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RELPA  
REGIONAL ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS  
IN PASTORAL AREAS

ELMT  
ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS IN  
THE MANDERA TRIANGLE

ELSE  
ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS IN  
SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA

# FINAL EVALUATION

Enhanced Livelihoods in the Manderia Triangle (ELMT) and  
Enhanced Livelihoods in Southern Ethiopia (ELSE)  
Program 2007-2009

**11 January 2010**

Nigel Nicholson  
Solomon Desta



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Nigel Nicholson and Solomon Desta

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
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## ACRONYMS

AFD	Action for Development (Ethiopia)
AFREC	African Rescue Committee (Somalia)
AHA	Animal Health Assistant
ALLPRO	Arid and Semi-arid Lands Rural Livelihoods Support Project
ALRMP	Arid Lands Resource Management Project (Kenya)
ASAL	Arid and Semi Arid Lands
BDS	Business Development Studies (ELMT/ELSE)
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program
CAHNet	Community Animal Health Network
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CASPRO	Camel Service Provider
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning & Response Mechanism (IGAD)
CERF	Common Emergency Response Fund (UN)
CIFA	Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance (Ethiopia and Kenya)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CoP	Chief of Party
CSPB	Conflict Sensitivity and Peace Building (TWG)
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer (USAID)
DCoP	Deputy Chief of Party
DFCS	Dollow Farmers Cooperative Society (Somalia)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK Government)
DIPS	Detailed Implementation Plans (USAID)
DPP	Drought Preparedness Programme (ECHO)
DRR	Drought Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
ELMT	Enhanced Livelihoods in Mandera Triangle (program)
ELSE	Enhanced Livelihoods in Southern Ethiopia (program)
EPAG	Emergency Pastoralist Action Group (Kenya)
FAO	Food & Agriculture Organisation (UN)
FEG	Food Economy Group
FFP	Food for Peace Programs (USG)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHFSI	Global Hunger Food Security Initiative (USAID)
GoK	Government of Kenya
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
HM	Holistic Management
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI)
HRF	Humanitarian Response Fund (OCHA)
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
IR	Intermediate Result (ELMT/ELSE)
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
KCA	Kenya Camel Association (Kenya)
LDM	Livelihood Diversity and Marketing (TWG)
LINKS	Livestock Information Network Knowledge System (Ethiopia)
LP	Livelihood Protection (TWG)
LVIA	Lay Volunteers International Association (Ethiopia)
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MoNK	Ministry for Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands

MODA	Moonlight Development Agency (Somalia)
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
NCE	No Cost Extension (USAID)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (UK)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USG)
PACAPS	Program Pastoral Areas Coordination Analysis & Policy Support (RELPA)
PCAE	Pastoralist Concern Association Ethiopia (Ethiopia)
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Project (Ethiopia)
PEAR	Participatory Education Awareness & Resource Innovations (Kenya)
PIA	Participatory Impact Assessment
PLI	Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative (Ethiopia)
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PPG	Pastoralist Production Group (ELMT/ELSE)
PVP	Private Veterinary Pharmacy (ELMT/ELSE)
RCPM	Regional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (RELPA)
RCU	Regional Coordination Unit (ELMT)
RDD	Regional Drought Decision (ECHO)
REGLAP	Regional Livelihoods Advocacy Project (Oxfam GB)
RELPA	Regional Enhanced Livelihoods for Pastoral Areas (USAID)
RFA	Regional Funding Application
RMU	Regional Management Unit (CARE)
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor
RREAD	Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (CARE)
SADO	Social Life & Agricultural Development Organisation (Somalia)
SAGE	Social and Gender Equity (TWG)
SC/UK	Save the Children UK
SC/US	Save the Children USA
SSS	Somalia/South Sudan (CARE)
TSCG	Technical Steering and Co-ordination Group
TWG	Technical Working Group (ELMT/ELSE)
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VSF-S	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Suisse
WFP	World Food Programme (UN)
WRRS	Wamo Relief & Rehabilitation Services (Somalia)

# Map of ELMT-RELPA Operational Area



## 1. Executive Summary

The Enhanced Livelihoods in Mander Triangle (ELMT) Program operates through a Cooperative Agreement (for which \$10 million was allocated) which was signed between CARE South Sudan/Somalia (SSS) as the lead agency of a Consortium of six international NGO partners<sup>1</sup> and USAID on 31 August 2007. The ELMT is the field “operational” component of the East Africa Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas (RELPA) funded by USAID which aims to support an effective transition from emergency relief to the promotion of long-term economic development in pastoral areas bordering Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia in the Horn of Africa region. Other components include: (i) support to the COMESA<sup>2</sup> Secretariat supporting the Pastoral Areas Policy Engagement process; (ii) the Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) to facilitate coordination and policy analysis on key pastoral issues; (iii) Regional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (RCPM); and (iv) emergency response and relief through the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

The ELMT is also known as Enhanced Livelihoods in Southern Ethiopia (ELSE) and is hereafter referred to in this report as ELMT/ELSE. The program aims to increase the self-reliance and resiliency of the population through improved livelihoods in drought prone pastoral areas affecting the Somali and Oromo clans (referred to in the program document as the Mander Triangle). The program specifically supports results to: (i) protect livestock-based livelihoods in emergencies; (ii) enhance livelihoods through improved livestock production, health and marketing; (iii) enhance natural resource management; (iv) strengthen alternative livelihood strategies; (v) strengthen capacity of customary institutions in peace building, civil governance and conflict mitigation; and (vi) strengthen the pastoralist area “voice” in dryland policy formulation and implementation. ELMT/ELSE adopted a strategy to deliver the program by: 1) consolidating the evidence base, (generated by the six INGOs and their partners, including customary institutions, at the field level), 2) scaling up best practices from the evidence-base, and 3) drawing upon these best practices to contribute to policy initiatives.

The program document identified the need to undertake a final evaluation of the ELMT/ELSE program. The evaluation was undertaken (November 2009) during the first phase of a no-cost extension (September to December 2009); another no-cost extension (January to April 2010) is currently under consideration by USAID. The principle objectives of the evaluation are to: (i) assess key achievements and impacts of the ELMT/ELSE program; (ii) assess the effectiveness of the Consortium in achieving ELMT/ELSE objectives; (iii) identify lessons learned and recommendations for consortium working; cross-border and regional programming; and donor policy for promoting pastoral livelihoods in the Horn of Africa; and (iv) encourage key stakeholders to constructively reflect on and learn from the ELMT/ELSE.

Key achievements and impacts of the ELMT/ELSE program are reviewed by outcomes and results identified in the logical framework. There were significant efforts by the ELMT/ELSE program to improve **early warning information, contingency planning and response** in support of livestock based livelihoods during emergencies. This component of the program benefited most from the collaboration with PACAPS supported through technical assistance from the Food Economy Group (FEG) which reconciled the livelihood analysis and zoning across the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Somali borders and rolled out a new approach to “early preparedness/response” to Consortium members on a pilot basis around Mander in north-east Kenya. Seven new contingency plans were developed

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<sup>1</sup> The INGOs include CARE South Sudan/Somalia, CARE Ethiopia, CARE Kenya, Save the Children US Ethiopia, Save the Children UK Ethiopia and Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Suisse Kenya/Somalia.

<sup>2</sup> COMESA is the regional economic community taking a lead for regional implementation of the African Union and the NEPAD-CAADP.



using this approach (2 in Ethiopia, 3 in Kenya, and 2 in Somalia). There are examples of some emergency response based upon these plans. Efforts by the program to generate regular updated livelihood analysis and harmonise early warning systems were severely undermined by the absence of Save the Children UK (SC/UK) technical support (livelihood protection) for much of 2009. These bimonthly syntheses are considered very important as they propose livelihood interventions that could be undertaken in different scenarios. However, because of lack of follow-up, there was little evidence that this analysis was used by Consortium partners or other actors (particularly local government).

The greatest focus on **livestock health** was through animal health rather than production or marketing. ELMT/ELSE has built upon earlier efforts of Consortium partners to train community animal health workers (CAHW), training a total of 255 in two years on animal husbandry and health (with more focus on camels) in all three countries (including a significant number of female CAHWs). However access to affordable, quality drugs has been a long-standing issue. VSF Suisse piloted an approach linking community animal health workers (CAHW) with community drug stores and private vet drug suppliers using a risk-share model. The pilot has been very successful as evidenced by the evaluation and the participatory impact assessment (PIA) undertaken by PACAPS<sup>3</sup>. It has potential for sustaining and expanding animal health provision in northern Kenya.

The Ethiopian partners supported the vaccination of over 1million animals in eight woredas in southern Ethiopia which was a timely and significant achievement. ELMT/ELSE co-funded the largest (14<sup>th</sup>) Kenya Camel Forum (Moyale) to date in 2009 and supported the establishment of the first Ethiopia Camel Forum (Debre Zeit). Efforts have been made to build the capacity of livestock marketing groups, but with little success. The Regional Livestock Marketing Symposium held in Nairobi in October 2009 aimed to promote best practice in livestock marketing, but the impact is yet to be determined.

Of all the technical working groups, the **Natural Resource Management** group was the most active and influential with a network of over 230 individuals. Issues such as the use and management of the invasive species prosopis, prescribed fire for rangeland regeneration, holistic management and rangeland products were debated at technical fora and have been well documented. Unfortunately, the opportunities to promote cross-border NRM linkages were not achieved as would have been expected. In Ethiopia, a new methodology on participatory NRM mapping was developed and successfully piloted at *madda* level. Rangeland rehabilitation in Ethiopia, (including via building the capacity of customary institutions), included bush thinning over 480ha, the establishment of dry season grazing reserves totaling 7,676ha, and the re-opening of 40 key migration routes with some success. Holistic management is being piloted in Ethiopia and Kenya as an improved tool to manage resources, but has yet to be adequately tested in an appropriate community-managed environment.

In Kenya, 622 individuals were trained in Business Development Skills (BDS) to promote **livelihood diversity and marketing** including a ToT capacity within Consortium partners. Subsequently beneficiaries including cereal groups, pastoralist production groups (PPGs), and fodder producers were trained. In Ethiopia 270 individuals were provided BDS training and 107 trained in food processing; in Somalia and Kenya 201 women received training in milk hygiene & processing and basket making. The training conducted in 2009 is considered very appropriate, but the impact has really yet to be ascertained. A wide range (and relatively small number) of income-generating activities have been supported (including the provision of seed money) throughout the ELMT/ELSE program including bee-keeping; mat making; hides & skin processing; fodder production, savings, credit & literacy; cereal, livestock and milk marketing. These have demonstrated mixed results and would benefit from more rigorous impact assessments.

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<sup>3</sup> 'Impact Assessment of the Community Animal Health Systems in Mandera West District of Kenya', by VSF Suisse.

It is not clear for example what impact the support to PPGs has had to date, whereas the fodder production techniques applied by 132 farmers in Somalia and Kenya produced an important resource during the 2009 drought. Whilst there has been reasonable gender equity across the program beneficiaries, there are key targeting issues especially of fodder contact farmers.

A number of initiatives were supported to promote **conflict-sensitivity and peace-building**. These included reconciliation meetings with the elders of the Borana, Garre and Gabra in southern Ethiopia; peace-building between the communities of Dollow Ado (Ethiopia) and Dollow (Somalia) representing a cross-border initiative; and the establishment of 15 conflict/early warning desks in Greater Wajir (Kenya) which now represent a model for community-based early warning. Of particular significance was the Moyale Cross Border Peace Conference in November 2009 bringing together pastoralists and senior government officials from both sides of the border (Ethiopia and Kenya) which agreed plans to strengthen a framework for cross border peace-building.

Initiatives to promote the **pastoralist area “voice”** in dryland policy formulation are not comprehensive and have come late in the program. In 2009 ELMT/ELSE supported linkages between pastoralists, key resource organizations and government officials to help define the future strategies (with respect to education, investment and infrastructure) of the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands (MoNK), as well as to contribute to the Ministry's “Vision 2030”. A number of other initiatives including the Yabello (Ethiopia) Pastoralist Forum (August 2008); the Moyale Peace Conference, the Ethiopia and Kenya Camel Fora; and the Regional Livestock Marketing Symposium (Nairobi, October 2009) have helped voice the pastoral agenda.

Over the two years from 1 September 2007, ELMT/ELSE program reports **assistance to 159,612 vulnerable households** (households where at least one member has benefited from the program)<sup>4</sup>. Of the individuals benefiting over 48% are female, which is a considerable achievement in this context. The main characteristic of the interventions was that they were scaled-up activities of country-based projects; few interventions were effectively cross border activities and most of these were training workshops and exchange visits. The regional dimension of the program was better represented in the second year, but collaboration with other actors (including governments) was most effective at the field level.

Key **challenges** to program implementation have included: (i) successive poor or failed rains in the operational area over the past three years; (ii) deteriorating insecurity in Somalia and immediate areas bordering Ethiopia and Kenya; (iii) new conditions for USAID funding make it untenable for partners to work in the current context in Somalia; (iv) protracted approval of sub-granting process and templates; (v) an unrealistically short time-frame for the program; and (vi) high staff turnover in Consortium partners affecting technical capacity and consistency.

The ELMT/ELSE **Consortium** represented a partnership of international NGOs with considerable experience and understanding of food and livelihood security in the Horn of Africa especially in pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood zones. However, the partners had not worked collectively before under such an arrangement and there was insufficient opportunity in the first year to develop a common sense of vision and purpose for the Consortium; administrative procedures to secure contracts for Sub-Grantees were unduly delayed (especially by the donor); and Consortium meetings out of necessity focused more on “housekeeping” than more strategic issues such as cross-border synergies and regional engagement.

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<sup>4</sup> There was no target number of vulnerable households set in the program log-frame so there is no benchmark to assess this achievement.

Furthermore, the role of the **Regional Coordination Unit (RCU)**<sup>5</sup>, led by the Chief of Party (CoP), was to “administer and coordinate” the ELMT/ELSE partnership; it did not in theory, however, have the “management” authority necessary to drive the overall program, and was also not well supported in this aim given the absence of two important committees proposed in the technical application: ELMT/ELSE Steering Committee and a Core Regional Committee on Pastoralism and Rural Development (CRC), [initially put forward as the overall ‘steering committee’ for RELPA.] However, RELPA’s ‘internal’ Technical Steering and Co-ordination Group (TSCG), consisting of representatives of COMESA/CAADP, PACAPS, RCPM, ELMT and USAID, was subsequently designed to assume this co-ordination role and succeeded to a limited degree, although in practice it operated primarily as an information sharing forum. Thus the co-ordination and management of RELPA and ELMT depended too much upon personal relationships between the donor, the RCU and the Consortium partners rather than institutional structures.

This issue was especially reflected in the **Technical Working Groups**<sup>6</sup> (TWGs), which were one of the main vehicles for promoting the three strategies of the program, (referred to earlier) and instituted in each of the Consortium partners. The TWGs were not sufficiently resourced nor well coordinated and inevitably only performed where the assigned Technical Adviser was sufficiently experienced, (and at post) and able to network effectively. The result was a mixed bag of success and failure, with poor linkages between the TWGs to achieve the intended “horizontal weave” across the program, and often insufficient drive to promote cross-border synergies or regional agendas.

