned to be delivered to different target groups: community members, CAHWs and relevant woreda government staffs. The total number of participants targeted for all types of trainings was 733. The project's achievement at activity level was 71.08 % (i.e. 521 participants drawn from the targeted community members and government staffs were trained). The majority of key informants interviewed agreed that types of trainings delivered by the project were relevant and appropriate.

As livestock emergency interventions are required to be guided by LEGS and the National Guidelines and Standards, training on LEGS was planned to be given for a total of 51 staff from relevant regional and woreda offices, and the training was given for 54 participants.

Enhancing the capacity of CAHWs was not only necessary for the delivery of the animal health component of the project, but also a valuable means of addressing the veterinary service needs of pastoralists in the area after project completion. As such, the LBFERP planned the delivery of refresher trainings in basic animal health to 222 CAHWs. The evaluation team confirmed that CAHW's trainings were delivered by¹² FARM Africa and CARE to a total of 139 CAHWs. The trained CAHWs were also provided with kits of basic veterinary equipments and drugs.

¹² Even though there were currently at total of 56 CAHWs in Assayita and Mille woredas (*“Report on Verification of Assessment, Targeting and Familiarization at District Level”, 2/3/2011*), SC-UK's final report did not indicate how many of them were trained. The evaluation team managed to interview only one CAHW in Assayita woreda who said he took refresher training.

TABLE 4-13 SUMMARY OF TRAININGS PLANNED AND DELIVERED BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

Summary of Trainings Planned and delivered by implementing agencies													
S.No.	Type of training	SCUK			CARE			FARM-Africa			Total		
		Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%
1	CAHWs Training	60	NA	-							60	NA	0
2	Woreda staff training on DRR	160	65	40.63							160	65	40.625
3	Community Disaster Management Training	50	NA	-							50	not reported	0
	Total	270	65	24.07							270	65	24.07
4	LEGS: To woreda, region and partner veterinary professionals/staff on				26	27	103.85	25	27	108.00	51	54	105.88
5	basic animal health refresher and on LEGS to CAHWs on				53	50	94.34	109	89	81.65	162	139	85.80
6	EW and flood mitigationTo government staff on				60	60	100.00	60	53	88.33	120	113	94.17
7	Crop management training for target community and woreda government staff				0	0	0	130	150	115.38	130	150	115.38
	Total	270	65	24.07	139	137	98.56	324	319	98.46	733	521	71.08
1	Refresher training on basic animal health and on LEGS was given to CAHWs by CARE and FARM, but there is no report from SC-UK on LEGS training to CAHWs as planned.												
3	Except FARM-Africa, women participation is not reported by the other two agencies. It is not possible to have aggregate data on their share.												
4	In some of the trainings given by FARM-Africa, the target groups were not the same as planned target groups.												
5	From both Assaita and Mille woreda, sixty five office experts and development agents took training on vegetable production, disaster risk reduction and marketing for five consecutive days. (page 13 of SCUK terminal report)												

Another relevant training which was given during project implementation was on Early Warning and Flood Mitigation. This training was given for a total of 113 (out of the 120 planned) government staff and community members. Training on crop management training was planned to be delivered to a total of 130 participants from target community and woreda government staff, and was delivered to 150 participants. SC-UK also planned to deliver Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) training for 160 woreda staff; however the planned training was given for 65 participants only (40.63% of the targeted).

Moreover, several awareness creation workshops were conducted according to plan. Participants in all sessions of training and awareness creation workshops were composed of people from all relevant stakeholders. It was difficult for the evaluation team to further analyze the trainings from women's participation and equity points of view because of lack of consistencies in reporting on gender disaggregated data of participants in the different trainings.

FARM Africa also reported that it provided training in crop management to agro-pastoralists in their woreda. However, the views of the trained agro-pastoralists could not be assessed for lack of a list of training participants (and difficulties encountered in locating them).

Apart from trainings, other activities performed by the project and that can enhance local capacity were: purchase of maize seed from local markets, purchase of forage seed from a Women's Cooperative Association at a cost of Birr 100/kg by SC-UK in Assayita woreda.

In addition, at the end of the project, SC-UK and FARM Africa provided unutilized veterinary drugs and equipments (which were of a considerable amount in the case of FARM Africa) to the respective woreda PARDOs. However, CARE Ethiopia provided the unutilized veterinary drugs to best performing CAHWs (as incentives) at the end of the project.

Benefits of Refresher Trainings to CAHWs

A sample (n=7) of CAHWs who participated in the refresher training on basic animal health service were interviewed (through a semi-structured interview). Analysis of the data showed that: on average each CAHW covers 3 villages, each CAHW treats on average (median) 40 camels, 80 cattle and 160 shoats over a one-month period. The major constraints CAHWs faced in their service delivery were: lack of transportation, mobility of pastoralists and delays in payment of per-diem.

According to the CAHWs interviewed, the drugs that are mostly sold (and are usually in short supply) are identified to be Oxy Tetracycline and Ivermectine. However, a monitoring report from the regional DPFSB also indicated that, during the initial stages of the project, CAHWs and community members complained about shortage of the drug Diazinon (drug for ectoparasites). Diseases that CAHWs have no drugs to treat with were: 1) a disease known locally as 'Nail disease' (described as a disease that causes the animals to limp), and 2) a disease known locally as 'Armko' (and caused by eating raw seeds of Prosopis).

The benefits to CAHWs derived from the refresher trainings, as perceived by the CAHWs, were: improved capacities in terms of disease diagnosis and treatment, improved reporting capacities, better quality service provision and awareness in the use of vouchers. Data from the HH survey and the FGDs conducted in Awash Fentale and Buremudaitu also showed that the quality of service provided by CAHWs was generally better than before, and that the training complemented their traditional knowledge.

4.5 RELEVANCE AND COHERENCE

The shift from emergency response to the holistic disaster risk management approach necessitated the country's policy framework and the institutional setting of the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) under the Ministry of Agriculture. This resulted in the need for many NGOs (including SC-UK, CARE Ethiopia and Farm Africa) to align their intervention modalities based on the principles of the holistic DRM approach. As such, it is clear that the planning and implementation of the LBFERP were based on concepts used in disaster risk management.

The relevance of the project is assessed against the following criteria:

- Are the project objectives valid for the context and in line with livelihoods based emergency response principles and guidelines?
- Was the intervention based on an adequate analysis of emergency need?
- Are the activities and outputs consistent with the objectives of the project?
- Are the project activities mutually reinforcing and adequately linked?
- Has the project responded flexibly to changing circumstances over time?

The answers to most of these questions are in the affirmative; and have been discussed in Section 4.2 of this report (Analysis of the Design of the Project).

The main components of the LBFERP are found to be highly relevant and appropriate because: they are valid for the emergency context, are based on principles of a livelihoods-based response approach, are based on adequate needs assessments; the planned activities and outputs are consistent with the project's main objective, they are consistent with the emergency response guidelines of humanitarian organizations in pastoral areas and they are in line with the appeals made by the Afar National Regional State after the floods.

In all of the six targeted woredas, outbreak of livestock disease is a recurrent occurrence following floods of such magnitude. In these woredas, where animal disease outbreak was expected in the aftermath of the August 2010 floods, the project's main focus on provision of livestock-related support (especially veterinary services) was highly appropriate in terms of protecting key livelihood assets. Moreover, the livelihoods of agro-pastoralists were threatened since the flood destroyed and inundated large areas of standing crops and pasture. As such, the project's inclusion of the second component, a crop-related support (seed, hand tools, maintenance of irrigation canal) was appropriate.

Of course the flood victims had other challenges; however, they could either cope with these challenges on their own or with the support of the government and/or other NGOs.

Some components of the project such as veterinary service remain highly relevant even now, as they address the fundamental aspects of pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods. It was also repeatedly mentioned that, in all FGDs, the veterinary service is relevant at all times and should not be viewed as a one-off exercise needed in association with some specific events (floods, draught).

Despite efforts made in designing the appropriate response at the time of preparation of the project plan, the LBFERP had issues in terms of responding flexibly to changing circumstances over time. Two of the issues worth noting are 1) the failure to address the gap created following FAO's withdrawal and the subsequent dropping of important components such as water-points development and emergency feed supplies and 2) the delay in project start-up.