In many ways the achievements of ELMT/ELSE were the more remarkable given that the institutional capacity of **RELPA** was never sufficiently realized. Besides no CRC mentioned previously, PACAPS never fulfilled its coordination role (for reasons it justifies), nor did it develop a “common work planning, reporting and monitoring & evaluation system” which should strategically inform future regional programming. A collaboration plan was developed between PACAPS and ELMT/ELSE which included providing technical resources to TWGs, but this was only realized (and effectively so) in the area of livelihood zoning, early warning and contingency planning (livelihood protection). The role of the Regional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation component was unfortunately never well synchronized nor understood by the ELMT/ELSE program. Furthermore, the links with OFDA and the “crisis modifier” facility identified in the RFA were never realized to ensure an effective response to emergency situations which prevailed during the program period. Overall, the added value of RELPA lay more with the work being undertaken in policy development (targeting COMESA/CAADP) to which the ELMT/ELSE field experience has contributed.

The main **recommendations** for future programming are that:

- i. There should be a no-cost extension (January-April 2010) to incorporate key cross-border and regional activities already initiated as well as technical documentation on “good practice” developed during ELMT/ELSE phase one.
- ii. Funding of another phase (minimum five years) is strongly encouraged to build upon the gains achieved in phase one.
- iii. Future program design must focus on: (a) a concept of “zonal hubs” which would be identified according to cultural and clan ties and facilitate cross-border synergies; (b) key technical priorities which would be identified in consultation with communities and customary institutions relevant to these operational areas; (c) developing strategic relationships with relevant

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<sup>5</sup> The RCU was instituted within CARE Somalia/South Sudan as the lead agency of the Consortium.

<sup>6</sup> The TWGs included: (i) livelihood protection (SC/UK); (ii) livestock services (VSF-S); (iii) natural resource management (SC/US); (iv) livelihood diversity & marketing (CARE Kenya) - representing the first four intermediate results of ELMT/ELSE - (v) conflict sensitivity & peace building (CARE Somalia); and (vi) social & gender equity (CARE Ethiopia) - representing cross-cutting issues.

- governments and regional institutions responsible for the economic, technical and policy development relating to drylands and pastoralism; and (d) ensuring that the program represents a platform for the “voice” of pastoralists in the region.
- iv. The program must draw upon the most appropriate technical expertise to address the principal technical issues affecting pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods (natural resource management, livestock health, production and marketing, livelihoods diversification) and including emphasis on early warning, contingency planning and timely response.
  - v. More emphasis must be placed on learning from the program experience through rigorous impact assessments.
  - vi. Consortium partners should be selected upon their experience and commitment to contribute to a more focused cross-border and regional strategy.
  - vii. The RCU should champion the “vision” and the “purpose” of the Consortium on behalf of the partnership and assume the overall management responsibility for the program.
  - viii. The RCU should manage and coordinate the functions of the TWGs (which will focus on four strategic areas), field coordinators assigned to each of the “zonal hubs”, and a strengthened learning, monitoring and evaluation section.
  - ix. An ELMT/ELSE Steering Committee should be constituted to provide advice and guidance to the RCU headed by a Chief of Party and act to diversify the program’s funding base to ensure a longer term development approach to pastoral areas.
  - x. The program should strive to engage other pastoral and dryland initiatives to the ELMT/ELSE “platform”; ELMT/ELSE should demonstrate cost-effectiveness by actively raising awareness of pastoral and dryland issues and attracting additional and appropriate investment into these areas.

## **2. Introduction**

### **2.1 Context of the Mandera Triangle**

Humanitarian emergencies associated with recurrent drought and at times floods, have become regular events over the past three decades in the Horn of Africa. Increasingly those worst affected are communities associated with the pastoralist livelihood system<sup>7</sup> which is one of the oldest, more resilient and adaptive livelihood strategies in Africa and one particularly well suited to arid and semi-arid environments. Research demonstrates that pastoralism is one of the most productive uses of dryland environments and that livestock production is vital to the biodiversity and sustainable management of these areas<sup>8</sup>. However, fundamental changes in climatic conditions and rising commodity prices - complicated by insecurity, transformation of rangelands, land fragmentation, insecure land tenure, poor infrastructure, minimal investment and political marginalization - has undermined the ability of pastoralist communities to respond, leading to increasing levels of poverty and further marginalization in the region over the past ten years.

The “Mandera Triangle” represents a critical area for pastoralism within the Horn of Africa - encompassing north-eastern Kenya, south-eastern Ethiopia and south-western Somalia - and includes the traditional rangelands of both the Somali<sup>9</sup> and Oromo<sup>10</sup> ethnic groups. It also represents the area at the heart of the 2005-2006 drought.

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<sup>7</sup> Pastoralism is often defined as a livelihood in which at least 50% of a household’s food and income is derived from livestock.

<sup>8</sup> Key points extracted from the draft COMESA/CAADP Policy Framework for Food Security in Pastoralist Areas (second draft November 2009).

<sup>9</sup> The Somali pastoralist ecosystem transects national borders and stretches from Kenya to Djibouti including the whole of Somalia, and covering more than 1m sq km.

Out of a total pastoralist and agro-pastoralist population in the three countries of approximately 20 million, about 30 percent were identified in 2006<sup>11</sup> as in immediate need of emergency assistance. Drought has continued to prevail across much of this area over the past two years. Shortages of water and food has caused high levels of livestock deaths and uncommon movements of human and livestock populations across borders<sup>12</sup> and cultural boundaries which have at times triggered conflicts over access to water, rangelands and other resources.

A return to self-reliance and economic growth in these dryland areas is both possible and necessary. However, pastoralism has first to be better understood and appreciated. Pastoralists have developed a diverse range of strategies, institutions and networks to exploit the unpredictability of arid environments to their economic advantage and they need to be better supported to optimize these opportunities. Furthermore, the contribution of pastoralism to the national economy is rarely acknowledged. Yet livestock accounts for 85% of the export revenues in Somalia (worth \$200m per annum); it contributes around 40% of the agricultural GDP in Ethiopia; and supplies 70% of the meat entering the domestic market in Kenya. The recent lifting of the ban on livestock trading by Saudi Arabia with countries in the Horn of Africa opens up further economic opportunities for the livestock market.

The “Mandera Triangle” also encompasses a complex political framework. Much of Somalia has now been without any effective form of government since 1991 and the recent escalation of insurgency within the country has created a real threat to the humanitarian situation in south and central Somalia as well as security within the region. Ethiopia and Kenya, who normally portray a degree of political indifference to each other, have both been very much engaged in efforts over the past ten years to secure a government administration in Somalia that will contain this situation. Otherwise formal political, and particularly economic links, between the three countries are weak, yet a huge amount of informal trade (including livestock) carries on across borders linked to both demand and supply within the region and increasingly from the Gulf States – and most of this trade is not officially recognized or captured.

The deteriorating security conditions in southern and central Somalia now have direct implications for south-eastern Ethiopia and north-eastern Kenya making conditions very difficult for humanitarian agencies to operate. CARE Somalia ceased ELMT operations in October 2008 because of security threats to the organization and its staff; at the time of this evaluation VSF Suisse also suspended its operations in Gedo because of taxation demands on the organization by “local authorities”. UN security advice, to which most agencies have to comply, now prevents international staff from working in many parts of this operational area. Furthermore, recent US Government directives, increasingly sensitive to any US Government funding reaching categorized terrorist organizations, have essentially made Somalia untenable to all organizations receiving USAID funding and seeking to operate there.

## **2.2 Rationale and Outline of the Enhanced Livelihoods in Mandera Triangle (ELMT) Program**

Because pastoralist livelihoods across the Horn of Africa are increasingly under threat in this particularly challenging environment, USAID established an umbrella program (financed through the US Government’s Famine Prevention Fund), known as the (East Africa) Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas (RELPA). The program commenced in 2006 with the aim of *supporting an effective transition from emergency-relief dependency to livelihood resiliency and the promotion of*

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<sup>10</sup> The Oromo pastoralist ecosystem (including the Borana, Gabra, Guji, and Arsi clans) covers areas of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia, with important cross-border movements and livestock trade.

<sup>11</sup> Source of information : UN OCHA.

<sup>12</sup> It is estimated that 80% of cattle from the Greater Garissa area moved to Somalia during the 2009 drought.

*long-term economic development in dryland and pastoral areas* of the region. The principal RELPA program objectives are to:

- Increase household incomes and economic resiliency of populations living in dryland, pastoral areas;
- Reduce requirements for emergency assistance;
- Establish conditions by which pastoralists in the Horn of Africa can participate in the broader process of social and economic development; and
- Support the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to manage a policy and investment process in the region, with an emphasis upon vulnerable pastoral areas.

The expected results of the RELPA program were to: (i) increase self-reliance of populations in pastoral areas and engagement of governments in the target area to reduce vulnerability to shocks; (ii) engender longer-term regional policy engagement in connection with the COMESA Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP); (iii) advance synchrony, coordination and collaboration with pertinent bilateral USAID programs in the region; (iv) promote synergies with national and multi-lateral investments in the region; and (v) be innovative.

The RELPA program comprises five components intended to be complementary to each other (and each operating for a maximum period of 24 months):

- I. The **COMESA**<sup>13</sup> Secretariat supporting the Pastoral Areas Policy Engagement process through the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP);
- II. The Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (**PACAPS**)<sup>14</sup> supporting: (i) regional coordination and policy analysis; (ii) regional livestock and meat trade; and (iii) early warning and early response;
- III. The Regional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation component (**RCPM**) which was awarded separately<sup>15</sup> from PACAPS in February 2007 (although originally a component of PACAPS) to undertake: (i) a baseline CPM sensitivity assessment of the area; (ii) training and skills building of RELPA partners in conflict sensitive approaches to programming; (iii) partnership strengthening between RELPA partners, existing peace committees and local government structures; and (iv) information and networking between RELPA partners;
- IV. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (**OFDA**) supporting emergency response and relief activities within the region; and
- V. The Enhanced Livelihoods in the Mander Triangle (**ELMT**) program which aims to: (i) diversify economic activities and strengthen market linkages; (ii) improve animal health services; (iii) enhance natural resource management; (iv) strengthen customary institutions; (v) “raise” pastoralists’ voice; and (vi) protect pastoralist livelihoods in the dryland, cross-border region of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

For ELMT, a Cooperative Agreement was signed on 30 August 2007 between USAID and CARE Somalia/ South Sudan representing a Consortium of six international NGOs who were to be responsible for the implementation of the two-year program for which \$10 million was allocated; ELMT was very much the field-based component of RELPA. The ELMT program is led by CARE Somalia/South Sudan (SSS) together with CARE Ethiopia, CARE Kenya, Save the Children US

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<sup>13</sup> COMESA is the regional economic community taking the lead for regional implementation of the African Union and the NEPAD-CAADP.

<sup>14</sup> PACAPS is implemented by the Feinstein International Center of Tufts University and the early warning and early response components were supported by the Food Economy Group (FEG).

<sup>15</sup> RCPM was implemented by PACT Kenya and the baseline assessment was conducted by Management Systems International (MSI).

(SC/US), Save the Children UK (SC/UK), and Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Suisse (VSF-S) all of whom have considerable experience working with pastoralist communities in the region. In turn these partners work with 16 other local partners<sup>16</sup> as well as international resource agencies (through short-term consultancies) under this initiative. USAID's rationale was to engage with a partnership of competent actors that were already operational at field level to ensure that resources and time were not wasted in an "establishment" phase. A **map of the ELMT-RELPA operational area** and the geographical distribution of Consortium partners is provided at the beginning of this report.

The goal of the ELMT program is: ***"to increase the self-reliance and resiliency of the population through improved livelihoods in drought prone pastoral areas of the Mendera Triangle"***

There are six expected results for the ELMT:

1. Livestock based livelihoods protected in the event of an emergency;
2. Livelihoods enhanced through improved livestock production, health and marketing;
3. Natural resource management enhanced;
4. Livelihoods enhanced by strengthened alternative and complementary livelihood strategies;
5. Strengthened capacity of customary institutions in peace building, civil governance and conflict mitigation;
6. Pastoralist area "voice" in dryland policy formulation and implementation strengthened at all levels.

The ELMT has adopted three strategies that build upon the field experience of Consortium members (and other actors in the region): (i) review, verify and consolidate the evidence base ("best practices"); (ii) disseminate and scale-up the evidence-base; and (iii) develop policy "roadmaps" or guidelines to inform ongoing and developing policy initiatives in the RELPA program area as well as help guide investment in the Horn of Africa.

Early on during the inception of ELMT, the program in Ethiopia was (informally) re-named Enhanced Livelihoods in Southern Ethiopia because the government authorities and partners felt that the title "Mendera Triangle" did not adequately represent the operational areas in Ethiopia where the program was focused. Consequently, the program will be referred to from hereon in the report as ELMT/ELSE.

A No-Cost Extension (NCE) to the ELMT/ELSE program was approved for the period 1 September to 31 December 2009, whilst in December a second (and final) NCE was approved for the period from 1 January to 30 April 2010.

## **2.3 Scope of the Evaluation**

A final evaluation of the ELMT/ELSE was identified and included in the Technical Application submitted by the CARE SSS led Consortium to USAID. Terms of Reference (TOR) were developed in consultation with the Consortium Partners three months prior to the evaluation which was conducted in November 2009. The Evaluation TOR are presented in **Annex One**.

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<sup>16</sup> Of these 21 local partners, five were contracted as consultants by the RCU for specific services and one Sub-Grantee (SOS Sahel) was contracted by two Consortium partners in different operational areas of Ethiopia so they were counted twice.

## Objectives

The overall objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess key achievements and impacts of the ELMT/ELSE program;
- Assess the effectiveness of the Consortium in achieving ELMT/ELSE objectives;
- Identify lessons learned and recommendations for:
  - Consortium working
  - Cross-border and regional programming
  - Donor policy for promoting pastoral livelihoods in the Horn of Africa; and
- Encourage key stakeholders to constructively reflect on and learn from the ELMT/ELSE.

## Approach & Methodology

The Evaluation team consisted of: (i) a lead consultant (independent); (ii) a technical consultant (independent); and (iii) a policy consultant focusing on pastoralist issues from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the UK. The exercise has been supported by the services of Inter-Mediation International (IMI) who have considerable experience in collaborative working processes in support of development programs.

Initial stages of the evaluation included: (i) a desk review; and (ii) the development of an evaluation matrix incorporating key questions for different categories of respondents. The technical consultant focused on field visits and has evaluated the main achievements and results of the program as well identifying key challenges in program implementation. The lead consultant has focused on the effectiveness of consortium functioning and the added value of the wider RELPA program through interviews with donors (including USAID), Consortium partners, Governments and technical agencies in Addis Ababa and Nairobi.

IMI concurrently has conducted an e-survey of some 50 respondents, targeted telephone interviews with 10 respondents and analysis of the feedback. The technical and lead consultants presented key findings and recommendations at the ELMT/ELSE Consortium Meeting in Nairobi to solicit feedback (for inclusion in the draft report) as well as facilitating group work on different dimensions of collaborative working which had been prepared by IMI. IMI will produce a policy brief on consortium working drawing on lessons from ELMT/ELSE.

The ODI policy consultant will draw upon the key findings of the evaluation to address key issues that have prevented program interventions in support of pastoral livelihoods from being as effective as they could.

## Time-Frame and Outputs

The interviews and field visits to southern Ethiopia and north-eastern Kenya were conducted by the technical consultant from 2 to 20 November 2009. Interviews conducted by the lead consultant in Nairobi and Addis Ababa from 9 to 20 November 2009. A schedule of the evaluation mission is presented in **Annex Two** and a list of respondents in **Annex Three**.