4.6 VOUCHER/CASH TRANSFER APPROACH

BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON VOUCHER/CASH TRANSFER APPROACH

The existing documentation of cash- and voucher-based responses shows that they are overwhelmingly successful in terms of their impact. The body of experience that this conclusion is drawn from is still small and there is a need for caution. There is also only limited evidence about their feasibility in complex emergencies. What experience there is, however, strongly suggests a case for the further development of cash- and voucher-based approaches and for piloting their application on a larger scale (Harvey, 2005).

Vouchers are coupons (tokens or electronic cards) that provide recipients with access to commodities. Projects using vouchers seek to increase access to a specific set of goods and services in order to achieve the project objective. Vouchers can function like cash, meaning that recipients can redeem them for any commodity from participating traders, or they can be redeemable only for specific goods and services, such as pre-determined amounts of food or school fees (Paul Harvey, 2011).

Vouchers come in two main forms: 'cash vouchers' and 'commodity vouchers'. Cash vouchers can be exchanged for a range of commodities up to the cash value printed on the voucher. Commodity vouchers must be exchanged for a fixed quantity of named commodities. The key difference between cash grants and voucher schemes is the degree of control the implementing agency has over their use. Vouchers can be traded through producers, traders, middle men and retailers who have reached a prior agreement with the agency. Whilst this is laborious and slower to organise it does offer more control. Voucher schemes tend to be used when there is high risk associated with handling cash, where markets are weak and the risks of inflation are high, and where the target population identifies the need for a particular commodity which is available locally (WFP, 2008).

Vouchers can be used for most technical interventions but particularly for the purchase of animal health services, water, feed, shelter materials, and provision of livestock. Issues of assessment and targeting are no different from other interventions, however serious consideration needs to be paid to the high levels of organisation and the time required to implement voucher schemes. For example, there has to be some negotiation with traders to ensure supply is at agreed prices, contracts have to be signed with each trader, vouchers have to be printed and tracked etc.

WHEN TO USE VOUCHERS

The decision to use vouchers should be based on a needs assessment and response analysis. Vouchers are used when the agency wants to restrict purchases in order to achieve specific project objectives, or when there are security concerns around distributing cash. In deciding to use vouchers, there should be a good answer to the question: 'Why does the intervention wish to restrict recipients' choice?' A recent review of good practices (Paul Harvey, 2011) surmises that this could be because:

- **Project objective:** there is a clear need for an intervention in a particular sector or sectors that would be best met through increasing access to certain goods and services (e.g. shelter materials, food).
- **Security:** there are reasons to fear robbery when transporting and distributing cash, either for distributors or recipients.
- **Political acceptability:** the host authorities are more amenable to voucher interventions than to cash.
- **Agency mandate and/or donor restrictions:** these are not good reasons to limit recipients' choice, but may nonetheless compel agencies to programme in a particular way.

The basic conditions that need to be in place are the same as for any cash based response – a functioning market, availability of key commodities, acceptance by host authorities and ability to address inflation risks. However, voucher programmes can often exert more control over supply than cash transfers. Agreements can be set up with vendors stipulating that they stock minimum amounts of certain commodities, or the project can start at a small scale so as to convince vendors that the goods

they stock will be purchased. Whatever the system, priority commodities and services identified in assessments and those needed to achieve the project objectives must be made available by traders. If this is not the case, voucher-based intervention is not the best way forward.

DESIGNING VOUCHERS

Where agencies use paper vouchers, these should be designed to ensure that recipients can use them with relative ease and that they cannot be easily reproduced. Agencies should follow this basic guidance (Paul Harvey, 2011):

- **Local language:** vouchers should be translated into the local language.
- **Denominations:** denominations of vouchers should be flexible enough to allow recipients to make smaller purchases. Programmes often use a combination of different denominations.
- **Validity:** the validity period should be indicated on the voucher.
- **Serial numbers:** serial numbers are used for monitoring and tracking the distribution/redemption of vouchers.
- **Colours:** if multiple fairs or distributions of vouchers are planned, different-coloured vouchers can be used on different days to prevent vouchers from being recycled. Colours can also be used to represent different denominations.
- **Preventing fraud:** basic steps should be taken to ensure that vouchers cannot be easily replicated, such as printing on special paper, adding a unique stamp just before the distribution and not printing vouchers on agency computers or copiers.

TABLE 4-14 POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CASH TRANSFER SCHEMES

Possible Advantages of Cash Transfers	Possible Disadvantages of Cash Transfers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost efficient: distributing cash is likely to be cheaper than commodity-based alternatives because transport and logistics costs are lower • Choice: cash allows recipients to decide what they should spend the money on. This enables people to choose what they most need, and allows for this to vary from person to person • Multiplier effects: distributing cash can have knock-on economic benefits for local markets and trade if the money is spent locally, and it may stimulate agricultural production and other areas of livelihoods • Avoids disincentive effects: unlike commodities (food) cash is unlikely to discourage local trade or production • Fewer costs for recipients: Food often costs recipients a significant amount to transport from the distribution site to their home. Cash avoids this • Dignity: cash can be better at maintaining the dignity of recipients. It may, for instance, be possible to avoid long, degrading queues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inflationary risks: If an injection of cash causes prices for key goods to rise, then recipients will get less for their money and non-recipients will be worse off • Anti-social use: cash can be used to buy anything. Some may be used for anti-social purposes • Security risks: Moving cash around may create particular security risks for staff implementing cash programs, and for the recipients of them • More difficult to target: because cash is attractive to everybody it may be more difficult to target, as even the wealthy will want to be included • More prone to diversion: cash may more attractive than alternatives and so particularly prone to being captured by elites, do diversion particularly where corruption is high and to seizure by armed groups in conflicts • Disadvantages women: women may be less able to keep control of cash than alternatives such as food • Less available from donors: donor governments may be more willing to provide commodities than cash • Consumption/nutrition: if a transfer has particular food-consumption or nutrition objectives, then food may be more effective

Source: (Harvey, 2005)

EXPERIENCES OF LBFERP IN PROVISION OF VOUCHER-BASED VETERINARY SERVICE

During the design of the LBFERP, it was planned that (with the exception of the prophylactic vaccination campaign) beneficiaries would share the costs of the livestock (clinical) treatment service; and that the money generated from the provision of the animal health services would be used to cover the allowances of the CAHWs and replenish the veterinary drugs stocks. However, for the vulnerable households who cannot afford to pay for the livestock treatment, the service will be rendered free of charge through voucher system (SC-UK, CARE, FARM Africa, 2010).

However, during implementation, the envisaged service delivery on cost-sharing basis could not be feasible; and all target beneficiaries received the veterinary treatment service free of charge, regardless of their wealth status.

The LBFERP was the first of its kind in using voucher-based approach for emergency response in the area. And this section of the present report discusses the experiences of the implementing agencies in the voucher-based animal health service provision and a summary of the views of the beneficiaries regarding the voucher-based approach.

EXPERIENCES OF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

The approaches employed and/or steps followed by the implementing agencies in their voucher-based veterinary service delivery were more or less similar:

- refresher trainings on basic animal health and voucher-based service delivery are given to CAHWs;
- trained CAHWs are provided with kits of basic emergency drugs and equipments;
- beneficiary communities are given awareness about the use of vouchers (including its cash value) using clan leaders, CDCs, etc;
- the vouchers (with uniform cash value per HH) are distributed to the beneficiaries;
- the beneficiaries pay (using the vouchers) to CAHWs after they get equivalent service;
- CAHWs collect the used vouchers from beneficiaries and submit regular reports to the AHT (or focal person);
- Animal Health Technicians and Assistants (AHT and AHA) and agency staff conduct supportive supervision of CAHWs work;
- CAHWs return used vouchers (and vials, bolus-seals); and they are paid per-diems upon submission of progress reports to kebele chair and obtaining approval from woreda PARDO.















The use of the voucher transfer approach by the three agencies was widely accepted by the beneficiaries, with 95% of the sampled respondents (HHs) preferring vouchers to cash or in-kind support. This is remarkable given that the voucher-based approach is the first of its kind in the project area.

FIGURE 5: DENOMINATIONS OF VOUCHERS USED BY CARE-ETHIOPIA FOR VETERINARY SERVICE PROVISION (LBFERP)¹³



¹³ The vouchers used by FARM Africa and SC-UK are similar in appearance to the one in Figure 5, except some subtle and important differences (which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs).

FIGURE 6: CAHW DAILY REPORT FORMAT (CARE ETHIOPIA, LBFERP)

CAHWs Rx report Sheet					
					
					
					
Words: _____ Kebele: _____ CAHW's Name: _____ Signature: _____			Monitored by: _____ Signature: _____ Certified by: _____ Signature: _____	Date: _____ Date: _____	

DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES OF THE VOUCHERS USED BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

The vouchers were used only for the animal health component of the intervention. The experiences of its application in the project areas by the three agencies, is discussed below in some detail for the sake of learning lessons (better programming of voucher-based interventions in the future and in similar contexts).

The three agencies designed and printed their own, separate, vouchers for the animal health intervention. In view of the fact that the voucher-based veterinary service was the only component of the entire intervention that is common to all the three agencies, the voucher-based veterinary service provision could have been better coordinated, made more economical (in terms of, among other things, reducing design and printing costs, improving quality of service, saving time, avoiding duplication of efforts, etc.), thereby creating better chances for improved levels of performance and success both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (i.e. notwithstanding the challenges related to agency-specific modes of operation).

First of all, the total (cash) values of the vouchers distributed to beneficiaries by the agencies were different (CARE 160 birr, FARM Africa 74 birr, and SC-UK's 135 birr). All three agencies printed and distributed three smaller denominations of their vouchers, albeit different ones: CARE used 20, 25 and 35 birr denominations, while SC-UK used 1 birr, 5 birr and 10 birr, and FARM Africa used 5 birr, 10 birr and 20 birr denominations.

The vouchers used by the agencies had different qualities and features. The vouchers used by CARE Ethiopia were relatively better than those used by either SC-UK or FARM Africa in several ways than one: CARE's voucher had better design, was more appropriate/friendly for illiterate beneficiaries and was printed in good quality paper; it also reached beneficiaries faster. On the other hand, the vouchers used by FARM Africa had issues with its design (features) and it took the project office a very long time to print the vouchers (more than three months); while SC-UK's voucher, in addition to having design issues, it was printed on lower quality paper and could easily be damaged in the hands of beneficiaries before its expiry date (e.g. the colours used to identify voucher denominations could bleed easily at the slightest contact with moisture).

All agencies used the same set of pictures of animals (camels, cattle, shoats) in their vouchers; apparently to differentiate the cash values/denominations of the vouchers and drugs. Using pictures of these set of animals may be appropriate for the Afar context; however, CARE Ethiopia exploited the pictures more cleverly – in such a way that pastoralists could, by just looking at the picture, easily attach a cash-value/denomination to a specific voucher. Afar pastoralists attach the highest value to camels, the next higher value to cattle, and the least value to shoats. Recognizing and utilizing this context, CARE used a picture of a *lactating* camel for the highest-valued voucher (birr 35), a picture of cattle for the next higher-valued

voucher (birr 25), and a picture of shoats for the voucher with the lowest-value (birr 20). As a result, beneficiaries in Awash-Fentale and Gewane could easily identify the denomination of the voucher in their hand, enabling them to pay only the appropriate amount to CAHWs for veterinary services; and just as easily could they know how much “money” they were left with until the expiry date of their vouchers.

Interestingly, FARM Africa applied the reverse order (to that of CARE) in using the pictures of animals to differentiate voucher denominations: picture of camels for the least valued voucher, and that of shoats for the highest valued voucher. Again, SC-UK did not at all use the pictures of animals to differentiate voucher denominations; rather the pictures were used to differentiate the types of drugs used to treat the different species – which could be of more use to the CAHWs treating the animals than to the beneficiaries themselves. Beneficiaries serviced by SC-UK’s project office had to “read” the numbers written on the vouchers to differentiate the denominations, except that the numbers are written different colours.

See Table 4.15 below for more information on the different features of the vouchers used by the agencies.

TABLE 4-15 COMPARISON OF FEATURES OF THE VOUCHERS USED BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

Features of Vouchers used by Implementing Agencies: Differences and Similarities				
S.No.	Voucher Specific Features	CARE	FARM Africa	SC-UK
1	Good quality of paper used (weight, moisture resistant, durable etc)	Yes	Yes	No
2	Easy to identify drug types used for different species	Yes	Yes	May be?*
3	Prevent fraud (Easy to identify authentic & forged vouchers)	Yes	Yes	May be No**
4	Help proper targeting (Space for bearer's identification)	Yes	No	Yes
5	Printed serial number (for monitoring or tracking vouchers)	Yes	Yes	No
6	Validity period (voucher expiry date easily known)***	May be	May be	May be
7	Local language used in the voucher	No	No	No
8	Denominations printed (appropriateness depends on cost of drugs)	20 birr, 25 birr, 35 birr	1 birr, 5 birr, 10 birr	5 birr, 10 birr, 20 birr
9	Total Value of Distributed per HH	160 birr	74 birr	Vary from 35 to 105 birr
10	Economical for printing (Less number of vouchers printed)	Yes	No	No
11	Voucher value identifying method (apart from printed number)	Animals: Camel=35, Cattle=25, shoats=20	Animals: Camel=1, Cattle=5, Shoats=10	Colors: red=5, green=10, blue=20
12	Easily identifiable denominations (User friendliness, See No. 11)	Yes	No	No
13	Cost of drugs printed on voucher (for the beneficiary)	No	No	No
14	Voucher distribution method	All at once	All at once	In three phases
* Drugs that are not applicable for a given species are not clearly indicated in SC-UK's voucher				
** Only office seal is used in SC-UK's vouchers to prevent fraud, can easily be printed using an office printer				
*** Expiry date on voucher is written in Gregorian calendar in all agencies				

Why print different denominations of the voucher?

Finally, having discussed all about the vouchers used by the three implementing agencies of the LBFERP (their features, denominations printed etc), it may help future programming to ponder a bit on one more question: Why was it important, in the first place, to print three ‘different denominations’ of the voucher? Was there a *real* need to print three different denominations in the context of the LBFERP? What was there in the animal health service provided by the LBFERP that ‘three denominations’ could do but that a single ‘denomination’ wouldn’t?

Basically, voucher schemes require a functioning market to be effective, which in the present case might mean the availability of private veterinary service providers in the project area. However, due to the absence of such providers, the voucher-based animal health service had to be implemented through CAHWs and the woredas' PARDOs. As such, what the beneficiaries had to do to get the service (once they are selected and got their vouchers) is show their valid voucher to the CAHW; and what the CAHW does is put marks on the voucher (to indicate the type of drugs, amount used etc) after providing the services required of him at that visit. And this exact type of service could be provided using just a *single* voucher, on which the total (fixed) cash-value or amount may be indicated. The beneficiaries do not necessarily need to have or carry three vouchers to get this service.

In other words, if a similar project were to be implemented in just a similar context (voucher-based animal health service with all conditions remaining the same), it should be possible to do the job using a voucher with a *single* 'denomination' or value, without going through all the troubles of designing and printing different denominations of the voucher. Apparently, there is no *real* need to print several denominations of the voucher as a single voucher with a fixed cash-value can serve the purpose just as effectively. As such, considerable time and resources used in the processes of designing, printing, awareness creation, etc could have been saved if a single voucher were used in LBFER.

VIEWS OF BENEFICIARIES ON VOUCHERS

The evaluation sought to elicit information about the experiences of beneficiaries themselves in all sampled woredas with regard to the use of vouchers in delivering the veterinary health component of the project. Both FGD participants and respondents of the HH survey expressed their views about whether they preferred vouchers to other type of support, the reasons for their preference and what the advantages and disadvantages of the voucher system were. Of all the respondents in the sampled woredas, an overwhelming majority (95%) said they preferred the voucher approach. Disaggregated by woreda, 92.6%, 93.1% and 100.0% of beneficiaries in Assayita, Buremudaitu and Awash Fentale respectively, preferred vouchers to other forms of support.