The principal outputs from the evaluation are:

- Presentation of the key findings and recommendations by the technical and lead consultants at the Final ELMT/ELSE Consortium Meeting in Nairobi 24-26 November 2009;
- A Final Evaluation Report incorporating the key findings of the technical and lead consultants by 15 December 2009;



- A Policy Brief on Working as a Consortium by IMI based upon the e-survey, telephone interviews and the findings of the evaluation team by 20 December 2009;
- A report on the consortium functioning by IMI for internal use in any future phase of the ELMT/ELSE by 20 December 2009; and
- ODI Policy Paper on key constraints affecting effective program interventions in support of pastoralist livelihoods in the Horn of Africa Region by 20 December 2009.

### 3. Relevance of the ELMT/ELSE

The US Government's Famine Prevention Fund that funded RELPA supported one of the first regional initiatives to address pastoralist livelihoods over the past 20 to 30 years. The vision of the RELPA program to support an effective transition from emergency-relief dependency to livelihood resiliency and the promotion of long-term economic development in dryland and pastoral areas reflected a critical need on the ground and therefore sound. The Famine Prevention Fund provided resources that could potentially bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and sustainable development. It constituted an innovative approach focusing on cross-border issues that affect pastoralism in a complex and challenging region. It also built upon the positive experience of the Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) in Ethiopia and the experience and competence of NGOs already established and active in the field across the three countries. Furthermore, and critically, it recognized the importance of working with customary institutions that both represent and understand pastoralist communities and their livelihoods.

Unfortunately, the scope of the program was far too ambitious in such a short time-frame, and whilst this was recognized by those associated with the design<sup>17</sup>, it was inevitably never going to achieve its desired results. In effect competing consortia, preparing bids within a tight schedule, were encouraged to adopt an unrealistic framework in effort to 'win'. The strategy to deliver by consolidating the evidence base, scaling up best practice from the evidence base and to draw upon this best practice to contribute to policy initiatives was never well articulated or linked<sup>18</sup>. Neither were the strategies to promote cross-border synergies and the regional dimension to programming. There was insufficient analysis of the very different and complex political make-up of the region which was inevitably going to make both cross-border and regional implementation extremely challenging. Furthermore, the focus of international NGOs is still very much on country level programming and changing the "mind-set" to a more regional approach (with Consortium partners that in most cases had not worked with each other before) was always going to require a greater investment in orientation and preparation. Time was not allowed for this process to happen.

The USAID Request for Applications (RFA) was very explicit with respect to linkages with other components of RELPA and in particular policy engagement with COMESA and CAADP. But a lot "hung on" this linkage without sufficiently acknowledging other regional authorities (such as IGAD) and governments themselves. The program design did not sufficiently demonstrate an understanding of governments' own initiatives to develop strategy and policy in arid lands and pastoralist areas. The program document needed to identify what the strategic engagement with national authorities should be to influence this work which will always essentially provide the building blocks to a regional position. In Kenya, initiatives with respect to draft national policy development on Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) were not sufficiently taken into account. It was not clear what consultation process (if any) took place with concerned governments in the design of the Request for Applications (RFA) and certainly in the case of Ethiopia there was a distinct lack of "ownership" in the planning process. The

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<sup>17</sup> USAID's Request for Applications (RFA) was very elaborate and prescriptive; it essentially determined the broad framework of the program to which applicants were required to comply.

<sup>18</sup> The rationale for RELPA working with COMESA on livestock trade has some logic, but the exclusion of IGAD as a strategic regional partner was not clear - nor was IGAD apparently consulted on the program priorities.

authorities reacted at the program launch in Ethiopia with strong objections to the very name of the program and their lack of commitment to the program in the first six months of operation was one of the principal causes delaying implementation. Furthermore, recognition of other government and donor initiatives (in planning or under development) with respect to contingency planning, poverty reduction and drought within this region and the potential to collaborate were not outlined.

## **4. Achievements & Effectiveness of ELMT/ELSE**

This section reviews the achievements and effectiveness of activities undertaken through the ELMT/ELSE program over the past two years since its inception on 1 September 2007. The activities are reviewed against the fourteen program “outcomes” defined in the program logical framework.

### **4.1 Useful EW information is available and used by Consortium members/partners and local government offices**

Save the Children UK (SC/UK) carried out a field assessment in February and May 2008 to meet various early warning and response actors working in Northern Kenya and Somali/Oromia Regions of Ethiopia to: (i) identify field level early warning (EW) actors; (ii) understand the type of EW information they collect; and (iii) review monitoring formats/tools applied and reports produced. The intention was then to link with these EW actors and draw upon the EW information generated and to improve information sharing. Although the findings were fed into the Awassa and Jijiga workshops, they were not taken forward in a consistent and coherent manner. Livestock Information Network Knowledge System (LINKS) also carried out a field survey and reviewed the conventional and traditional early warning systems in Borana zone in October and November 2008 which covered the same issues and came to many of the same conclusions. Given that SC/UK had agreed to backstop LINKS, this overlap should not have happened.

The assessments documented current EW practices so that useful lessons could be learned and applied to ensure more effective policies, needs assessments, and aid programming to support livelihoods. Both efforts were targeting harmonization of the early warning system for data collection, analysis and integration of modern and conventional and dissemination to coordinate responses and to use resources effectively. LINKS presented the findings at two workshops one in Addis Ababa and one in Borana. Community Initiative Facilitation and Assistance (CIFA) Ethiopia reported that as a result of the latter workshop they collected their cross border market information more systematically and more regularly. However the collection of market information by CIFA is unsustainable and its continuity is unreliable and probably should have focused more on capacity building of local government.

It is recommended that the collection and dissemination of cross border market information is an effort worth pursuing vigorously in the future given the dearth of such information and its importance in encouraging a cross-border perspective. During the workshops, participants discussed in detail conventional and traditional early warning systems, the early warning systems used in the last five years, strengths and weakness of the existing early warning systems, early warning information providers, and policy and market issues.

The workshops concluded that there is a need to enhance the early warning assessments and monitoring of disaster risks. Early warning systems are an essential investment in the protection of lives, livelihoods and property, contributing to the sustainability of development, and they should be integrated into governmental policy and decision-making processes and emergency management systems at all levels.

Oxfam GB (a Sub-Grantee of CARE Kenya) trained fifteen peace monitors and set up fifteen conflict early warning desks in Wajir. The monitors produce: weekly situation reports, incident and monthly reports and situation briefs and alerts. The monitors are linked to IGAD's Conflict Early Warning & Response Mechanism's (CEWARN) cross border peace monitors, peace committees and other key actors. The information is collated with additional input from the CEWARN cross border peace monitor and passed on to local decision makers and on to a sub-committee of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, which doubles up as the country conflict early warning and response conflict unit. The work of the peace monitors is considered very effective as the conflict early warning information is fed in to local peace building and conflict resolution structures as well as the CEWARN mechanism. There are a number of incidents where conflicts were mitigated as a result and the National Steering Committee has cited the EW desks as a model for community level early warning.

World Food Programme's (WFP) food monitors were also trained in conflict sensitivity alongside the peace monitors in order to establish linkage between the two as a strategy to enhancing conflict early warning. Recent follow up indicated some level understanding by the monitors, especially the food monitors, of the concept and their role in conflict mitigation and actually diffused some minor conflicts within their areas of jurisdiction. 78 people attended this training. The conflict early warning desks are functioning well and have been cited as a model for community early warning by the National Committee on Security. It is hoped that their effectiveness will be examined in more detail through the Participatory Impact Assessment (PIA) planned by Oxfam GB and Wajir Peace on peace building in October.

SC/UK provided technical and financial support to develop livelihoods baselines for three *woredas* Miyu Mulla, Lagahda and Seahad in Fik, south western Somali region, which had not been covered in previous studies. WFP also contributed technical staff and logistics. The field work has been completed and data analyses done using the baseline storage spread sheets. One baseline data set and one baseline livelihoods report is produced and shared with regional partners.

SC/UK produced five bimonthly synthesis of early warning livelihood situation updates for the ELMT/ELSE operational area from November 2008 to September 2009. The purpose of the updates was to provide early warning information to Consortium members and partners to plan and coordinate and implement early response to protect pastoral livelihoods in the event of drought or emergencies. The updates consolidated and analyzed early warning information from various sources and considered the livelihood implications. The updates informed past and current situations including cross border and future livelihood conditions based on probable occurrences of emergency scenarios. They also provided livelihood intervention options for different scenarios.

The updates were effective in terms of their content, but there is no evidence to suggest that they were utilized by Consortium members to plan and coordinate their emergency responses. In general the updates were not very timely and regular, (while some were not produced.)The audience of the update was also limited to Consortium members and close partners. The district level food security offices, District Steering Groups or Drought Management Committees and ultimately the pastoralists should have received the updates. Moreover the updates should be translated into the local languages to be more useful and effective. The production of the updates was a good innovation that needs to be further nurtured and developed and promoted to be institutionalized by governments.

CARE Ethiopia and SC/UK supported a number of multi-agency early warning field assessments and analysis meetings in Borana and Somali region respectively. The assessments are carried out at the end of each season. Depending on the outcome of the assessment, interventions such as restocking, hay distribution, water tankering are undertaken to deal with problems of drought or any other hazard. SC/US has also participated and supported periodic situational assessments in Liben and Goro Dola

*woredas* and Hargelle *woreda* in Somali region. It is reported that the SC/US restocking support with heifers and camels as well as water tankering is partly a result of these assessments. It is felt that support to multi-agency situational assessments by SC/UK and CARE Ethiopia enhanced the quality and use of information generated out of it and promoted multi-agency coordination in responding to shocks. If well planned the multi-agency assessments could complement EWs. However, the NGO support to undertake the periodic assessment should not continue forever. Rather NGOs should invest in building the capacity of relevant government departments to take the lead in the assessments and be encouraged to take the responsibility in terms of resource and technical, capacity.

## 4.2 Improved capacity for contingency planning

SC/UK supported FEG/PACAPS workshops on early warning/early response in Addis Ababa and Nairobi in January and February 2008. They were attended by ELMT/ELSE Consortium members and other partners. Two cross border early warning/early response workshops were then organized in June 2008 in Moyale (Ethiopia) by CARE Ethiopia and SC/US, and in August 2008 in Mandera (Kenya) by VSF Suisse and CARE Somalia. The workshop in Moyale was attended by people from 15 governmental departments and NGOs from Kenya and Ethiopia; and the Mandera workshop was attended by people from 16 agencies from Kenya and Somalia. Issues discussed in both workshops revolved around the harmonization of EW reporting/analysis and the role of customary institutions in EW/ER, cross-border information sharing and response mechanism etc.

The workshops focused on developing likely scenarios crisis calendars to inform early response planning where the likely timeline for common shocks were examined, as well as the implementation and lead times for different interventions. This was used to identify the necessary start up times for emergency interventions and the available indicators that should be used to trigger decision making. SC/UK provided technical support to both workshops. The Food Economy Group (FEG) with input from SC/UK also introduced a step by step guide to help partners to develop contingency planning and early response plans in their operational areas. In Mandera the workshop led to a number of proposals being developed for interventions in Somalia and increased co-ordination and sharing of information by stakeholders.

In March 2008, CARE Somalia and VSF Suisse conducted a participatory community workshop in Dollow (Somalia) to develop a contingency plan for the district. The participants of the workshop were representatives from local authorities, customary institutions, local NGOs and key community leaders. The objective of the workshop was to develop a contingency plan for Dollow, Gedo since projections were that the *gu* rains (April-May 2008) would be below normal in Southern Somalia and neighboring areas of Ethiopia and North East Kenya on the back of below normal *deyr* rains (October 2007-November 2007). The plan was developed to help the local community and organizations working in the region to mitigate the impacts of the anticipated livelihood shock. It was noted that one of the weaknesses of the plan was that it failed to look at cross border conflict mitigation and peace building. Dollow Ado and Dollow and Luuq districts of Gedo region Somalia act as one grazing territory for pastoralists and there is huge cross border mobility. Cross border peace building and conflict mitigation should have been incorporated into the plan. It is also essential that early warning systems should be linked to resources to enhance early responses.

During the course of 2008 and early 2009 CARE Ethiopia and CARE Kenya conducted a series of training workshops in Yabello (southern Ethiopia) and north-east Kenya for government experts, communities and their leaders, marketing groups and customary institutions on drought cycle management, early warning systems, preparation of contingency planning using the FEG/SC/UK model. The training workshops contributed towards the building of the capacity of the consortium members and other partners in the government to develop several contingency plans. Furthermore,

CARE Ethiopia facilitated the development of new contingency plans for newly created Dillo and Dhas *woredas* and provided contingency funds for the *woredas*' Disaster Management Committees and updated three *woreda* contingency plans. CARE Kenya facilitated the development and updating of three contingency plans in Marsabit, Mandera Central and West. The process was partly funded by the Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) project managed by CARE Kenya.<sup>19</sup>

Contingency planning has been adopted by authorities in Borana, Ethiopia. There is an increasing demand by the authorities for more guidance and support from CARE Ethiopia to develop more contingency plans for *woredas* which were not part of the CARE/ELMT areas. The Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) drought management offices in Garissa and Mandera adopted the new scenario based, livelihood focused early response planning which was not considered in the earlier ALRMP supported contingency plans. There are some indications that contingency planning is being internalized by authorities in Borana and the new approach being adopted by the ALRMP at least in Garissa and Mandera. The ALRMP in Takaba and El Wak developed contingency plans based on the new model.

CARE Ethiopia and SC/US provided logistic support for the vaccination of over 1million animals in mid 2009 in Southern Ethiopia and Somali region to avoid possible disease outbreaks that could decimate the livestock resource. Such interventions contribute toward protecting the livestock based pastoral livelihood. The support provided by ELSE/ELMT included logistics such as per diem, fuel, transport to facilitate the mass vaccination. The vaccine and the manpower was the contribution of the government.

In the discussion with leaders of customary institutions in Negele, Yabello, Garissa and Mandera it was noted that the EW/ER training has contributed towards changing the attitude and behavior of pastoralists to be more proactive in terms of managing risks. They talked about timely destocking before being hit by drought, diversification of assets and sources of income to complement pastoralism or enhance their livelihood, keeping fewer but more productive herds, and species diversification to include mainly camel in their herd. The field observation in Borana, Negele confirmed increased practice of hay making and strengthening of communal enclosures. The field visit in Mandera confirmed the increasing investment in fodder production and storage to be used both in normal times and during drought periods.

SC/UK under ELSE and CARE Ethiopia under ELSE and RREAD conducted a study on climate change adaptation among pastoral populations in Shinile and Borana Zones in conjunction with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). The objective of the study was to promote programming that supports appropriate preparedness initiatives in pastoral areas. This is a good piece of work that could bring up the issue of pastoral livestock system vis-à-vis climate change including the need to review government policies on support to pastoral livelihoods and build climate change into development programming as well as strengthening early warning and climate predication information flows to pastoral communities. In most cases climate change is related to crop production or livestock systems in highland settings with better moisture and pasture. We can say pastoralists and their areas are marginalized when the issue of climate change agenda is discussed and addressed. The research produced three outputs: (i) a Research Assessment Report, (ii) a Policy Brief, and (iii) a Documentary Film. The report has been disseminated and the video screened at the Copenhagen World Summit on Climate Change in December 2009.

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<sup>19</sup> RREAD is implemented by CARE-Kenya and CARE-Ethiopia, (and formerly CARE Somalia) and funded by ECHO's Regional Drought Decision; it was designed in collaboration with the RCU to ensure complementarity between programs.

### 4.3 Early response interventions implemented

In February 2009 SC/US carried out restocking of 72 households from Liben and Goro Dolla *woredas* using ELMT funds. Beneficiary selection was conducted in line with the traditional Borana mutual assistance – *busa gonofa* and through the monthly elders' council meetings. The purpose of the restocking was to help the household stay in the pastoral system. In this restocking arrangement the community contributes 25% of the livestock for restocking. This innovative move demonstrates the community's investment in the process, and ensures that resources are targeted to those most in need. Each household was restocked with four heifers (one contributed by the community) of Boran breeds.

Other Consortium partners managed to raise some funds from other donors to mitigate the effects of livelihood shocks in their ELMT/ELSE operational areas. CARE Ethiopia reported that it provided livestock feed using PLI funds for a nucleus herd using a central feeding system from February to June 2008 in Dire, Miyo, and Dhas *woredas*. A total of 2,954 households with 9,200 heads of cattle were served for around 60 days.

In 2008, SC/US mobilized PLI resources and secured an additional UN-OCHA HRF grant (counted as cost share) to: (i) provide supplementary feed to cattle; (ii) support women's groups to purchase and sell grain in order to help stabilize grain prices; (iii) facilitate livestock traders to accelerate the off-take of livestock by increasing the number of markets in remote areas; and (iv) rehabilitate key water points. SC/US secured funds from OFDA to carry out slaughter destocking in 10 PAs in Dollo Ado, Liben Zone and Dollo Bay, Afder Zone in August 2008.

CARE Kenya through its ECHO funded RREAD program has been able to include some early response activities around Takaba and El Wak following the failure of the rains in early 2009: fuel subsidies to boreholes and provision of frequently needed spare parts and paying of transport for PPGs to off take livestock are being carried out. From May to June 2009 VSF Suisse (VSF-S), funded by FAO CERF carried out PPR and CCPV vaccination in Isiolo and Wajir and South Central Somalia. VSF Suisse Kenya has also secured funds from UNOCHA and ECHO to carry out slaughter destocking around Isiolo, Wajir and Mandera in mid 2009.

Drought reserves, hay making, fodder production and the mass vaccination contributed towards protection of livestock based livelihood. The report by CARE Ethiopia and SC/US and the discussion held with beneficiaries in Borana and Liben confirmed that the enclosures were used to maintain and save lives of mainly breeding animals and calves during the peak dry period in 2009. The mass vaccination supported by SC/US and CARE Ethiopia protected livestock from succumbing to disease outbreaks. The fodder contact farmers in Mandera also reported that they did not lose any livestock for the long drought that hit their areas.

The ELMT/ELSE **Livelihood Protection Technical Working Group** (LP/TWG) operated well in the first year, but became ineffective when the TA left in April 2009. Unlike the other TWGs the TA post was financed 100% in the first year of the program and so more was expected in terms of output from this group.

### 4.4 Increased quality and coverage of private veterinary services

All Consortium members have been training community animal health workers (CAHW) for a long time using different funding sources. SC/US used ELMT/ELSE resources to support training of 23 female and 17 male CAHWs. VSF-S Somalia trained a total of 85 male and 4 female CAHWs. The training of the CAHWs was very useful in terms of building the human infrastructure to reach and serve more pastoral communities. Moreover refresher training was given by CARE Ethiopia for 52

CAHWs and VSF-S Kenya provided similar training for 32 male CAHWs. The trainees were able to refresh their veterinary knowledge and capacity in disease surveillance and reporting and gained knowledge about new diseases such as swine flu and PPR.

It was noted during the field visit that the CAHWs in Wargadud, Takaba in Kenya have a very strong linkage with the CAHWs across the border in Moyale, Ethiopia. They share information, skills and knowledge. The flow of drugs across the border is smooth. They at times go to Ethiopia to provide services.

It is the first time that VSF-S have trained female CAHWs, although this was only done in Somalia. SC/US on the other hand has been training female CAHWs for a long time. The attitude towards female CAHWs varied from place to place. In Ethiopia there is a positive tendency to accept them. They are even considered as reliable and honest with lots of advantages in providing continuous and sustainable services. However, in Kenya among the Moslem community, they are not so much welcomed in particular by the male CAHWs, although female animal husbandry trainees were enthusiastic to become CAHWs and provide a service to women who care for the weak and sick animals around the homestead. Religion, distance they have to travel to give services, and family responsibilities were mentioned by the male CAHWs as the major obstacles to the training of female CAHWs. The two female CAHW/CASPROs from Liben in Ethiopia and Garissa in Kenya interviewed during the field visits expressed their satisfaction with their job and indicated that they make enough from the service to support themselves. Both women received their CAHWs training before the commencement of ELMT/ELSE. They received their CASPRO training by ELMT/ELSE.

*The female CAHW interviewed from Liben in Ethiopia is a student in grade 9 with an ambition to become a veterinary doctor. When she started as CAHW she had problem of acceptance by the community until they realized that she was more serious in her job than the male CAHWs. She has now become the most preferred CAHW in her village. She said it took her sometime to secure the trust of her community. She did not however hide traveling alone long distances away from her village is a challenge for her and believes that it will continue to be a challenge to all female CAHWs. Otherwise she felt that women are the best service providers.*

Cheap drugs are becoming a big challenge for the CAHW services. Despite this, CAHWs from Ethiopia and Kenya report that there is a trend among pastoralists to look for quality drugs: they avoid buying/using fake drugs which are available for very low prices. They understand the effectiveness of good quality drugs even though they are expensive. The long drought in Kenya has been also a serious problem that led to the reduction of demand for veterinary services.

The Participatory Impact Assessment (PIA) in Northern Kenya identified the possible over-prescribing of antibiotics which need to be addressed in future refresher trainings. It also confirmed the need for increased animal husbandry training and awareness-raising of the community who also demand antibiotic use where it is not appropriate. Care needs to be taken when training community members that they realize the importance of using CAHWs or Animal Health Assistants (AHA) to prevent promoting antibiotic resistance and wasting money.

VSF Suisse Kenya piloted a model of linking CAHWs with drug stores that were in turn linked to private vet drug suppliers using a risk share model. VSF-S Kenya and VSF-S Somalia rehabilitated five and two drug stores respectively in their operational areas, VSF-S also supplied billboards to six pharmacies to increase their visibility to the community. The billboards helped visibility as well as acceptance the facility by the community as an important vet drugs store. VSF-S Somalia reported that the display of ELMT logo with the USAID logo was not acceptable by some members of the

community in Gedo or Lower Juba. The drug store owners and their assistants were also trained in drug store and business management and entrepreneurial skills. VSF-S Kenya initiated linkages between the supported drug store owners with major drug suppliers using a risk share model. In the case of Somalia vouchers were initially provided to communities to access services from CAHWs. However, in 2009 a meeting was held in Garissa to link pharmacies to drug suppliers, (although not using the risk sharing, drug stores were encouraged to pay for drugs up front as it was too risky to use the same model in Somalia).

Various organizations including SNV and CAHNet Africa, VSF Belgium and VSF Germany were interested in the approach adopted by VSF Suisse to support the privatization of veterinary services. SNV and CAHNet Africa are planning to implement a similar project in Samburu district and other ASAL areas in Kenya. The linkage improved supplies of veterinary drugs. There was however a lost opportunity to link the VSF Suisse CAHWs and pharmacies to pharmacies in Kenya particularly around Liboi and Mandera.

### Private Veterinary Pharmacy (PVP) Performance in Kenya: May 2008 to August 2009

Drug store	Total sales	Total Expenses	Profit/Loss USD
Framo	12,378	10,942.00	1,436
Garbatulla	2,362	998	1,364
Ngurinit	5,870	4,241	1,629
Wajir, Buna	-	-	-
Wagadud	2,712	5,262	-2,550
TOTALS	23,322	21,443	1,879

It has been reported that all supported vet drugstores, (except one in Wargadud owned by a CAHW named Hussen) have made a profit between Ksh102,290 and Ksh122,206 over the period of one year.

*The owner of the Wargadud store Hussen Okash first trained as a CAHW in 2001. He began his drug store business in 2008. He was linked to Vet Agro through VSF-S and also received training in Business Development Studies (BDS). He started with his own Ksh100,000 matched by a credit line of Ksh100,000 from Vet Agro using the risk sharing mode. After few up and downs Hussen's business is picking up. Hussen places his drug orders to Vet Agro by cell phone. The suppliers deliver the drugs by public transport (commercial transport) with the detailed invoice. Hussen uses the M-Pesa system to make payments. Hussen has placed three orders between April and November 2009. He is preparing for his fourth order. Hussen is a drug store owner and at the same time a CAHW practitioner. Each time he places orders ranging from Ksh30,000 to 50,000. He could have placed more orders if it had not been for the long drought. He travels deep into the pastoral areas using a boda-boda or on foot to treat and vaccinate animals or to supply other CAHWs with drugs. CAHWs and some pastoralists use a radio call system to put their orders to Hussen for drugs or services. His business was affected by the long drought and the tribal clash between the Garre and the Murrel that has reduced the demand for drugs. Hussen is a Garre but his main customers are the Murrel.*

The VSF Suisse approach to privatize the veterinary service worked well. A major veterinary supplier (Vet Agro) in Kenya was interested to expand its links with other drug stores in Northern Kenya and CAHWs were making sufficient profit to encourage them to continue to provide a service (see the PIA)



in enhancing the flow of drugs through the linkages established between the drug suppliers and drug store owners and the CAHWs. It also provided a profitable business to most of the drug store owners mentioned above. It has been noted that good working and effective linkage formed between CAHWs, drug store owners and veterinary drug suppliers in Kenya and Somalia. However prior efforts made by CARE and SC/US in Ethiopia were less effective. Lessons could be learnt from the experience in Kenya and Somalia to replicate in Ethiopia.

The support for community animal health services in Ethiopia was supposed to be informed by a CAHP assessment to be conducted by CARE Ethiopia and Tufts University. However, SC/US demanded that they also wanted to be involved. Differences about the TOR and selection of consultant ensued and the assessment still hasn't been completed. SC/US did carry out some meetings between CAHWs and local pharmacies, government offices; however it is unclear how effective this approach is in the absence of a stronger strategy.

*The owner of the Framo drug store in Takaba is Mohammed Abdullahi Abdi who is a CAHW who received his first training in 2000. He started his drug store business in 2005 using the money he saved from his services. He started small with Ksh30, 000. In September 2008 he was given material support such as shelves from ELMT/ELSE. He received training in BDS and linked with the Vet Agro drug suppliers. His current capital exceeds Ksh200, 000. He provides services for a wide range of areas including pastoralists across the border to Ethiopia. He receives his supplies from Vet Agro through Moyale at times, otherwise direct to Takaba. He made his last order in June 2009 and did not make more orders due to the drought and a drop in demand. It is now picking up. Mohammed, who is known as Dr. Masengo both in Ethiopia and Kenya, does not support training of female CAHWs for several reasons including religion.*

*Mohammed still works as a CAHW in addition to his drug store business.*

VSF-S Somalia had initially planned to construct crushes and kraals in two sites in order to facilitate and promote CAHW services. One crush was constructed at one of the sites, Gubata in Dollow. However, monitoring showed slow use of the crush, thus construction of the others was shelved. VSF-S Kenya also abandoned its plan to construct a crushes and kraals because of lack of community interest.

#### **4.5 Increased livestock disease surveillance and response**

CARE Ethiopia and Lay Volunteers International Association (LVIA) developed a livestock disease map for Teltelle and Yabello *woredas*. The methodology was developed with the collaboration of Tufts University. A validation workshop in the eighth quarter of the program was conducted in Yabello town to collect comments and feedback from various stakeholders in order to further enrich the livestock disease map. Borana zone administration committed to use CARE Ethiopia and LVIA developed livestock disease mapping to proactively plan preventive vaccinations and treatments. Whether the zonal administration is going to use the mapping is something to be seen in the future. The exercise proved very effective in terms of skills development and securing the interest from government. It would be very good practice to replicate in other ELMT/ELSE areas.

#### **4.6 Camel and other livestock husbandry practices enhanced**

Several training sessions were provided to Consortium members and partners in camel production and health and improved husbandry practices of other livestock species. VSF-S organized two training of trainers (ToT) sessions on camel husbandry and health in Moyale (Ethiopia) in February 2009 and Dire-Dawa (Ethiopia) in August 2009 to ELSE/ELMT members and other partners including

FAO Ethiopia, Farm Africa, LVIA and government veterinarians from Oromia Agricultural Research Institute. Following the training SC/US trained 31 CAHWs in camel health and husbandry from Liben and Goro Dolla districts of Ethiopia. The Technical Advisor (TA) to the Livestock Services Technical Working Group (TWG) was instrumental in delivering the training.

VSF-S helped develop a camel husbandry and health training manual led by the Kenya Camel Association (KCA) and the Arid and Semi-arid Lands Rural Livelihoods Support Project (ALLPRO). The draft manual was used for the first time to train Camel Animal Health Service Providers (CASPROs) in Isiolo (December 2008) and in Garissa (February 2009) by VSF-S and KCA jointly. Feedback from these trainings was incorporated into the draft manual.

ELMT/ELSE supported the 14th Annual Kenya Camel Forum (KCF), held in Moyale in May 2009, that promoted cross border learning and information exchange on camels. The forum also set up a cross border multi-ethnic peace committee and increased the recognition of camels in the national livestock policy. The annual forum, along with the cross border training sessions that have shared knowledge and experience between Kenyan and Ethiopian partners, directly influenced the formation of the Ethiopian Camel Forum. The launching workshop for the Ethiopian Camel Forum took place in Debre Zeit in September 2009.

The forum is now housed at the Government of Ethiopia's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Directorate. A steering committee comprised of different NGOs and government offices has been formed to oversee the function of the forum. The Kenya Camel Forum and the launching of the Ethiopian Camel Forum and the cross border training in camel husbandry and health have helped to raise knowledge in camel health and promoted the importance of camels among policy makers in both Ethiopia and Kenya.

Four workshops were facilitated by VSF-S Kenya to hundreds of community members from four districts in Kenya in improved animal health and husbandry practices. These training workshops attracted considerable interest from pastoral community members. A visit that was made to group in Wargadud who received the training indicated that the training was helpful and it led to improvement in their husbandry practices, and in hygienic meat and milk management. More of such training is needed in Ethiopia, Somalia and elsewhere in Kenya to enhance livestock production. But it is crucial to note that animal husbandry trainees don't see themselves as CAHWs and as a result try to treat animals themselves.

#### **4.7 Increased income from livestock sales**

ELMT/ELSE Consortium members such as CARE Ethiopia, CARE Kenya, and SC/US tried to build the capacity of several livestock marketing groups through training sessions in Business Development Services (BDS), provision of seed money and institutional capacity building. CARE Ethiopia and Kenya supported linking livestock marketing groups to major buyers through visits and capacity building. The week long trip organized by CARE Kenya to take the Pastoralist Production Groups (PPGs) to Mombasa and Nairobi to visit to terminal markets and fattening ranches helped the PPGs establish business linkages with major livestock buyers.

However these linkages did not stimulate the start-up of effective business activities, apart from one case where 80 head of livestock were supplied. Shortage of working capital by the PPGs was an issue to supply the required volume of animals to buyers in the required time frame. This calls for the need for appropriate financial institutions to be identified which can facilitate the PPGs access to loans.

CIFA (a Sub-Grantee of CARE Ethiopia) collects cross-border livestock, livestock products, and cereal market prices around Moyale. They share the information to interested parties in Ethiopia and Kenya. This effort is innovative, but does not seem to be sustainable. CIFA should focus more on developing this capacity to collect and analyze data within an appropriate government department to ensure continuity of the service. It requires more than market information to enhance cross border livestock trade. Meeting the veterinary and policy requirement is another dimension that requires greater attention at national and regional levels.