Those beneficiaries of the animal health component who preferred the voucher-based support were further asked what the reasons are for their preference. The commonly mentioned reasons for preferring voucher-based support, in all sampled woredas and kebeles, are summarized below:

- Vouchers are used for the intended purpose only (getting veterinary service); had cash been given instead, they might have spent it on other things or needs;
- Value of aid/support provided is known;
- The amount used and remaining amount (in value of voucher) is known;
- Gives choice of treatment service (we choose which of our animals gets the veterinary service, and when)
- Increased awareness about modern veterinary services: ("We now know that one vaccination alone cannot cure all animal diseases" or that "different drugs are needed to cure different diseases". Previously many of them wrongly believed that one vaccine cures all diseases, and they used to fear (wrongly) that vaccines even kill their livestock)
- We get (free) veterinary service
- We get proper treatment for our livestock, and enough amount of drugs (doses)
- Vouchers ensure equitable service ("everybody who has got vouchers gets the veterinary service from CAHWs");
- We now know that we need to save money for veterinary services;
- We know cost of drugs;
- Vouchers assure us that we are direct beneficiaries;
- Pictures on the vouchers help identify the type of drugs.

Some disadvantages of the voucher mentioned by the beneficiaries were:

- Duration was short, there was no continuity of service;
- Late start of voucher based service (mainly in Buremudaitu);
- Value of voucher provided is not proportional to number of livestock owned (same amount is given to all regardless of livestock owned);
- Voucher's value was not enough;

- We had some difficulty in identifying the different denominations of voucher and we had to seek help from someone who can read (mentioned by mainly in Assayita, and some in Buremudaitu)

TABLE 4-16 RESPONSES TO VOUCHER RELATED QUESTIONS OF HH SURVEY, BY WOREDA

Question	Response	Woreda							
		Assayita		Buremudaitu		Awash Fentale		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Got Voucher	Yes	26	100.0%	62	100.0%	48	100.0%	136	100.0%
	Total	26	100.0%	62	100.0%	48	100.0%	136	100.0%
Were there vouchers left Unused	Yes	3	12.0%	22	40.7%	6	13.6%	31	25.2%
	No	22	88.0%	32	59.3%	38	86.4%	92	74.8%
	Total	25	100.0%	54	100.0%	44	100.0%	123	100.0%
Prefer voucher to in-kind support	Yes	25	92.6%	54	93.1%	47	100.0%	126	95.5%
	No	2	7.4%	4	6.9%	0	.0%	6	4.5%
	Total	27	100.0%	58	100.0%	47	100.0%	132	100.0%
Will pay for LS health	Agree	NA		NA		44	95.7%	44	95.7%
	Not sure	NA		NA		2	4.3%	2	4.3%
	Total	NA		NA		46	100.0%	46	100.0%

CAHWs were asked (through a semi-structured interview) about the advantages of the voucher system in relation to the CAHWs themselves. The advantages mentioned were:

- Increased income as they serve more clients;
- Get information about dosage (voucher helps in knowing correct drug doses);
- The type of drug written on voucher is useful;
- Reduced number of clients seeking service on credit;
- Convenient for locating potential clients (as we know who received voucher);
- Satisfaction from better service to community;
- Voucher helps differentiate treated & untreated animals (or HHs who used voucher & for what animals)

TABLE 4-17 SUMMARIES OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF VOUCHER APPROACH IN LBFERP

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhances proper use of aid (Used only for intended purpose) • Equitable (all beneficiaries who got voucher get the service) • Enhances proper targeting (only targeted households get service, and animals receive treatments) • Protects illegal trading and wrong use of livestock medicines (allows the use of only the specific drugs listed in the voucher) • Allows flexibility on date of service within the expiry period (beneficiaries can receive the service any time within the project period) • Voucher allow easier monitoring and control of service delivery to beneficiaries • Encourage private investments and build capacities of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs time and great effort at the initial stage (beneficiaries cannot easily understand how the systems will operate at the beginning, implementers may face resistance) • Requires care in designing vouchers, illiterate beneficiaries may not easily understand or differentiate the different monetary values of the voucher • May be costly than cash grants (requires expenses related to printing and other labour, material and service costs) • Involves many stakeholders and partners (e.g. PARDO, communities, implementing partners, private providers, and other relevant stakeholders) • Short-term in duration, and experience is gained in

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p>existing local institutions like CAHWs (the system motivates professionals to invest in private veterinary services/drug shops)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ensures adequacy of drug doses and treatment service ● Enhances access to service (benefits households in remote areas) ● Can increase awareness of the community on different types of veterinary services (pictures on the voucher help this purpose) ● Enhances local economy (can efficiently use local service delivery systems because CAHWs and private veterinary service providers are paid upon delivery of vouchers used) ● Confidence of beneficiaries (“Voucher is like a money at hand”) ● Promote modern veterinary systems (if effectively implemented, can change attitudes to use of service in the future on cash basis) ● Convenient (reduces travel time, saves labour to be used for other productive purposes, and can save energy of animals as CAHWs can provide the service door to door or wherever the animals are) ● No risks of price change (the service is given at constant price during intervention period) ● Can create conducive environment to create awareness before the treatment service (as voucher distribution sites can be used to create awareness on the types of treatment services that will follow and makes beneficiaries to be prepared and ready) 	<p>small-scale exercises;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Voucher amount provided is usually uniform (regardless of livestock owned); ● In low-capacity contexts (e.g. absence of veterinary service providers or trained CAHWs), the use of voucher transfer is not the appropriate response in the immediate aftermath of an emergency; ● A wider use of voucher transfers may increase the risk of fraud and corruption (requires a high level of transparency in reporting and accounting procedures); ● Wide areas covered by a single CAHW undermines effectiveness of voucher-based veterinary service provided through CAHWs <p style="text-align: center;">Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In the absence of private providers, vouchers creates the opportunity to deploying CAHWs as providers during implementation of animal health interventions which in turn improves the incomes as well as the capacities of the CAHWs in quality service delivery. ● Faster response time in emergency situations (voucher transfers could be mobilized more rapidly as a resource to meet identified needs) ● Allows complementarities (Can be used in combination with other types of support as in LBFERP in Afar) ● Growing knowledge base (good practice information) as vouchers are increasingly being used in humanitarian interventions in different contexts

5. SUSTAINABILITY

In some respects, sustainability is not such a significant issue when considering emergency response interventions since their primary purpose is merely to provide immediate but temporary, short-term humanitarian relief. However, given the devastation caused by recurring floods (occurring almost every year (Afar DPFSB, Feb 2011 - Jan 2012)) in the project woredas, there are significant long term impacts for the affected populations. As such, critical questions to ask here may include: how the implementing agencies’ responses and recovery interventions enabled communities to rebuild their livelihoods, how have the interventions been linked to longer term livelihoods rehabilitation and development, and to what extent has disaster risk reduction (DRR) been considered in ensuring that beneficiaries and partner institutions are better prepared for future disasters of this magnitude and scope.

As such, one aspect of sustainability that requires close attention by the agencies, the government and its development partners is the strengthening of private sector veterinary service provision in the region, which currently is practically non-existent.

Regarding the LBFERP, the project planned and implemented capacity building measures which are intended to enhance the sustainability of project activities and results. Most important among these measures are the different trainings provided to veterinary professionals and related technical staff in government line departments to build the capacities of public sector veterinary functions; and the refresher trainings provided to the CAHWs. Enhancing the capacities of CAHWs was not only

necessary for the delivery of the animal health component of the project, but also a valuable means of addressing the veterinary service needs of pastoralists in the area after project completion. The relevant trainings provided during the project period can significantly contribute towards ensuring sustainability; but these trainings alone are not sufficient.

Of course, apart from the trainings given to community members and local government staff, the implementing agencies handed over (unutilized) veterinary drugs to the respective woreda PARDOs. CARE also provided some amount of drugs to CAHWs by way of incentives and to keep them in business. These measures can help enhance local capacities but their effects are likely to be short lived.

For example, when asked what they intend to do with the veterinary drugs they received from SC-UK at the end of the project, an official from the Assayita woreda PARDO informed the evaluation team that they have no plans (or even intention) of continuing the provision of the voucher-based veterinary service (either through CAHWs or otherwise). On the other hand, however, many beneficiaries in Assayita were holding on to some of their unused vouchers (although the project had long been completed) hoping to get the veterinary services using the vouchers.

As such, the capacity building measures taken by the project may not be sustainable, as these have not been adequately institutionalized in the sense that reliable mechanisms and linkages were not put in place where the roles and responsibilities of the entities taking over the activities are clearly defined and funding mechanisms are identified. Establishing systems for monitoring (by the implementing agencies) regarding the utility of the drugs handed over to the PARDOs could help organizational learning for future programs. These could be factors limiting the sustainability of project benefits unless a more sustainable solution is found through the concerted efforts by relevant agencies and stakeholders.