CARE Somalia conducted several consultative meetings that involved elders, traders, pastoralists, district authorities, and Ministry of Livestock Development, Kenya to facilitate livestock trading that benefits communities from Garissa (Kenya) and Lower Juba (Somalia). The effort went so successfully, and among other achievements a consensus was reached by the stakeholders to have a single livestock market day in the region on Saturday of every week in Afmadow town. The market was to be launched on 15th October 2008 but did not take place due to the closure of CARE Somalia program for security reasons. Despite this, the program has made a case for cross border work on livestock trade between these two regions and has built community consensus on a single market day and in Afmadow town. This is an effort that deserves continuation even by other agencies once the security situation improves in the region.

The Regional Livestock Marketing Symposium organized in Nairobi from 21<sup>st</sup>-23rd October 2009 and hosted by CARE Kenya was organized jointly by a number of ELMT/ELSE partners and the ELMT/ELSE Regional Coordination Unit (RCU). It was an important undertaking that brought together donors, government officials, NGOs, private sector and community members from Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda. Challenges and opportunities of livestock marketing in the region were discussed through a wide range of research papers presented and best experiences shared. It is expected that a symposium proceeding will be published as a special issue of AU-IBAR's journal and will be distributed widely including to policy makers in the region.

After two and half days of deliberations, the participants reached a number of conclusions, and made a set of recommendations about best practices and policies that would support and promote improved marketing of livestock and livestock products across the pastoral regions of the Horn of Africa. The main conclusion was that public-private partnerships are the key to promoting livestock trade in pastoral areas. In addition participants agreed that there was a lack of a deliberate and focused effort by governments to promote pro-pastoralist and livestock trade policies that can help pastoralists benefit from the increasing global demand for livestock and livestock products. Moreover participants were unanimous in stating that access to market information and financial institutions is vitally important for pastoralists to trade their livestock in a competitive manner. It was also agreed that trans-boundary diseases continue to seriously threaten regional and global trade.

Participants recommended that pastoralists must organize themselves into producer and trader associations to promote collective access to markets and improve their bargaining power. Market information systems should be scaled up and made available to benefit pastoralist marketing efforts. Access to financial services including Islamic banking should be improved for pastoralist and other value chain actors.

Participants recommended that governments should ensure that policies promote pastoralism and address the challenges pastoralists face. The need for adequate security was also highlighted to curb livestock rustling, banditry and violent conflict. Effective application of drought early warning for implementing emergency off-take strategies was considered one of the key areas that need government attention. With regard to export, trade in chilled carcasses rather than live animals should be promoted to limit the impact of stringent international requirements. It was also agreed that

government budgetary allocations to the livestock sector should be commensurate with its contribution to national GDP.

In general it can be said that ELMT/ELSE has done little to improve livestock marketing to increase sales and income for the pastoralists. The main vehicle for promoting livestock marketing - the cost share - LIPfund was not effective as the Equity Bank was too stringent in its loan requirements and not Sharia-compliant to benefit pastoralists. The support to livestock marketing groups and associations in Ethiopia showed limited impact. Out of the six *woredas* where CARE Ethiopia operated, only its two Sub-Grantee partners promoted livestock marketing co-operatives where marketing work was initiated, but remained very limited.

The Technical Advisor (TA) position for the **Livelihood Services TWG** changed hands three times at VSF Suisse. It occasionally engaged well with ELMT/ELSE but fell short of its potential. VSF Suisse through its program of work has contributed significantly to better understanding across the Consortium of animal health services (with a strong focus on camels) notably through more effective engagement with the private sector and fodder production. Consortium members were appreciative of this TWG for its input in animal health, camel husbandry and fodder production.

#### **4.8 Improved rangeland management**

##### **Customary institution role in NRM strengthened**

SC/US and CARE Ethiopia supported several meetings with elders to revive and build the capacity of customary institutions and to strengthen their role in managing the rangelands. The monthly meetings that are held by customary institutions in CARE Ethiopia and SC/US operational areas were useful to discuss issues and to reflect on successes and failures in managing their resources and other community affairs. Local officials have given recognition to the customary institutions and participate in their monthly meetings which gave the customary institutions legitimacy and authority to function beyond the traditional structure. It has been noted that natural resource management (NRM) initiatives led by customary institutions are taking root in CARE and SC/US operation areas.

The institutions are gaining back some of their lost power to make decisions in areas of establishing and dismantling enclosures, opening up corridors for livestock movement, identification and removing households who settled in inappropriate places, reinstating traditional rangeland and water use laws, control in expansion of farmlands, etc. The customary institutions are also involved in development and peace building activities. In particular SC/US tries to implement its community based program through the customary institutions. The customary institutions are given some space to influence the direction of development in their respective areas; their role is not just consultative, but they share decision making power with SC/US which reflects the ultimate form of participation based on mutual respect, knowledge and resources.

However, few NRM activities such as prescribed fire and holistic management implemented by CARE Ethiopia were not done as part of a participatory process but were rather carried out as separate activities. Most of the SC/US and CARE supported customary institutions have women members. For example, the 17 member Borana customary institution in Liben has five women members.

##### **Participatory rangeland resource assessment, mapping and community action planning**

Several spatial and resource mapping training sessions were given to Consortium members and other partners in and outside the ELMT/ELSE area. The training was facilitated by SC/US and CARE Ethiopia in November 2009. Based on the recommendation of consultants employed to carry out an assessment of mapping processes and activities of SOS Sahel and SC/US in southern Ethiopia, agreement was reached among Consortium members to focus on resources first when doing participatory mapping and add boundaries last. Consortium members agreed that it is important in

participatory mapping to encourage communities map all of the resources they use, irrespective of territorial borders and add administrative borders at the end.

SC/US developed several maps for different pastoral areas using the agreed methodology and developed Community Action Plan (CAP) for each. It was reported that as the result of the training and practical involvement of Consortium members, government partners and community members developed their skills in participatory mapping. Moreover the maps have been used to develop CAPs that can be used to direct development in the pastoral areas. This is best practice that can be expanded to other Consortium members in their operational areas.

SoS-Sahel together with LVIA were contracted by CARE Ethiopia and SC/US to develop maps at the *dheeda* level (instead of the PA level) and also to test out a methodology to consolidate previously mapped areas and introduce GIS maps to local communities. This is an activity which was completed recently. Raising the scale/unit of analysis is commendable since PA represents just a small administrative unit and not a resource management unit. *Dheeda* is often a larger grazing unit. This was the first step and now needs to be followed up through presentation to local stakeholders and to encourage them to plan at *dheedha* level. The use of GIS with communities was also an initial activity that needs further follow through.

### **Rangeland rehabilitation and enclosures**

The rangeland rehabilitation undertaken by CARE Ethiopia and SC/US in Ethiopia focuses on bush thinning, use of prescribed fire, enclosures for selected animals, hay making, and livestock mobility. CARE Ethiopia used community funds to support bush thinning of over 480 hectares (ha). In anticipation of suppressing the bush, prescribed fire was used in few enclosed areas. However the success rate was very poor. This was partly because of insufficient herbaceous layer that will be used as a fuel load to have effective burning and partly due to well established woody plant communities that can't be burned easily.

SC/US supported sixteen meetings of customary institutions in the second year of the program, which led to the establishment of sixteen enclosures of 7,676ha. 2,920ha were established as dry season grazing reserves. The enclosures were useful in improving the pasture production. It is being reported by pastoralists that calves, lactating cows and other weak animals benefited from the enclosures and survived the peak dry seasons. It has been observed that pastoralists have begun making hay from grass harvested from the enclosures. There is a growing interest among the pastoral communities in Borana and in some of the SC/US operational areas to put aside more lands for enclosures and to make hay.

CIFA (a Sub-Grantee of CARE Kenya) facilitated a workshop to promote harmonization among the different actors in environmental protection and management. The workshop involved 26 female and 33 male members of Water Users Association (WUA) committees, grazing area elders and Environmental Management Committees (EMC) members. The forum discussed several natural resources management issues.

It raised awareness of the participants on the communities' mandate to manage their environment and policies or laws that empower communities to benefit from the forest; opportunities available for the community in wildlife management; the concept of participatory forest management; tree nursery management; water sector reforms and governance; and the role of customary institutions in NRM. However this initiative was not part of a consolidated approach to support the associations, so it is likely to have limited impact.

### **Piloting holistic management in Kenya and Ethiopia**

Holistic management (HM) is being piloted in Ethiopia and Kenya as an improved tool to manage the rangeland resources and improve decision-making at the household and community level in general. Prior to the piloting, several awareness raising and capacity building training sessions were conducted in August and November 2008 to Consortium members and other partners both in Ethiopia and Kenya respectively. A cross-visit was also conducted to the Africa Centre for Holistic Management in Zimbabwe by senior Consortium members, USAID and partners in October 2008 to visit sites where holistic management was successfully applied and natural resources rehabilitated and preserved intact.

It was essential that these efforts were made to raise the knowledge of Consortium members regarding holistic management before embarking on the actual piloting of the approach. One of the pilot sites in a village called Dikale, Yabello (Ethiopia) was visited by the evaluation team. It was observed that the pilot site is well protected and respected by the villagers and they were waiting eagerly to see the results of the intervention. The team also met several individual community members and village elders who were not fully informed of the pilot project, nor were all local government offices. In such NRM pilot trials the wider involvement of the community and the local government office in charge of NRM is crucial to its success and thus more work will need to be done to ensure better community participation and government involvement.

The first pilot site established by Participatory Education Awareness & Resource Innovations (PEARS) in Kenya, who has received two small grants from the RCU of \$10,000 to cover training costs, has not yet been fully established partly due to the recent drought and partly as PEARS themselves continue to have reservations about some aspects of the approach. The HM approach has interesting elements for rangeland management, yet also requires more testing in a communally owned rangeland areas where drought and conflict over resources is a frequent phenomenon, (as is the case in Borana.)

### **Water development**

Very limited water development activities were implemented by the program. CARE Somalia through its local partners, Wamo Relief & Rehabilitation Services (WRRS) and Social Life and Agricultural Organization (SADO) rehabilitated three water points in Bardera district of Gedo and Afmadow district of Lower Juba. The activities were implemented through cash for work schemes. In Afmadow district the volume of a dam was increased through de-silting by WRRS. In Bardera district, SADO rehabilitated two dams, through cash for work. SADO also trained the User Committees of each dam on the management of the dams.

The water points were identified by the local communities and local authorities. They are located in wet season grazing areas where seasonal earth dams are the main sources of water both for livestock and humans. It has been reported by CARE Somalia and SADO that the water points have continued serving large number of livestock during the rainy seasons. They helped livestock to stay longer in the wet season grazing areas to exhaustively utilize the available grazing resources before they go back to the dry season grazing areas.

Community Initiative Facility Assistance (CIFA), a sub-grantee of CARE Ethiopia, rehabilitated two shallow wells at Tuka and Haramsam villages in Moyale. The wells are located along livestock market routes. Furthermore, SC/US used ELMT/ELSE resources to complete rehabilitation of the Tutufe well in Liben *woreda*. Rehabilitation of another well in Goro Dola *woreda* is in progress. Tutufe well is the only reliable source of water during the dry period for human and livestock in the locality. The rehabilitation was prioritized through community participation. 62% of the cost of the construction was covered by the community and the balance by SC/US. This approach is completely different from the

incentive based approach such as food or cash for work and it is something that has to be emulated by others.

#### **NRM workshop in Somalia on status of natural resources**

CARE Somalia organized and supported a series of workshops and meetings for elders, community members and local officials to discuss the condition of natural resources in the ELMT/ELSE operational area in Somalia between May and September 2008. Issues discussed included: (i) spread of prosopis in the riverine area of Dollo and Luuq; and (ii) indiscriminate cutting of useful trees such as acacia tortolis for charcoal making that often ended in the export market. It is being reported that following the workshops issues of protection of key species and charcoal burning for export were picked up well by the local communities both in Lower Juba and Gedo. However there has been no follow up of the progress due to the closure of the program.

#### **4.9 Pastoralists supported to provide environmental services**

CARE Somalia undertook an assessment of the spread of prosopis in the riverine areas of Dollow and Luuq districts. It was noted that prosopis is becoming a serious threat that is taking over prime grazing lands. Discussions were held on the appropriate control and management of this invasive plant species. In May 2008, CARE Somalia held a consultative community meeting in Afmadow district to discuss natural resources problems in the district. In this meeting, the community members raised their concern on the destruction of key tree species for charcoal destined for export. The participants felt that the charcoal burners were targeting Acacia tortilis for its quality charcoal. This is a very important tree to the pastoralists as it produces very nutritious pods for livestock. The elders resolved to take steps to halt this destruction.

In August 2008, CARE Somalia organized a two-day inter-district community workshop on NRM in Gedo region of Somalia. The aims of the workshop were: to analyze the current status of NRM in Northern Gedo and to develop a common strategy for the protection of key trees species and the control of invasive species like Prosopis sp. The workshop passed resolution including revitalization of the customary laws to manage natural resources. District level workshops were held to take forward the resolutions of the inter-district workshop held in Dollow. In September 2008, two NRM workshops were organized, one in Luuq and the other in Gedweyne districts. In this workshop the problem of invasive species like the prosopis in Luuq district was thoroughly discussed. Several NRM initiatives were facilitated by CARE Somalia in 2008 before its closure. It is however unfortunate that with the closure of CARE Somalia program everything was cut short. It is advisable to take up and implement these good initiatives once the security situation improves.

In NRM learning workshops supported by SC/US in Liben and Dollo it was noted that there are several different prosopis controlling techniques used by communities in Dollo. SC/US Dollo sub-office was tasked to document the practices so that the most effective ones could be scaled up in other ELMT/ELSE areas. So far nothing has yet happened on this line. The NRM Technical Advisor is preparing a good practice guideline on prosopis management and use.

It is being reported that SC/US supported a gum and incense group established in Hargelle and provided business skill training and seed money. It was noted that the groups need further training in gum collection and processing skills. They also need assistance to be linked to markets.

#### **Natural Resource Management Technical Working Group**

The NRM TWG facilitated discussions on various important NRM issues and produced various publications. The Technical Adviser (TA) connected professionals and policy makers, through meetings and enhanced interaction and knowledge sharing online through e-mails. The TA played an effective role in searching for good practices in NRM in pastoral areas and sharing them with others

through TWG meetings and publications, emails, etc. Issues such as the control of the invasive species prosopis proved to be a key issue in certain areas and the debate shed considerable light on the methods of control and management.

Other issues such as prescribed fire, holistic management, rangeland products etc. were relevant and of interest as illustrated by the high level of attendance at the meetings. The opportunity was there through the NRM TA to promote cross border NRM linkage between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalis, but the program failed to capitalize on this. It was reported that lack of openness, trust, and a collaborative spirit, among consortium members and the territorial mentality of partners was partly responsible for hinder cross border linkage—although there was improvement in Year 2.

#### **4.10 Improved capacity of pastoralists and pastoral drop-outs to access business opportunities**

##### **Training in Business Development Skills (BDS)**

ELMT/ELSE Consortium members received ToT training in Business Development Skills (BDS), Value Chain Assessments, MSME (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise) development, key financial instruments and Innovative Models in Enterprise Development at the MSME level in Nairobi and Addis in July 2008. Subsequently, they trained the different income generating groups in their respective areas including, cereal groups, fodder producers, CAHWs and drug store owners. It was the TA for Livelihood Diversity & Marketing (LDM) who gave the training to Consortium partners in Ethiopia and Kenya. He used a training module which was later used by the Consortium members to train groups and local partners.