Therefore, the sustainability of the benefits derived from the LBFERP are at risk of being lost because there was no detailed exit strategy in place to ensure that all components are fully supported by local entities upon termination of the project.

6. CROSSCUTTING ISSUES

Gender, Environment and HIV/AIDS

In woredas worst hit by floods, the flood has disrupted every single person's life; however, the impact of the devastation was much severe on the poor, the women, children and the elderly. Children easily get sick due to lack of milk and other nourishing foods, and following drinking of contaminated water. As women are the ones very much responsible to care for the children as well as for sick and stranded livestock, their workload increases considerably.

Accordingly, the design of the project gives emphasis to women from the outset, planning that 30% of the beneficiaries would be female headed households. The project, throughout all its stages and in all its components was gender sensitive and has properly addressed the issues of women's involvement in all endeavours including beneficiary selection. The beneficiary selection were carried out based on agreed criteria, which among other things addressed gender, age, degree of the problem, number of children under 5, livestock and farm land ownership.

Of the total 31,419 beneficiary households in all intervention woredas, 28.62% were female headed households and have shared all the benefits from the project components. Even though the plan also states that (in addition to female-headed HHs) priority would also be given to other disadvantaged groups (e.g. chronically sick or disabled people) there were no data in the reports of all the implementing agencies regarding the number of such beneficiaries or if they were given special support at all.

Despite the important steps taken by the project to addresses gender issues, there were some aspects of the challenge that were not properly addressed. A case in point is the failure to redesign the project to fill the gap created by FAO's withdrawal, which left challenges that could have potential implications to women in particular unaddressed (Support in terms of water point rehabilitation and emergency feed supplies would have significantly reduced the work burden on

women). Although this evaluation did not particularly analyzed the effects of the absence of these activities it is believed that women did not fully benefit from the project as was initially intended.

Environment

Important measure was taken by the project to protect the environment from pollution. During the intervention period, various efforts have been done not to harm the environment in such a way that used drugs, vaccine vials and sealants were returned after use and properly disposed off.



FIGURE 7: FGD WITH WOMEN'S ONLY GROUP (ASSAYITA WOREDA)

HIV/AIDS

The joint plan of LBFERP gives due emphasis to addressing the needs of sick and vulnerable community members in that they receive priority in beneficiary selection; and selection is done in such a way that proxy indicators (such as HHs with members suffering from chronic infections and illnesses) are used to avoid stigmatization of those infected/affected community members. Moreover, the project includes HIV/AIDS awareness creation sessions during trainings and occasions involving community activities.

However, regarding awareness creation, with the exception of CARE Ethiopia (which reported that it allocated time for discussing HIV/AIDS issues at every occasion and activity involving community participation), there neither was any evidence nor was any mention (in the final reports) of such activity during the project period by SC-UK and FARM Arica.

7. LESSONS LEARNED

- 1) Agencies involved in implementing livelihoods-based interventions need to adopt innovative and flexible systems so as to reduce the response-time in different emergency scenarios. Agencies and donors need to think ahead about the next hazard (flood, draught) and put in place more enabling systems for timely response in the event of such hazards.
- 2) The benefits of well planned, designed and executed voucher-based animal health interventions are multifaceted. Apart from the direct benefits gained from the veterinary service itself, such interventions have the potential to dispel long-standing myths in Afar (such as “vaccination kills livestock”, “one vaccination cures all livestock diseases” to mention just a few) which hitherto contributed to the limited market for private providers, there are benefits by way of improved awareness about (and market demand for) modern veterinary services. The use of vouchers also fosters the development of private sector veterinary service provision by creating the conditions and opportunities for promoting the service, and in the absence of private providers creates the opportunity to deploying CAHWs as providers during implementation of animal health interventions which in turn improves the incomes as well as the capacities of the CAHWs in quality service delivery.

- 3) Through better coordination among implementing agencies, service provision through the voucher approach can be made more economical in terms of reducing design and printing costs, saving time, avoiding duplication of efforts etc.; and coordination creates better chances of achieving intended results.
- 4) If a similar project were to be implemented in just a similar context (voucher-based animal health service with all conditions remaining the same), it is possible to do the job using a voucher with a single 'denomination' or value, without going through all the troubles of designing and printing different denominations of the voucher.
- 5) In planning interventions involving maintenance/construction of infrastructure (such as irrigation canals), allocating a lump-sum amount without adequate market assessment is not sufficient as unforeseen shortage of funds might compromise efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention. Infrastructure works, by their very nature, require a special set of skills and material inputs, and are often outside the common operating functions of the project implementing agencies. Therefore, from the outset, budget allocation should always be accompanied by work and quality specifications, i.e., decisions about budget allocation should be based on a reasonably detailed set of specifications outlining the type of materials, expertise, etc and other inputs to be used during implementation.
- 6) Strengthening agricultural supports (tools, seed, fertilizers etc.) to pastoralist areas where there is access to irrigation can contribute to efforts towards improving food-security of agro-pastoralists (although this requires further investigation before a scaled-up application).
- 7) A considerable amount of the success of the LBFER Project in Afar, once the project is launched, can be attributed to the close collaboration of agency staff with their counterparts in the woreda PARDOs. This has been the case, at least in Awash Fentale and Assayita woredas, where the respective focal persons had good understanding with each other, were highly motivated and they positively engaged themselves towards the common goal of protecting the livelihoods of flood affected pastoralists in their area. The lesson that can be learned here is that, notwithstanding other requirements, in emergency interventions like the present one, recruiting highly motivated project staff having good interpersonal relationship skills (and who are familiar with conditions in the project area) can mean the difference between success and failure of the projects.
- 8) Several versions (in soft copies) of the joint project plan have been circulating among the implementing agencies and the donor. As such it was difficult to locate the final version of the joint plan which was approved by HRF. There were some discrepancies between the joint project proposal that the evaluation team obtained from SC-UK and the separate project agreement documents that each of the implementing agencies individually signed with the Afar region (ADPFSB and APADB); and this situation created some difficulties during the evaluation. As such, agencies need to make sure important documents (electronic or otherwise) are properly archived for easy access at later stages.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Over all the LBFERP in Afar has been successful in addressing the identified needs of the communities in the targeted areas; though the extent of achieving intended outcomes and performance results are mixed across the six project woredas. Despite the delays in project start-up, the evaluation concluded that, once the implementation was started, the project has generally been effective, efficient and highly relevant; and that it achieved its main objective – protecting livelihood assets of flood affected communities.

Technically, the project's design did well to include two very relevant components (livestock and crop related) and aimed at protecting livelihoods of 35, 275 HHs and vaccinate/treat 711,661 heads of livestock in the six woredas. However, due to the gap left by the withdrawal of FAO (which was to implement the water point development and animal feed sub-components), the extent of the project's impact on livelihoods of beneficiaries, especially in terms of reducing the work burden on women, were not as originally intended.

The observed changes, as defined by the beneficiaries themselves, include improvement in the body conditions of their livestock, reduced disease-related livestock deaths, higher prices for livestock, improved livestock productivity and improved milk production and consumption, reduced expenditures on seeds, farm tools and livestock health services, and improved capacities of CAHWs. The data also revealed that there are evidences of improvement in terms of access to diversified sources food (decreased dependence in purchases and food-aid).

The level of coordination among implementing agencies has been higher at the initial stages, but it somehow waned towards the middle of the project period. As such, and there is a need (and ample room) for improved coordination and collaboration in future joint interventions.

The voucher-based approach has been particularly successful: it had been instrumental in achieving the project objective; it has been widely accepted by the beneficiaries and contributed a great deal in the improved awareness among beneficiaries about modern veterinary services.

In conclusion, the project's beneficiaries in the sampled woredas and kebeles, almost without exception, believe that the LBFERP has been a very successful one; and that they had not seen any other intervention quite like this one in terms of its effectiveness and coverage, and this is particularly true of the animal health component. This view was shared by key informants from woreda PARDO offices. However, most of the beneficiaries also said that its duration was very short and expressed their concerns regarding the sustainability of the benefits derived from the project.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The achievement of planned results (outcomes/impacts) of emergency interventions are usually hampered due to delays (slow response time) caused mainly by the long time it takes to kick-off (long processes to complete the paperwork - proposal development and approval and procurement of inputs and deploying project staff etc. As such,
 - 1.1. Donor agencies and implementing agencies need to set up alternative mechanisms and procedures (separate from those that apply to development aids) by which emergency responses to such rapid-onset shocks as floods are treated to reduce response time;
 - 1.2. When one project is implemented jointly by two or more aid agencies, it is recommended that a leading and responsible body (e.g. a steering committee with members from implementing agencies) be formed which coordinates the overall implementation of the project; monitors activities and achievement of intended results in proper time; and this body should have operating mandates for a duration lasting from inception to completion of the intervention.
2. All six project woredas (Mille, Aysayta, Gewane, Amibara, Buremudaytu and Awash Fentale) and surrounding areas were continuously affected by floods in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010; and each time they needed external aid to cop with the impacts of the floods on their livelihoods. As such, there is an urgent need to design development interventions (as opposed to emergency responses) to enhance the resilience of communities in these areas against the negative impacts of the recurrent floods;
3. In Afar, food insecurity is a major concern of its inhabitants as well as development partners as the livelihoods of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are often threatened by the frequent occurrence of shocks (floods, draughts, conflicts, disease outbreaks etc). And since livestock are the main stay of Afar pastoralists' livelihoods, outbreaks of livestock diseases as a result such shocks threaten their livelihood assets and the victims have very little choice by way of viable coping mechanisms. Therefore, diversifying their food sources and livelihoods strategies is of paramount importance. There were evidences (during this intervention) that due to the tangible benefits of the crop and hand tools support by the LBFERP, many agro-pastoralists (and even some pastoralists) are becoming

more enthusiastic about practicing irrigated farming. Thus, although this observation has to be supported by further investigations covering a wider area, considering the potential that the Awash river offers for applying irrigation farming on a larger scale, implementing well designed livelihoods-based interventions focusing on agriculture (which among others, include supports like provision of adequate farm tools, improved crop and forage seeds, trainings in farm management, access to improved irrigation systems etc) have the potential to greatly improve the livelihoods of agro-pastoralists because such supports encourage them to be more and more engaged in practicing agriculture as a viable means towards ensuring their own food security in the long run.

4. Considering the dispersed nature of settlements of the communities in the Afar region and their seasonal mobility, currently the area covered by a single CAHW to deliver veterinary service is large. As such, there is a need to increase the number of CAHWs in the project area to improve accessibility and service delivery. This is especially important for future voucher-based veterinary emergency projects, due to the limited (usually short) period given to such projects; and using many CAHWs allows coverage of large areas in short periods.
5. Despite several efforts by different aid agencies and the government to tackle the shortage of water sources for livestock, it still remains a chronic problem in the project area. As such, aid agencies need to seriously consider incorporating development of water sources such as birkas, shallow wells, etc in their livelihoods based interventions to improve the situation;
6. There are virtually no private veterinary service providers in the region, despite evidences of demand for the services. As such, development programs by government and its development partners need to intensify their engagement in programs and mechanisms that foster the emergence and development of private sector veterinary service provision, including support in terms of access to finance (credit facilities), drug supplies at subsidized costs (cost recovery basis), facilitating trainings to existing practitioners, CAHWs etc.;
7. There is a need to strengthen existing women groups and co-operatives (and facilitate establishment of new ones) to engage them in small businesses and trade - such as milk, meat, ghee, forage seeds etc., with a view to empowering women and ensuring their own food security;
8. The monitoring and evaluation aspect of emergency responses is often paid little attention, probably owing to the “emergency” nature of the interventions. This unfortunately common practice has made monitoring as well as evaluation of the planned outcomes/results of many an intervention difficult/impossible, thereby reducing effectiveness, efficiency and hampering learning and accountability.
 - 8.1 The M&E system of an intervention (be it emergency or otherwise) should be regarded as a *long-term* effort, as opposed to a periodic effort for a short period or for the duration of a specific project/program. As such, setting up adequate mechanisms for the purpose should be a key activity of humanitarian interventions.
 - 8.2 During emergency responses, the issue of establishing baselines is often neglected. Data from initial assessments are not adequate and/or they usually do not match (or are not comparable with) those required for the evaluation of the interventions, i.e. they do not allow proper comparison of situations before and after the intervention. As such, it is recommended that even emergency projects consider the collection of baseline data on the main indicators (those used for measuring the intended targets/results) within the first few weeks of the project so as to facilitate comparison of ‘before’ and ‘after’ situations in the intervention area (this would allow proper evaluation of the intervention thereby greatly enhancing accountability and learning).
 - 8.3 There is still an unmet need to support/strengthen response planning capacities of public sector as well as implementing agency staff engaged in such interventions.

- 8.4 It is also quite necessary that donors as well as implementing partners require the incorporation of adequate *Results Monitoring and Evaluation Plans* in the design of emergency responses from the out set, and set mechanisms to follow up adherence to the same throughout the different implementation stages of the interventions.

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10. APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)

Terms of Reference for **The Evaluation of Livelihoods based Flood Emergency Response Project in Afar** **National Regional State**

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Ethiopia experienced massive flooding in several parts of the country, which affected the lives and livelihoods of the pastoral communities. Afar National Regional State was one of the areas affected by the flood disaster, which destroyed crops, infrastructure (homes, roads, water points and bridges), and pasture for livestock. The disaster resulted in displacement and migration of people to the highland areas.

To address these flood-induced problems, three agencies namely CARE, FARM Africa and Save the Children UK, designed a joint flood response project entitled “**Livelihoods Based Flood Emergency Response in Afar Regional State.**” This project was funded by UNOCHA/HRF in Ethiopia.

The project focused on the protection of the livelihood assets and recovery of pastoral and agro-pastoral households through livestock and crop related interventions. Planned interventions were designed to protect household assets by improving animal health; livestock feed and seeds to the agro pastoralists to cultivate. The project was implemented in six Woredas namely Assaita, Mille, Awash-Fentale, Gewane, Amibara and Buremodaitu from December, 2010-June,2011.

The interventions by CARE, FARM-Africa and SCUUK ended on 30th June 2011 and therefore, SCUUK on behalf of the partners is seeking a consultancy firm to conduct the final evaluation of the Livelihood-Based Flood Emergency Response. The consultant (s) will assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and implementation approach (e.g. voucher system) of the intervention and document the impact and coverage of the programme.

2. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The extremely heavy rainfall in the highland areas coupled with significant rainfall in the low lands of Afar increased the volume of water in the perennial and seasonal rivers to Afar region from the highlands of Ethiopia. This resulted in the flooding of Mille, Dubti, Adaar, Ayssaita, Amibara, Gewane, Awash Fentale, Dallol, Teru and Telalakworedas especially towns and villages along the riverbanks. About 67,420 people in 46 kebeles were affected including thousands of livestock. There were no loss of human life in any of the woredas but there were loss of livestock, damage of 3,096 ha of standing crop, and loss of other assets like shelters and home utensils (HHs)¹⁴. Assessments were conducted in the affected woredas to assess the damage and the threats caused by the flood and the following needs were identified: livestock feed, animal health (mass treatment and vaccinations), crops seeds (maize and vegetable seeds), WASH, rehabilitation of damage roads and bridges to increase access and NFI assistance to the affected community.

Livestock productivity was threatened by the occurrence of sporadic and outbreak of flood borne diseases (e.g. infectious diseases such as anthrax, blackleg, pasturellosis, pneumonia and other contagious diseases). The likely occurrence of water and soil borne disease is higher in flood-affected areas causing deaths and loss of assets thus undermining the resilience of

¹⁴ Reports from the Woreda Administrations and Regional DPFBSB – September 2010.

the pastoral community. The Livelihood based Flood Emergency Response in Afar Regional State objectives, there fore is to protect livelihood assets and speed up recovery of flood affected vulnerable pastoral and agro pastoral households through livestock and crop related interventions.

The Afar region is one of nine administrative regions of Ethiopia located within the north eastern lowlands, bordering Djibouti to the east and Eritrea to the north. The area is characterized by a harsh climate with temperatures up to 40°C, highly variable average precipitation between 5 and 600 mm annually, and recurrent droughts and floods. Under these conditions the mobile pastoralisms’ the dominant type of land is based on spatial mobility and flexible use of dispersed pasture and water resources over space and time (Lewis, 1969; Kassa, 2001a). Most of the 1.4 million Afar who are the main inhabitants of the region (Central Statistical Authority, 2008) depend on mixed stocks of camels, cattle, sheep and goats¹⁵.