These training sessions were very late to define partners' implementation strategies. They were also quite radical for many of the partners (e.g. suggesting that grants and free inputs should not be given and individual initiatives were preferable over group activities) and some partners were not receptive to the approach whilst others misinterpreted some elements (e.g. the concept of micro-franchising). Several hundred different income generating group members in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia were trained in BDS by staff members of the Consortium. CARE Kenya for example, using its own staff, trained 287 women and 140 men from 42 different income-generating groups including 13 groups from RREAD project in four different districts. 68 women and 127 men from 12 Pastoralist Production Groups (PPGs) were also trained by a short term consultant hired by CARE Kenya. The consultant used the same training material.

The BDS training was accepted and valued highly by Consortium members and the communities. Income generating groups in Ethiopia and Kenya began applying the lesson learnt in planning new business and expanding the existing ones. Income generating group members visited by the evaluation in Kenya indicated that the BDS training was useful in improving their business planning, rationalization of allocation of resources in terms of distributing revenue into consumption, savings and reinvestment, computation of profit and losses, market negotiation skills and in defining, researching and targeting markets. Following the training several group members opened a bank account to make savings and build their capital. Several groups diversified their businesses and individuals who were less reluctant to take the risk of starting business were encouraged and began new business. Although it is premature to talk about sustainability at this stage, since the training was given in the final year of the program, we can say the BDS training was a real success at least in Kenya. There is a need to move aggressively with the same pace to give the BDS training to more group members in Ethiopia and Somalia if security improves. The training materials can be developed to a manual that accommodates specific situations in the different program areas with different level of enterprise development.



### **Study on the causes, profiles, and dynamics of pastoralist drop-outs**

CARE Ethiopia hired a consultant to study the causes, profiles, and dynamics of pastoralist drop-outs and to identify strategies to help them continue with livelihood options without threatening the integrity of the livestock based pastoral system. The study was conducted in three *woredas* in Borana. The study identified drought, insecurity, conflict, livestock raiding, large family size, poverty, livestock disease and mismanagement of herds as the key causes for dropping out of pastoralism. Participants of the study group recommended the following external interventions to rehabilitate and improve the livelihood conditions of pastoral drop-outs in Borana:

- Food aid (a temporary solution to save lives)
- Settlement where there is more space for cultivation with full extension package
- Saving and credit services to support petty trading and other small business
- Create urban/town job opportunity to absorb the excess manpower
- Skills development to make drop-outs marketable at the job market
- Restocking for those who want to return to pastoralism (needs careful targeting)
- Return conflict induced dropouts to their place of origin and assist them to build peace and co-exist
- Integrated conflict management as an integral part of any pastoral development scheme.

The following are the observations of the consultant team:

The study found out that pastoral drop-outs and destitute pastoralists are becoming a big issue in pastoral areas in Borana. In most cases it is destitution that feeds into the increasing number of pastoral dropouts. Among other things it is essential to deal with destitution to cut down the rate at which pastoralists are leaving the system. It is also important to design policy interventions that address the specific needs of pastoral drop-outs. The following specific recommendations were given by the consultant to be followed up by CARE:

- Enhance positive diversification among pastoralist and alternative livelihoods for dropouts through investment in education and skills development;
- Enhance women empowerment with a focus on family planning;
- Ensure security and peaceful co-existence;
- Urban development and urbanization that strengthens linkage with the pastoral economy and that complements pastoralism, not replacing it;
- Promote the development of financial intermediation services and enhance the operation of private enterprises;
- Strengthen indigenous safety net mechanisms which remain important, but are coming under extreme pressure; and
- Pursue development that identifies other goods and services and income generating opportunities from the rangeland that can support destitute pastoralists and dropouts.

The study was informative of the magnitude of the drop-outs problem and its negative impact on the viability of the pastoral system. Although CARE Ethiopia targeted drop-outs in its support for IGGs, it is unclear how useful the study has been.

### **Assessment on existing Income Generating Groups (IGGs)**

CARE hired a consultant to conduct an assessment and analysis of the existing IGGs in the ELMT/ELSE operational area of Borana zone in October 2008. (Other Consortium Members also carried out PIAs in their respective areas.) The main objectives of the assessment include exploring the current status of IGGs, identifying IGGs for possible income generating interventions, and identifying economically feasible income generating activities (IGAs). The assessment has identified various challenges that include financial access, drought, illiteracy, lack of legality, and lack of market

linkage. With regard to the opportunities, the assessment identified high motivation of members, availability of local resources, and access to road and local market. The assessment has identified petty trade; trading of livestock (cattle and goats) and grain; and milk processing as the feasible income generating activities/interventions.

The assessment came up with certain recommendations including:

- Support of groups in finance, literacy improvement, and training on practical skills of business management;
- Systematic organization of IGA groups to solve the problem of activity duplication in the same locality;
- Facilitation of the establishment of market linkage between the value chain operators including those groups;
- Continuous and close monitoring of IGGs to inspect their progress, identify their problems, and take actions; and
- Awareness raising sessions for private sectors to understand the importance of linking themselves to their input suppliers.

### **Support to Income Generating Groups (IGG) and Pastoral Production Groups (PPG)**

All Consortium members in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia supported a multitude of income generating groups which are involved in different economic activities. The kind of support given ranges from training and building the institutional capacity of the groups to providing seed money and material (input) support. CARE Kenya implemented interventions to support several groups and individuals involved in bee keeping, mat making, farming, hides and skin, livestock and milk marketing. VSF-S assisted groups and individuals involved in fodder and milk marketing. CARE Ethiopia supported groups involved in livestock and cereal marketing and petty trading. SC/US did a lot of work with cereal groups and petty traders. CARE Somalia in the first year supported communities in Dollow, Somalia, through its sub-grantee Dollow Farmers Cooperative Society (DFCS) to plant and produce fodder for household use and marketing. Later, DFCS moved to VSF-S Somalia when CARE closed its program in Somalia.

*The **Sherafa Bee Keeping Group** in Mandera has six women and six men members. They have all dropped out of the pastoral system from Takaba area eight years ago. The group has 45 hives donated by different organizations. ELMT/ELSE provided them with ten modern hives. The chairman said since they received the modern hives, production has gone up despite the drought and sales and consumption increased. The current drought affected yield slightly. Otherwise at each harvest they get 9-12 kg per hive. The group members provide consultancy services to other bee keepers based on a fee for the services. They charge Ksh500-1,500 per day for providing services to harvest honey. Bee keeping has become a chief source of income to the group members followed by farming. The chairman reported that training in bee keeping combined with the modern hives provided by ELMT/ELSE and the BDS training is changing their lives for the better. The group has a high level of confidence to solve problems and is optimistic about its future.*

***Dandi Dimtu Cereal Group** in Bitata has 15 women members. The group received a grant of Birr 17,500 by SC/US to purchase maize as a start up capital. After four months it made a profit of Birr 5,700. It buys maize from outside and supplies the community when there is a shortage. They buy haricot bean from the community which is produced locally and sell it to buyers outside the community. The group is providing a buying and selling services to the community. An old cereal group called Arda Bururi that received support from ELMT/ELSE for donkey carts was also visited during the evaluation. This group is well established and mature enough to graduate from such support. It has competed with local traders successfully. Dandi Dimtu has to go a long way to overcome the challenges created by local traders and to sustain itself as grain trading group.*

### **Milk marketing**

VSF-S and CARE Kenya provided training in late 2008 and in 2009 in milk hygiene and improved processing and handling to milk traders in Mandera, Wajir, and Somalia. The training was preceded by assessments that identified the lack of adequate infrastructure in the markets such as milk shades, running water, poor transportation and unhygienic containers as the major problems that affect quality of milk in the market. A pilot project was implemented providing aluminum milk cans. Preliminary observations indicated that milk spoilage among trained women traders using aluminum cans was taking four hours longer than those without such cans. The percentage of milk spoiled among trained women reduced from 15% to 2.5%. There is potential to improve milk quality supplied to the market. However the training in milk hygiene and handling should include the producers as well as the traders.

### **Savings, credit and literacy**

All Consortium members encouraged both group and individual level savings and credit culture and literacy and numeracy among the target communities. They tried to implement these activities as an interface to the income generating activities. Promotion of the savings and credit had a mixed result. It was fairly successful in Ethiopia, but a little challenging in Kenya. The groups who are dominated by Muslims were reluctant to adopt the scheme in particular the loaning and interest aspect of it. Some groups such as the mat making group in Garissa adopted the saving part of the scheme to accumulate capital and left out extending loan with interest paid. There is a need to develop a financial intermediary facility that provides appropriate financial products to pastoralist in general and the Muslim community in particular. CARE Somalia also mobilized communities in Afmadow district, to form women's savings groups. Twenty groups with a membership ranging from 10-15 were formed in various villages of the district. However, these groups did not receive any training in capacity building and support and never took off from the ground.

The attempt made to implement a literacy and numeracy program by ELMT/ELSE Consortium members is encouraging. CARE Kenya introduced a cost sharing approach to train group members to be literate and numerate. The community was expected to pay 50% of the cost of the teacher and ELMT/ELSE pays 50%. This program is going well both in Ethiopia and Kenya. Of the two groups visited by the evaluation in Bitata (Ethiopia) and Garissa (Kenya), 50-70% of the group members became literate and numerate in less than four months. The groups have started keeping their own records without external support. Expansion of the scheme and its sustainability is an issue to be thought of. An exit strategy should be designed to handover the program to the appropriate ministry in each country when the program phases out.

### **Eco-tourism**

The eco-tourism study conducted by a consultant hired by CARE Kenya was a useful piece of work that should be taken up by Consortium members in Ethiopia. The assessment was very comprehensive and looked into various dimensions of eco-tourism models including financing, equity, community participation, social, environmental and economic benefits as well as the legal

arrangements between community-owned conservancies and private sector camp managers. Eco-tourism in pastoral area in Ethiopia is unexploited sector that could generate local and national benefits. However, the study concludes that there is very limited potential for eco-tourism in northern Kenya due to logistic and security constraints.

### **Fodder production**

Fodder production was promoted to support livestock and enhance pastoral livelihoods in VSF-S operational areas in Kenya and Somalia. Intensive and repeated training workshops from late 2008 to late 2009 and educational visits were provided by VSF-S on fodder production, harvesting, conservation and storing to selected contact farmers who practice irrigated agriculture in the riverine area along the Dawa, Juba and Tana basins. The training enhanced the skills and knowledge of contact farmers in fodder production. DFCS which was originally a sub grantee of CARE Somalia played a significant role to promote fodder production activity in Dollow district of Somalia.

The contact farmers were provided with production inputs including seed and equipments. Over the last one year the farmers have produced thousands of bales of fodder that were partially used by their own livestock and partially marketed to generate income. In some cases, as in Raspu, the farmers sold hundreds of bales of fodder to the local government who distributed it as supplementary feed to the community during periods of drought.

The fodder intervention was a success in terms of increasing fodder production and enhancing the incomes of the contact farmers to improve their livelihood. More people are becoming interested to produce fodder for both marketing and to use it for their own animals.

*Ali Bulcho a contact farmer in Mandera indicated that he replaced his maize production plots with fodder production. He said fodder is more profitable than maize production as its market price is often distorted by relief supplies. He has begun replacing low yielding indigenous breeds with high yielding exotic breeds. He said in 3-4 years time he will have only a limited number of high yielding dairy cattle that will be supported by the fodder from his farm.*

Fodder production and conservation ToT training was given by the Livestock Services TWG in collaboration with the Kenya Arid and Semi-arid Lands (KASAL) project of the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI Kiboko) to participants from the Consortium members and other partners from Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The training was effective in raising fodder production interest and knowledge of the participants. The participants from Ethiopia went back with seeds to start fodder production in their respective areas. SC/US has finalized land preparation along the Dawa river in Liben. The Borana zone pastoral development office has selected sites for rain-fed fodder production. The cross border impact of the training was encouraging to expand the practice in southern Ethiopia,

It was noticed by the evaluation that the intervention in Mandera had some targeting problems. Well-off farmers who own farms closer to Mandera town and who are easily accessible for frequent supervisory visits were targeted. The approach excluded the poor and the women who are the most vulnerable groups that need the support most. It may be a challenge to find the poor and the women who own and have access to the riverine area which are closer to Mandera town.

There may be a need to include riverine sites away from the town to find the poor and the most vulnerable small-holders who either rent out their plot to others or practice irrigation on a very small scale. The well-off farmers could be supported with training but support with seeds and equipment was a waste of program resources. In order to encourage seed supply, free seed distribution should be limited.

The **Livelihood Diversification and Marketing TWG** was effective in terms of training Consortium partners in BDS and initiating a few entrepreneurial activities in particular in Kenya. Some Consortium members considered the Technical Advisor was not sufficiently available (due to other commitments) to assist their efforts in enhancing alternative livelihoods. The TWG played an important role in organizing the Regional Livestock Marketing Symposium.

#### **4.11 Customary Institutions actively engaged in peace-building**

Three workshops were facilitated in 2008 and 2009 by CARE Ethiopia among elders of Borana, Garre and Gabra, the three major conflicting groups in southern Ethiopia to build their capacity to resolve conflicts and bring peace and stability in the area. The workshops brought about increased awareness of the elders on factors that cause conflict and helped them to reach consensus on the need for frequent meetings and interaction to deal with conflict causing issues proactively.

The Borana, Garre and Gabra elders made exchange visit to south Omo to gain knowledge and experience on how to resolve conflict and keep peace among people of different ethnic groups who are sharing common resources. In south Omo where the exchange visit was carried out, there are more than eight ethnic groups who used to be hostile to one another and fought for several decades to control resource and secure supremacy. Now the same people live together peacefully and cooperate in sharing resources.

They were assisted by an NGO called Ethiopian Pastoral Research and Development Association (EPARDA) to create a forum where factors that cause conflicts can be discussed and reach agreement to address the causes not the symptoms and ensure peaceful co-existence. The peace building meetings were conducted repeatedly and for long time to give them time and space to hammer out their differences. The exchange visit was facilitated by CARE Ethiopia. There were participants who came across the border from Kenya. A total of 61 men and 10 women (56 from the community and 15 from government offices) participated.

The workshops that brought conflicting groups together and the exchange visit to south Omo were successful in bringing relative peace, but the situation and the relationship between the three groups Borana, Gabra and Garre in southern Ethiopia still remains fragile.

As reported earlier, Wajir Peace set up 15 conflict early warning desks which are now being taken on by the Government of Kenya as a model for community conflict early warning. Support was given by CARE Kenya to the establishment of three new peace committees in Greater Wajir and they were trained in conflict resolution. CARE Kenya provided support to the Al-Fatah Council of Elders and peace committees to resolve four conflicts in Greater Wajir. The Council also acted proactively to stop a potentially violent conflict between the simmering clan conflicts of the Garre and the Murulle community that could have sucked in other clans from Wajir and across the Somalia and Ethiopia borders.

#### **4.12 Local peace building efforts linked to cross-border efforts**

##### **CARE Somalia cross-border peace initiative**

The cross border meeting organized in June 2008 by CARE Somalia between the communities in Dollow Ado of Ethiopia and Dollow Somalia over access to grazing, conflict mitigation and peace building was so productive that the relationship between the two communities has improved substantially. The efforts of the nine member committee (4 from Ethiopia and 5 from Somalia) who were selected at the workshop were able to reduce incidents of conflict that were common when pastoralists from one side of the border cross to the other side. There is more interaction and dialogue

now than before between the two communities that helps them to be proactive to arrest factors that could cause conflict.

#### **4.13 Improved capacity of pastoral representatives to engage in policy debates**

##### **Yabello Pastoralist Gathering**

CARE Ethiopia co-organized and funded a gathering held in Yabello that discussed the management of the rangeland resources, its degradation and ways to rehabilitate it. Thousands of pastoralists including prominent traditional leaders and government officials participated in the gathering. CARE had also presented its past experiences on rangeland management and the support it is giving to strengthen customary institutions at the gathering. It is being reported that the gathering helped promote grazing enclosures and bush thinning activities in Borana and it helped CARE to secure more support from the local authorities to implement its rangeland management activities and strengthening the role of customary institution in managing resources and maintaining peace. The gathering took place from August 4-6, 2008.

##### **Kenya Camel Forum**

The Kenya Camel Forum supported in May 2009 provided an opportunity to strengthen the pastoral voice as it brought together pastoralist camel owners from throughout the region with policy makers including the Minister and Assistant Minister of Livestock. These forums have taken place for a number of years. This one however was the largest and CARE Kenya was the main sponsor the 14th Annual Kenya Camel Forum (KCF) held in Moyale in late May 2009. The Forum hosted 252 participants from 16 organizations and over 22 districts as well as participants from Ethiopia who are interested in setting up an Ethiopian Camel Forum. The Kenya Camel Forum has been an opportunity to articulate issues pertaining to the development and promotion of camels and maintaining pastoralism. It is a relevant avenue to disseminate and discuss research findings, policy issues and also to demonstrate, in a practical manner, husbandry and health challenges involved in camel rearing.

The Forum promoted cross border learning and information exchange and set up a cross border multi-ethnic peace committee and secured the recognition of camels in the national livestock policy. VSF-S Kenya facilitated the attendance of four camel keepers, two each from Ngurunit and Garbatulla (trained as CASPROs) with 12 other camel keepers from Mandera and Wajir sponsored by its other programs. VSF-S Somalia was unable to support participants in 2009 because of difficulties of bringing people from Somalia, however it sponsored ten pastoralists from Gedo, Somalia during the May 2008 forum in Mandera, while VSF Suisse Kenya supported the participation of eight pastoralists from Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit and Isiolo.

The newly launched Ethiopian Camel Forum (ECF) expected to provide an opportunity for pastoralists to advocate on their needs. The ECF was a product of several efforts made by ELMT/ELSE staff supported by the Livestock Services TWG.

#### **4.14 More informed pastoral policies**

In August 2009, CARE Somalia in collaboration with Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) based in Nakuru (Kenya), organized a policy advocacy training for 12 ELMT/ELSE Consortium members and local partners including CIFA Kenya and Wajir Peace from Kenya, AFREC, SADO and JVCS from Somalia, CARE Ethiopia, CARE Somalia and VSF-Suisse.

The objectives of the workshop were:

- to introduce participants to key concepts about policy and procedures of policy making (using the Kenyan model) with a view to establishing opportunities for citizen participation in policy making process.
- to introduce participants to the policy context in ELMT/ELSE area and how it affects or impacts on pastoralism and pastoral livelihoods in terms of opportunities and constraints – the extent to which policies support or undermine pastoral livelihoods.
- To introduce participants to policy advocacy and strategies for effectively influencing policy processes, with a focus on how civil society can most effectively support citizen participation in policy processes.

These activities aimed at building the policy knowledge base of Consortium members and their ability to articulate and lobby for policy options that favor of pastoralists. There is little evidence to suggest that this has happened.

One person from CARE Ethiopia who attended the training was supposed to train 24 NGO and Government officials on the same. This expected training was not given when this evaluation was conducted. Another staff member attended training on pastoralism and policy in Ethiopia that was organized by the Feinstein International Center of the Tufts University in March 2008 at Debre-Zeit, Ethiopia. SC/US also participated in the IIED/Tufts led Dynamics of Pastoral Systems and Policy Options fora in Ethiopia, which SC/US has supported through the provision of natural resource management and other information. The RCU attended various meetings and workshops on pastoralism including the Horn of Africa Pastoral Network in which attempts were made to promote ideas that address the needs of pastoralists.

It is being reported that since January 2009, the Technical Advisor for Livelihoods Diversity and Marketing (LDM) has been working closely with the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands and facilitated meetings and discussions on the Ministry's key priority areas including infrastructure, investment and education. A claim was made that this working relationship has impacted the thinking in the Ministry on the key priority areas. Similar interactions and meetings are being spearheaded by the Ministry with the active participation of the LDM Advisor and various financial institutions to pave the ground for the establishment of a Northern Kenya Microfinance Working Group. This group will seek to systematically address how more MFIs can be encouraged to build a branch network in Northern Kenya, explore innovative outreach models using mobile banking, and develop sharia-compliant microfinance products.

The results of the assessment of the Eco-Tourism in Northern Kenya supported by CARE Kenya under ELMT/ELSE was expected to inform the Ministry for Northern Kenya on how best to promote eco-tourism development in that region.

The Regional Livestock Marketing Symposium conducted in October 2009 hosted by CARE Kenya and organized jointly by a number of ELMT/ELSE partners and the RCU brought donors, government officials, NGOs, private sector and community members from a number of countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda) to better understand the challenges and constraints of livestock marketing in the region and present a wide range of papers on successes and lessons learnt. This was seen as an important opportunity to engage in and influence policy for this sector.

The ELMT/ELSE Deputy Chief of Party facilitated a cross border peace campaign through a workshop held in Moyale (Ethiopia). Ministers, higher officials, NGOs and GO members participated in this meeting.

#### **4.15 Cross-cutting issues**

Whilst the ELMT/ELSE Technical Working Group for Social and Gender Equity (SAGE) achieved little progress, the project activities supported by ELMT/ELSE achieved a reasonable degree of gender mainstreaming. Women beneficiaries, who are generally difficult to access in pastoralist communities, participated in BDS trainings, IGGs, customary institutions, even in CAHWs and drug store owners. Also marginalized social groups such as the Bantus in Garissa and Somalia, the Konso in Ethiopia, were included. There is much more an issue of adequate gender equity at the senior level of ELMT/ELSE program management and this should be more effectively addressed in future.

Conflict sensitivity in programming was very important in the Kenya context. As reported by CARE Kenya, it adopted a conflict-sensitive approach in its most recent strategic planning document ensuring that staff recruitment includes a balanced ethnic representation and local vendors are where practical given preference (barring just those incapable of delivering satisfactory goods and services). The conflict sensitivity in programming is good but may not be so relevant in an environment where you have a civil war like in Somalia. It was not either relevant in Ethiopia where governance system has been decentralized.

#### **4.16 Cross-border programming**

Despite the fact that the ELMT/ELSE was a cross border project, it is sad that there were no significant truly joint cross border activities implemented. Of course activities such as training programs, workshops, exchange visits which do have a cross border element were implemented. The periodic Consortium meetings, M&E workshops, the ELMT/ELSE newsletter and technical bulletins, the technical briefs and good practice bibliographies and the website, consolidated reports facilitated sharing knowledge, experiences among the Consortium members and outside. There has been ample opportunity to implement so many cross border programs that could have had a real cross border impact and direct benefit to the pastoralists who live along the common border. Such programs could include, NRM, Marketing, Animal health, EW/ER and contingency planning to mention few. For such cross border programs national policies need to be taken into consideration, hence the need to involve national governments right from the beginning.

#### **4.17 Collaboration**

ELMT/ELSE collaboration with governmental and non governmental organizations in the project area were generally commendable. All Consortium members work closely with government. Collaboration was particularly effective in terms of identifying beneficiaries and determining approaches to project implementation. There was also close collaboration in some cases with organizations and agencies that were neither Consortium partners nor Sub-Grantees of ELMT/ELSE, including technical agencies such as FAO and SNV.

### **5. Impact & Sustainability of ELMT/ELSE**

Field observations in selected project sites, discussion with beneficiaries, project staff and local government development authorities and review of documents were made to assess the impact of the ELMT/ELSE program. As presented below the impact of the project in improving the lives of pastoralists in the Mandera Triangle and in strengthening the sustainability pastoral livelihood is limited. Given the short project-cycle of two years however, achievements of intermediate results are satisfactory. The knowledge and experience in Consortium working, cross border activities, networking and other fundamentals such as community awareness about the nature of the program,



have been laid out for a successful future livelihood project in the area or for an extended ELMT/ELSE program.

### **5.1 IR1: Livestock based livelihoods protected in the event of an emergency**

The aim of this intermediate result (IR) is to improve the capacity of pastoralists to respond to livelihood shocks in a timely manner and to reduce their requirements for emergency assistance in the event of drought, economic or conflict driven shocks. This is expected to be achieved through the production and distribution of harmonized early warning information that can be used by Consortium members, local government, communities and other interested parties; improved capacity of the Consortium members and partners from government to develop contingency plans for livestock based drought preparedness and early response interventions; and increase community awareness and knowledge in early warning and early responses. Over the program period noticeable results were observed in the following areas of interventions.

SC/UK's support to contingency planning and ensuring appropriate early response could have been much more robust and innovative than it was. The livelihood situation update was produced but without follow up. Although the information generated by the updates was good, the design of the program did not provide a system to monitor information utilization nor to feedback if the information had been considered useful by any party. Moreover, the information and analysis was not reaching local food security or drought management offices - nor the very communities who need the information most. SC/UK, with all its experience, could have been much more proactive in providing timely early warning information to enhance building the emergency response capacity of Consortium members.

The evaluation recognizes that contingency plans developed through the support of the ELMT/ELSE program were utilized to guide emergency responses in some districts to protect livestock based livelihoods. For example in Mandera Central district in Kenya and Dhas *woreda* in Ethiopia, the contingency plans were activated to assist pastoralists to mitigate the impact of the drought in 2008 and 2009. It was reported by CARE Kenya that in Mandera, the Department of Water Development secured funds for water tankering; the Department of Livestock Production supplied hay to core breeding animals, and CARE subsidized transport to enhance livestock take-off<sup>20</sup> due to the contingency planning that had been undertaken. In Dhas *woreda*, CARE Ethiopia supported the Disaster Management Committees (DMC) with logistics to conduct animal health and human health activities and to maintain peace which was an essential element to enhance movement of livestock in search of water and pasture.

Additional activities supported by the Ethiopian partners include drought reserves, hay making, fodder production and the mass vaccination which all contributed towards protection of livestock based livelihood.

The report by CARE Ethiopia and SC/US and the discussion held with beneficiaries in Borana and Liben confirmed that the enclosures helped mainly breeding animals and calves during the dry period in 2009. The mass vaccination protected livestock from succumbing to disease outbreaks. The fodder contact farmers in Mandera also reported that they did not lose any livestock for the long drought that hit their areas and milk production was maintained while significant livestock losses and reduction in milk supply was reported in the area. The various drought management training conducted by ELMT/ELSE Consortium members in Ethiopia and Kenya have had some impact on the attitude and behavior of pastoralists to be more proactive to manage shocks.

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<sup>20</sup> Financed through the ECHO supported RREAD project (CARE Kenya)

CARE Ethiopia reported that following the training, various changes have been observed that include hay making, diversification of livestock species, strengthening of communal enclosures, buying and storing of food grains when the market is good, and diversification of livelihood assets. Elders and customary institutions in Negele, Yabello, Garissa and Mandera confirmed that there is a change in the attitude and behavior of the pastoralists in their respective areas regarding response and preparedness to drought. These are all outcomes that indicate the impact of the early warning and response interventions to protect the livestock base livelihood of the pastoralists.

Whilst there is no specific information providing a definitive figure as to the number of households who retained their livestock based livelihoods due to ELMT/ELSE interventions, it is fair to say with certain level of confidence that some pastoralists who were at the margin of dropping out of the system remained in the system and continued as pastoralists due to the drought reserve, mass vaccination and restocking interventions implemented by CARE Ethiopia and SC/US and the fodder production interventions implemented by VSF Suisse and CARE Somalia through its sub grantee DFCS before the closure of the program. Nevertheless there is no doubt that the number of households impacted by the intervention is too small compared to the 20m pastoralists who live in ELMT/ELSE area.

## **5.2 IR2: Livelihoods enhanced through improved livestock production, health and marketing**

This IR is aimed at enhancing pastoral production systems, by improving livestock production, health and marketing. Areas of support included training of community animal health workers (CAHW), privatization of veterinary services, livestock marketing, and camel husbandry. The major results are discussed below.

The evaluation recognizes positive indications of change in livestock health in some parts of the program area. The business linkage that was developed between the drug store owners and the veterinary drug suppliers in Kenya and Somalia facilitated the effective distribution of drugs through the CAHWs working at community level in the pastoral areas. Livestock that received services through the established system are limited and not close to the millions of livestock in the Mandera Triangle. 59,700 animals were treated in Kenya from 4,776 households, and thousands of livestock in Somalia from 17,599 households. The 20 new CAHWs trained by VSF Suisse in conjunction with AFREC have also treated about 10,000 animals benefiting a total of 754 households. The billboards helped visibility as well as acceptance of the facility by the community as an important veterinary drugs store. However, they were not well received everywhere.

## **5.3 IR3: Natural resource management enhanced**

This IR aims at achieving restoration of a viable pastoral production system through reviving and strengthening the customary institutions, promoting improved tools and approached to rangeland management, building the capacity of NGO and government staff and supporting appropriate water development interventions.

The most significant achievement under this IR was the promotion of debates and documentation of good practice among development actors on key NRM issues led by the NRM Technical Working Group (TWG).

The strengthening of the role of customary institutions in natural resource management (NRM) contributed towards better management of the rangeland. This was manifested by the well managed enclosures visited in Borana and Liben areas in Ethiopia.

It has been reported by CARE Somalia that the workshops and meetings conducted for elders, community members and the local officials to discuss the condition of natural resources in Somalia raised awareness about the negative effects of indiscriminate cutting of useful trees for charcoal production.

The **NRM Technical Working Group (TWG)**, which began largely as internal technical working group for ELMT/ELSE partners, evolved into a broader, more inclusive group that includes members from government and NGOs. Today, the NRM TWG in Ethiopia is made up of over 150 members, whereas the larger group including members in Kenya and elsewhere that is mainly used for information exchange has over 230 members. It is being reported that in time this NRM TWG has gained in respect and in status and even 'legitimacy without having sought formalization or government approval. In future it would be of great value to continue (i.e. beyond the ELMT/ELSE program) the processes and activities that have been started by the NRM TWG and to seek a formal approval and legitimacy from the Ethiopian Government for it. One issue that would need to be resolved is where to house the TWG for continuity and sustainability.

The NRM technical working groups promoted active discussions on prosopis, fire, carbon sequestration, rangeland products and holistic management. Information on the discussions and other bulletins and resources were shared with over 250 individuals and has fed into SC/US and Somali region specific fora. A new methodology on participatory NRM mapping was developed and piloted including *madda* level mapping and the use of GIS with communities. Holistic management was promoted in Ethiopia and Kenya and pilot sites have been set up in both countries. A vibrant discussion was facilitated on the use and management of prosopis and piloting of approaches started in Dollo Ado (funded by another program). The shortcomings of this TWG was that it was very Ethiopian focused and did not invest efforts or replicate this success in Kenya and Somalia.

#### **5.4 IR4: Livelihoods enhanced by strengthened alternative and complementary livelihood strategies**

This intermediate result seeks to address the needs of pastoralists and pastoral dropouts who were forced to leave the system with alternative livelihoods. The intention is to assist pastoral dropouts with alternative livelihoods (mainly non-pastoral) strategies and pastoralists with appropriate complementary and livelihood enhancing strategies to increase their overall income and improve their livelihood. ELMT/ELSE Consortium members implemented a number of income generating activities that had a focus both on pastoralists and pastoral dropouts. The key results are discussed below.