3. Purpose of the consultancy

The overall purpose of the terminal evaluation is to assess the effectiveness, relevance, and impact of the Livelihoods-based Flood Emergency Response project in six woredas (Assaita, Mille Awash-Fentale, GewaneAmibara and Buremodaitu) of Afar National Regional State. The specific purposes of this terminal evaluation are:

- To conduct a joint final evaluation of the Livelihood-based Flood Emergency Interventions in Afar Region, implemented by CARE, FARM-Africa and SCUk
- To document lessons learned across agencies, assess the project implementation modalities, relevance and identify areas to scale up for future programming.
- To assess the intervention’s achievements against planned objectives and document the impact of the interventions
- To assess and document the experience of voucher based approach (cash transfer) employed during implementation as well as the strengths, Limitations, Opportunities and document lessons from this approach for future implementation.
- To make specific conclusions and recommendations of the interventions to inform future programming.

AREA OF FOCUS	ISSUES TO BE EXPLORED
1. Design	The consultant is expected to look into the design issues of the programmes. This will include geographic and beneficiary targeting, rationale/justification for the response, complementarity of the intervention with the existing programme, opportunities and challenges encountered and possible solutions suggested for better future programming.
2. Efficiency	Analysis of cost efficiency in achieving the outputs, cost per household and other important analysis regarding programme efficiency.
3. Effectiveness/impact	The consultant is expected to analyse and measure the extent to which the programme achieved the desired goals, targets and change, including the short and long term impact of the interventions, intended and unintended. This will also include analysis of the programme monitoring data to assess the programme performance in terms of:

¹⁵ Contested narratives of pastoral vulnerability and risk in Ethiopia’s Afar Region: by Simone Rettberg.

	<p>Production from seed supports and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure; Seed stock for future use; Livestock mortality reduction in and losses otherwise; Level of Regional, Zonal and Woreda government staff understanding, attitude and involvement; Community involvement and participation.</p>
4.Relevance and Coherence	<p>Determine whether or not the programmes were timely and geared up adequately to meet the increasing numbers and level of access to the programme by beneficiaries. The consultant will assess how well the implementation of the programme was coordinated with that of others and local structures, the level of government (Agriculture and Rural Development) involvement and coordination with other stakeholders throughout the programme period as well an analysis of opportunities and challenges.</p>
5. Voucher approach system(cash transfer)	<p>The consultant will assesses and document the experience and lesson learned in voucher based (cash transfer) approach employed during project implementation. The consultant will assess the Strengths, Limitations, and Opportunities of this approach.</p>
6. Coverage	<p>The consultant will assess temporal, spatial and beneficiary coverage aspects of the project. This could entail, inter alia: whether or not all those flood affected farm households who were in need in project Woredas were considered (inclusion and exclusion); and the adequacy of project period to meet its objectives.</p>

4. Scope of work

The final evaluation will focus on the process of project implementation as planned. The consultant will:

4.1 Review the existing documents available within Save the Children UK& its partners. These are:

Project proposal

Project reports (monthly progress, mid term report and field visit reports)

Programme monitoring data and statistics and to include programme performance indicators

4.2 Project/Field visit. The following activities will be conducted:

Visit and discuss with authorities and experts in government partners offices (Region, Zone and Woreda offices of Agriculture and Food Security and Disaster Preparedness and prevention).

Visit the project activities and discussion with implementing partners

Hold focus group discussions with the beneficiary farm households in project Woredas.

Conduct Focus Group Discussions with community groups, CAHWs, DAs, Community Leaders and beneficiaries level with the presence of all concerned partner agency staff members and donors.

4.4 The consultant will analyze beneficiary data and records and prepare draft report to submit for SCUUK Addis office for any comments.

4.5 Amend the draft report based on feedback given at all levels.

4.6 Submit the final version of the report both in hard and soft copies.

5. Roles and Responsibilities

The consultant will:

Undertake all activities stated in the scope of work

Responsible for the tasks specified and for making sure quality of work is done in the agreed time frame

Debrief the field assessment works both at Zonal and Addis levels;

Produce a final report with sound recommendations;

Identified lessons drawn and best practices.

Closely work with concerned SCUUK and partner organization staffs at all stage of the evaluation work.

Save the children UK will:

Facilitate the work as per the specified activity and timeframe in the outline provided above, providing transport and other logistical support;

Provide resources and contacts identified/mentioned in these terms of reference;

Effect payments according to the agreement;

Assign vehicle and required logistics.

6. Proposed Methodology

The data collection and analysis for this evaluation should employ mixed participatory tools including qualitative and quantitative methods. SC UK expects that the consultants should visit sites and review secondary and primary data through key informant interview and focused group discussions. Sources of secondary data will include program documents (proposal, results framework, work plan, and budget) documents and reports, articles, surveys, and existing monitoring and evaluation reports, whenever available. The consultant is expected to come up with detailed data collection methods and checklists.

7. Expected Output and deliverables

Analysis of the over all project implementation;

Lessons drawn and best practices of the project will be identified for future programming and scale up;

Analysis of the voucher based approach (cash transfer) i.e. SLOR of the voucher approach deployed during implementation

Recommendation to improve livelihood focused flood response projects will be suggested;

High quality evaluation report which includes:

Executive summary

Background information

Methodology of data Collection

Project deliverables

Modalities of Intervention and Integration with other/Similar Programmes

Findings

Challenges

Lessons Learnt and Best practices

Recommendations to include possible long term interventions

8. Management Structure

The Commissioning manager for the technical support on the side of SC UK Ethiopia programme will be Hailekiros Desta (SCUK Livelihoods Technical manager). The commissioning manager will liaise closely with relevant people within SCUK as well as with CARE and FARM-Africa. At project level, SCUK Operations Manager in Semera or his delegate will provide the support.

9. Time Frame

This evaluation should be completed within 6 weeks including desk review, field assessment and report writing up. The first draft report will be expected within 10 days after the field visit is completed. Final version should be submitted within five days of receiving feedback on first draft from all implementing partners through SCUK.

10. Terms of Payment

The payment will be on fixed terms with disbursements detailed below:

- 1) 30% of the total amount shall be paid upon signing of the contractual agreement
- 2) The remaining 30% shall be paid up on draft report submission,
3. The final 40% will be paid when the report is fully endorsed by SCUK.

11. Required Qualification and Experience

Qualifications in Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Economics, Emergency/Disaster Management, Rural Livelihoods, or such other related disciplines preferably at post graduate level is a requirement. The consultant is expected to have good research background and sufficient experience in designing, implementation and evaluation of emergency interventions and/or rural livelihood programmes in the Ethiopian context in general and in pastoral areas in particular. Furthermore, the consultant must have experience in the sectors outlined and must demonstrate exceptional skills in qualitative and quantitative research approaches to include exceptional report writing skills. In addition to these, the consultant should have demonstrated experience in managing, design and evaluation of agriculture focused emergency projects.

As part of the application process, the prospective consultant(s) will be required to submit a technical proposal including a draft work plan and financial proposal separately, of how they will accomplish this piece of work within the proposed period (which will then be used as the basis for the more detailed plan for the work itself).

Enquiries can be sent to:

Hailekiros Desta (Mr.)

Livelihoods Manager - Policy and Programmes Department

Save the Children UK, Ethiopia,

Office Tel: +251 (0) 11-629-3467/68

E-mail: hailekiros.D@scuk.org.et

Please send all applications (preferably by email) to:

Abate Mollaw: Human Resources and Administration Director

Save the children UK-Ethiopia

P.O. Box 7165, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Email Address: Abate.M@scuk.org.et

Landline:

Mobile: +

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Semi-Structured Interview with Officials from Government Offices

INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS
Greet the key informant. Introduce yourself if you have not had previous personal contact with him or her.
Thank the key informant for taking the time to talk with you about the ALBFER project. Provide a brief overview of why the interview is being conducted and why he was selected for interview.
In addition to the questions listed here, you may also want to probe further on topics that you find critical or interesting, but always remember to quickly return to the main topic of discussion.

Location: Woreda/city _____ Date: _____ Time: _____
Interviewer(s) Name: _____
Name of Key Informant: _____ Contact address: _____
Name of Organization: _____
Position: _____

1. How do you describe the current situation of the livelihoods of the flood affected communities in the project area as compared to that of the time right after the flood (which was indicated in the initial joint flood damage assessment)?

1.1 Please fill the following form for the period right after the 2010 flood, for this woreda¹⁶

Kebeles Affected (Name)	No. of affected HHS	No. of Targeted HHs	No. of Reported livestock death			Standing crop damaged (in ha)	No. of Water points damaged	Length of irrigation canal destroyed (in km)
			Camels	Cattle	Shoats			
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								

¹⁶ You may ignore this table if the data can be obtained from secondary sources (e.g. from the initial joint needs assessment)

1.2 Did **ALL** affected HHs get assistance? If not, why not? Was there any grievance handling mechanism in place in relation to targeting, equitability? Did you follow up adherence to agreed beneficiary targeting criteria?

1.3 Who (or which group) benefitted most? How?

1.4 Who (or which group) benefited the least or did not benefit at all? Why?

2. What was your involvement in the different phases of the project? What institutional linkages were there regarding project implementation?

Role During the initial joint needs assessment? _____

Role During project design? _____

Role During project implementation? _____

2.1 How did the targeted community members (beneficiaries) participate in all the above phases?

3. To what extent were the different components of the intervention were effective in achieving the planned results? Why? Or why not?

Animal health component: _____

Crop related component: _____

Capacity building component: _____

4. What changes have been observed in the lives of the beneficiaries as a result of the project as compared to their situation before the intervention?

Observed Change 1: _____

Evidence1: _____

Observed Change 2: _____

Evidence: _____

Observed Change 3: _____

Evidence: _____

5. If you have been working together with the implementing agencies, what were the agreed collaboration and reporting modalities during project implementation?

5.1 To what extent did every collaborating agency/partner play their assigned roles? If not, why not?

5.2 What problems (if any) did arise in relation to coordination? How were these problems addressed?

6. Were the infrastructure (roads, bridges, livestock water points, irrigation canals) damaged by the flood maintained? If so, was it timely? If not, why?

6.1 Were there any flood affected Kebeles/villages which were inaccessible (e.g. due to road damage) and hindered project implementation? If so, which kebeles/villages? What has been done by the project (or others) to reach and support these kebeles? If nothing is done, what was its effect on affected communities in relation to the project's results?

7. Were there any widespread livestock disease outbreaks which the project did not anticipate? If yes, how were these outbreaks handled and by whom?

8. What activities are planned (if any) and who will be responsible for the activities and resources required to ensure the sustainability of project results? What agreements/arrangements have been made with Gov./NGOs/ Community etc for this purpose?

9. What strengths, limitations and opportunities did you identify regarding the voucher approach?

Strengths: _____

Limitations: _____

Opportunities: _____

10. What are the three most important lessons you learned than can be useful in similar future interventions? (in terms of the different components of the intervention: seed support, animal health, animal feed etc.)

Lesson1. _____

Lesson2. _____

Lesson3. _____

11. Overall, do you think the project was a success in as far as achieving the main project objectives (viz. speedy recovery of livelihoods, increased milk production, reduced livestock mortality/morbidity)? Why?

Location: Woreda/city _____ Date: _____

Interviewer(s) Name: _____

Name of Organization: _____

Key informant interview questionnaire (Optional)

1- What is your opinion about the humanitarian community’s role in relief and recovery after the floods in your area?

1= Not Good	2 = Fair	3= Good	4=Very Good
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2- How did you find the Implementing Agency’s role in the intervention?

1= Not Good	2 = Fair	3= Good	4=Very Good
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3- Please rate Agency’s role as compared to other humanitarian organizations working in your area Rank 1-5, one being the lowest score and 5 highest

1	2	4	4	5
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4- Do you think communities still need the Implementation Agency’s collaboration for recovering from the impacts of the flood in view of the duration of the project?

1=1Yes	2 = No
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5- Do you agree that the Implementation Agency was able to implement the LBFER project effectively and reached out to communities as per their needs and priorities?

1= Disagree	2= Somehow Agree	3 = Agree	4= Totally Agree
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6- In your opinion, was the Implementing Agency able to ensure participation of all stakeholders during project planning and implementation?

1= Disagree	2= Somehow Agree	3 = Agree	4= Totally Agree
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APPENDIX 3: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS CONTACTED/INTERVIEWED

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1	Ato Hailekiros Desta	Livelihood Technical Manager	SCUK-Head Office, A.A
2	Ato Matebe Fente	Livelihoods Advisor	SCUK-Head Office, A.A
3	Mr. Peter Muhangi	Livelihoods Manager	SCUK-Head Office, A.A
4	Ato Wossen Getachew	Livelihood Advisor	SCUK-Head Office, A.A
5	Ato Teshome Zegeye	Area Operations Manager	SCUK - Field Office, Semera, Afar
6	Ato Jemal Mohammed	Project Officer (Crop Specialist)	SCUK- Field Project Office, Assayita
7	Dr. Ediget Tilahun	Project Officer (Livestock Health)	SCUK- Field Project Office, Assayita
8	Mr. Charles Hopkins	Pastoral Coordination Unit Head	CARE-Ethiopia-Head Office, A.A.
9	Dr. Amanuel Kassie	Livestock Services Advisor, Pastoral Coordination Unit	CARE-Ethiopia-Head Office, A.A.
10	Dr. Esmael	Project Officer (Livestock health)	CARE Ethiopia Field Office, Gewane
11	Ato Mandefro	Project Manager,	CARE Ethiopia Field Office, Gewane
12	Ato Kassaye		FARM-Africa-Head Office
13	Ato Alawis Ahmed	Project Manager,	FARM-Africa, Awash Arba Project Office
14	Ato Goytom	Project Officer	FARM-Africa, Awash Arba Project Office
15	Ato Ali Siraj	DPFS Directorate Head	Awash-Fentale Woreda PARDO
16	Ato Hamadu Ali	PARDO Head	Bouremudaytu woreda PARDO
17	Ato Mohamed Ali	PARDO Head	Asaita woreda PARDO
18	Ato Ibrahim	Deputy Head	Afar Regional State PARDB
19	W/ro Ayesha Mohammed	Head	Afar Regional State DPFSB
20	W/ro Seida Abdulkadir	NGO Coordinator	Afar Regional State DPFSB
21	Ato Mohammed Amin	Early Warning Program Coordinator	Afar Regional State DPFSB
22	Ato Mohammed Awol	Head	Afar Regional State APARDB
23	Ato Ware Musa	Kebele Chairman, CDC	Deho Kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
24	Ato Bayu Shimelis	Animal Health Assistant (AHA)	Deho Kebele, Awash Fentale woreda

25	W/ro Medina Mohammed	Women's Representative	Deho Kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
26	Ato Sema Aba'aba	Community elder	Deho Kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
27	Ato Habtamu Mekonnen	Development Agent (DA)	Deho Kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
28	Ato Abubeker Abaho	Animal Health Technician (AHT)	Deho Kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
29	Ato Ahado Ali	Kebele Chairman, CDC	Sabure Keble, Awash Fentale woreda
30	Ato Ne'ina Ber'ei	Clan leader	Sabure Keble, Awash Fentale woreda
31	W/ro Arba'ei Abahaba	Women's representative	Sabure Keble, Awash Fentale woreda
32	Ato Haye Ali	Youth representative	Sabure Keble, Awash Fentale woreda
33	Ato Daganachew Tuki	AHA	Sabure Keble, Awash Fentale woreda
34	Ato Hamedu Humed M/d	Kebele Chairman CDC	Boloyita kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
35	W/ro Zeyneba Ali	Women representative	Boloyita kebele, Awash Fentale woreda
36	Ato Abdo Dekeyisa	Chairman, FERC	Kebena 01, Awash Fentale Woreda
37	Ato Musa Koba	Kebele Chairman	Keredura Kebele, Assayita Woreda
38	Abdu Mohammed Seko	Religious leader	Keredura Kebele, Assayita Woreda
39	Ato Tewolde G/Tsadik	Development Agent	Keredura Kebele, Assayita Woreda
40	W/ro Merima Ali	Women's representative	Keredura Kebele, Assayita Woreda
41	Ato Abdu Hamed	Community Elder	Keredura Kebele, Assayita Woreda