Institutional capacity building, BDS, skill development, seed money support given to IGGs reinvigorated and re-energized existing groups. The BDS training encouraged formation of new group and individual business and expansion of existing ones. In the second year of the project the ELMT partners in Kenya and VSF Suisse moved aggressively to support and enhance alternative livelihood to dropouts and pastoralists. CARE Kenya trained 210 individuals from 15 groups and distributed beekeeping kits and improved hives for demonstration purposes; trained mat making groups in product design; meanwhile VSF Suisse trained milk marketing groups in milk hygiene and provided them with aluminum milk containers; trained contact farmers in fodder production and provided them with inputs. All of these efforts have laid the foundation to provide and strengthen alternative livelihood strategies to drop-outs and pastoralists. Although there are few groups like Sherafa bee keeping group in Mandera who demonstrated the positive impact of the intervention in short period of time it is too early to talk about overall impacts at this stage.

Training and seed capital support given to the cereal groups in Liben by SC/US is changing the lives of poor pastoral women. The groups have contributed in stabilizing grain prices and opened up alternative markets for agricultural products produced in their localities, the sustainability of the

SC/ELMT/ELSE Cereal Groups is questionable as they are confronted by aggressive traders to take them out of business. CARE Ethiopia also provided 9 groups (292 individuals) with seed money to support existing and develop new income generation activities.

The efforts made by all Consortium members to promote a savings and credit culture among the IGGs resulted in a mixed result. It is being noted that there was a certain level of success in both mobilizing savings and extending loans in CARE Ethiopia and SC/US operation areas. The impact of the effort was very limited in Kenya and Somalia. It is more appropriate to learn from other successful community based rural financial experience experiences implemented in southern Ethiopia.

The impact of the literacy program in enabling individuals in IGGs to keep records of their transactions is encouraging, while the 'cost sharing' approach between the community and ELMT/ELSE also helps to advance the scheme among more communities. Adults come to literacy classes with a purpose to achieve. Once they achieved that purpose they tend to drop out, unless situations create more demand. Expansion of the scheme is important, but it should be done in a sustainable manner with the participation of government for smooth handing over when ELMT/ELSE phases out.

## **5.5 IR5: Strengthened capacity of customary institutions in peace building, civil governance and conflict mitigation**

The causes of conflicts in pastoral areas in the Mendera Triangle are becoming more complex. They are no longer just resource-based and resolved through negotiation and cooperation based on reciprocities using the traditional mechanisms and the authority of elders. Economic interests and political dissent are playing a role in causing and fueling conflicts. The composition of actors in the conflict in pastoral areas is expanding to include non pastoralists such as politicians and urban business people. Nowadays it has become more apparent that in order to reduce conflict in pastoral areas the focus should go beyond pasture, water and pastoralists.

The aim of this IR was to support conflict resolution and mitigation in the Mendera Triangle taking into consideration the newly emerging scenarios that cause and fuel conflicts. Interventions under this IR were expected to have both national and cross border aspects as most conflicts in the Mendera Triangle cross national boundaries. Key interventions and results are discussed below.

The workshops supported by CIFA Ethiopia that brought the conflicting groups Gabra, Garre and Borana in southern Ethiopia together created space and time for parties to talk and interact on root causes of conflicts and ways to resolve them. Such interaction were useful to reduce tensions, nevertheless they were not able to bring a lasting peace. More work needs to be done and there may a need to include more actors such as the business people in towns and the youth including educated ones.

The cross border meeting organized in 2008 by CARE Somalia between the communities in Dollow Ado (Ethiopia) and Dollow (Somalia) over access to grazing, conflict mitigation and peace building was so productive that the relationship between the two communities has improved substantially. The efforts of the nine member committee (4 from Ethiopia and 5 from Somalia) who were selected at the workshop were able to reduce incidences of conflicts that were common when pastoralists from one side of the border crossed to the other side. There is more interaction and dialogue now between the two communities to be proactive to arrest factors that could cause conflict.

CARE Kenya reported that the conflict early warning system, including the conflict early warning desks, the peace committees and Al-Fatah Council of Elders were able to resolve four conflicts in Greater Wajir. The council also acted proactively to stop a potentially violent conflict between the

Garre and the Murulle community that could have sucked in other clans from Wajir and across from Somalia and Ethiopia.

## **5.6 IR6: Pastoralist area “voice” in dry land policy formulation and implementation strengthened at all levels**

The aim of this IR is to support the pastoralist in the Mandera Triangle to engage in policy debates and raise their voices at all levels and help in promoting local, national and regional policies that benefit them. ELMT/ELSE was expected to work in collaboration with local civil society groups to promote and enhance policy agenda that favors pastoralists. Limited activities were implemented under this IR.

The Kenya Camel Forum in 2009 provided an opportunity to strengthen pastoral voice as it brought together pastoralist camel owners from throughout the region with policy makers including the Kenyan Minister and Assistant Minister of Livestock. It was able to highlight the importance of camel husbandry in the arid environment in pastoral areas and its importance in the face of global climate change. The newly launched Ethiopian Camel forum is partly the product of the 2009 Kenya Camel Forum and partly that of the training on camel husbandry and health provided to Consortium members in Ethiopia and other partners from government and NGOs in Moyale and Dire Dawa by the TA for Livestock Services TWG. The Ethiopian Camel Forum is expected to provide an opportunity for pastoralists to advocate on their needs including the promotion of camels.

CARE Kenya reported that the Wajir Peace Initiative has been able to influence policy on a number of issues. Its experience has fed into the national guidelines on the development of peace committees, the early warning desks are being used as model for community based conflict early warning and it's experiences have recently been used to inform the strategy of Ministry of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands in its development of an annex to the Government's Vision 2030 document.

The Yabello gathering in August 2008 co-organized and funded by CARE Ethiopia and the Pastoral Development Office in Borana brought together thousands of pastoralists and government officials to discuss on management of the rangeland resources. The gathering offered opportunity to pastoralists to air and argue their case. It is being reported that the gathering helped promotion of grazing enclosures and bush thinning activities in Borana and it helped CARE to secure more to strengthen the role of customary institution in managing resources.

It is reported by the Technical Advisor for Livelihood Diversity and Marketing (LDM) that he has been working closely with the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands (MoNK) to facilitate a number of meetings as well as holding various discussions to help further some of the Ministry's four key priority areas particularly infrastructure, investment and education. These discussions have clearly influenced the Ministry's thinking about how to develop the Northern Kenya Education Trust Fund and introductions made for the Minister and his Advisor to the Aga Khan Foundation, Aga Khan University, Rattansi Education Trust as well as the Kenya Community Development Fund (KCDF). Some of the organizations to which the Ministry was introduced are now Board members of the soon-to-be-launched Fund. The TA has helped to build the Ministry's capacity in this area as well as enabled them to call on expertise and experience of others to build their Education Trust Fund. It is being reported that a similar impact will be achieved through the round-table consultative meetings with various financial institutions that the TA for LDM will be chairing with the Minister in November and the soon-to-be-appointed consultant selected jointly by CARE Kenya and the Ministry will shape the thinking related to the Northern Kenya Investment Fund. There is a real need for the introduction of an appropriate financial institution in the pastoral area.

The Moyale Cross Border Peace Conference which was held in November 2009 was attended by pastoralists, ministers, government people and NGOs from Kenya and Ethiopia. The forum gave opportunity for pastoralist to present their issues to the senior decision makers from the two countries. The forum also gave space and time to ministers and other senior government officials from Ethiopia and Kenya who attended the meeting to share ideas on how to collaborative to bring peace and stability along the common border of the two countries. This meeting was sponsored and facilitated by the RCU.

The above analysis shows that appropriate activities were implemented by ELMT/ELSE to realize the intermediate results. However it takes more time to see the results converted into the expected impact of increased self reliance and resiliency of the population through improved livelihoods in drought prone pastoral areas of the Mander Triangle. It also requires an appropriate policy environment that would facilitate effectiveness of the interventions.

## **6. Challenges to Program Implementation**

### **6.1 Climatic**

There have been a succession of five poor or failed rain seasons in the Horn of Africa over the past three years and indications are that the recent short rains have also been well below expectations. Oxfam GB reports that Somalia's drought is now the worst for 20 years and that the rainfall in November 2009 was less than 5% of the average rainfall for that month in areas of northern Somalia, southern Ethiopia and north-west Kenya. This situation continues to erode the resilience of farmers and pastoralists in these areas. During 2009 there has been a significant movement of livestock into areas of southern Ethiopia and southern Somalia, (despite considerable insecurity in the area) from drought affected northern Kenya.

### **6.2 Environment of Insecurity**

The political and conflict situation in Somalia has not only remained volatile during the program period, but has deteriorated significantly over the past two years. Maintaining neutrality in an environment where the nominal government and the insurgents are both demanding support and accountability can make the operating environment untenable. Added to this is the need to ensure equity with respect to car hire, employment and services across the sub-clans. There have been incidents of ELMT vehicles being hijacked, abduction of NGO workers in Mander and direct threats being made to ELMT partners. Even for very committed and experienced INGOs like CARE Somalia and VSF Suisse this has meant suspending their program operations in south/central Somalia which they have not been forced to do previously.

Another challenge is the "culture of dependency" that has developed within the operational area. Following successive years of drought, there has been a considerable amount of food aid and other relief provided to this area. It is very difficult to shift the paradigm and mind-set from aid to longer term development which requiring that certain conditions apply to program assistance and communities understanding the rationale behind this approach. This is particularly challenging when the political context is also so volatile.

### **6.3 USG Funding Conditions**

There was little or no support by USAID East Africa to allow "adaptive management" (programmatically or financially) by Consortium partners, even if this was endorsed and overseen by the RCU. This prevented ELMT/ELSE from being both innovative and responsive to changing

conditions. Symptomatic of this was the decision by the Regional Agreement Officer (RAO) for RELPA at USAID East Africa (during the course of the first year) not to allow the crisis modifier facility (allowing 10% deviation from budget allocation to fund emergency situations) which was built into the original design of the ELMT/ELSE program, was a major constraint on the effectiveness of contingency planning and early response. This facility had demonstrated its effectiveness during the first Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) in Ethiopia.

It is perhaps important to note here that the crisis modifier was not intended to turn the ELMT/ELSE into a “response” program, (which it was never designed to be), but rather would have provided the program greater budgetary flexibility as conditions in the operational area changed or deteriorated and new intervention priorities were identified. Furthermore, there were instances where key personnel could not be hired because the RAO viewed the proposed salary levels as unmerited even though they conformed to CARE SSS human resource policy. Such flexibility and delegation of responsibility is normally inherent in the spirit of a Cooperative Agreement.

Because of the rising insurgency in parts of southern and central Somalia, the United States Government (USG) has been compelled to review the conditions set out to prevent USG funding assisting terrorism in any form. The result is that the OFAC conditions are now so stringent that it has become virtually untenable for any organization as a recipient of USG funding to operate in Somalia. Increasingly this stringency may also apply in north-eastern Kenya.

#### **6.4 Protracted Program Administration**

The administration and screening of agreements, especially for Sub-Grantees, took an inordinate length of time (in part by Consortium partners themselves, but primarily by the USAID East Africa Mission which insisted on approving the templates and the process for approving sub-grants<sup>21</sup>). Inevitably this held back the recruitment of essential staff and the implementation of activities. The first (of seventeen) sub-grant agreements was not approved until seven months into the program and most of the Sub-Grantee Agreements were awarded one year into the program. The approval of the first No Cost Extension from 1 September to 31 December 2009 also took four months, a delay that in itself led to the postponement of various activities. It is always difficult to understand why the administrative process can so often fail the delivery of essential services at a time when pastoralist areas are facing particular hardship through drought and conflict.

#### **6.5 Institutional Impediments**

Many field staff of both Sub-Grantees and Consortium partners considered the ELMT/ELSE Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) to be “remote” and faced a long bureaucratic chain to reach decision-making at a strategic level, so often they lacked a sense of “ownership” in the program frame or decisions which were made in either Nairobi or Addis Ababa.

Many country-focused INGO actors find it institutionally challenging to operate “regionally”. Some of the issues that are particular to CARE as an organization have been well documented through an internal review process<sup>22</sup> which has highlighted that CARE’s business model is very much focused towards country programs and also notes the lack of incentives to engage in regional initiatives (this is fairly typical of most INGOs). However, it was also not clear to the evaluation team what function INGO regional offices are prepared to commit to bridge the strategic relationship between country programs, since there was no record of their engagement with ELMT/ELSE during the tenure of the

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<sup>21</sup> It is reported that the USAID East Africa Mission took seven months to provide this approval.

<sup>22</sup> “Operational Issues for Managing Multi-Country Projects” by Joe Stuckley and Mary Picard commissioned by the CARE USA East & Central Africa Regional Management Unit (July 2009).

program, and very little engagement for that matter from INGO senior management level, (e.g. Country or Assistant Country Director level).

## **6.6 Program Time-frame**

The ELMT/ELSE time-frame of two years was always unrealistic with respect to the very broad and ambitious objectives set for the program in a very challenging environment. There was no inception period when the RCU and principal partners could focus on staff recruitment, relationships between key stakeholders and the formation of the Consortium with a common understanding and purpose. This was largely due to the pressure on ELMT/ELSE program from other components of RELPA to conduct training and workshops as soon as the program had been approved. The ELMT/ELSE program clearly picked up momentum in the second year of operation when most of the administrative and other challenges had been overcome, but will not now be able to capitalize sufficiently on this despite two periods of no-cost extensions.

Anyone with field experience in the dryland/pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa will know how much unnecessary time is spent in managing short-term project cycles, how cost ineffective and inefficient it can be and how challenging this is to the overall operating environment. The effects are that relationships at community level are transient, capacity is rarely built, credibility with beneficiaries is undermined and key staff have no job security.

## **6.7 Staff Attrition**

The turnover of ELMT/ELSE staff has perhaps been the single biggest challenge to the program. In particular there has been a high attrition rate of Project Managers and Technical Advisers who were critical to ensure consistency and “technical memory” throughout the program. The issue is exacerbated in part by the environment of insecurity especially within the “Mandera Triangle”, but also the more experienced and competent staff are seeking greater job security where funding mechanisms ensure better stability.

Even when these key personnel were in post, many were allocated a time commitment to the ELMT/ELSE program which proved virtually impossible to manage in a Consortium set-up like ELMT/ELSE. There is no doubt that some committed individuals exceeded the time allocation, but it was often the case that senior management of the Consortium partners accorded more priority to country specific activities than a “regional” initiative such as ELMT/ELSE.

## **6.8 Weak & Fractious Institutional Engagement**

Inherent within RELPA and the ELMT/ELSE were weak institutional communications and engagement. This not only relates to linkages between the key program components (COMESA, PACAPS, RCPM, ELMT and OFDA) but also between the USAID East Africa Mission and the bilateral missions in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia who did not always feel sufficiently consulted nor did they agree with the way the program was being managed. A fractious culture within a program does not bode well for cohesion within the components of that program. Certainly the lack of commitment from the Ethiopian Government early on in the ELMT program was indicative of this (and the subsequent renaming to ELSE), which led to delays in implementation. The fact that the CTO was drawn into so many issues concerning the operations of ELMT/ELSE also reflected that the structures did not exist to manage the process sufficiently.



## 7. Effectiveness of Institutional Arrangements & Collaborative Working

### 7.1 The Consortium

CARE assumed the role as Prime Grantee of the ELMT/ELSE Consortium (through a **Cooperative Agreement** with USAID dated 31 August 2007) and in this function was represented by CARE Somalia/South Sudan (SSS). In turn CARE SSS signed **five Sub-Grant Agreements** with the other partners of the Consortium: namely CARE Ethiopia, CARE Kenya, Save the Children UK (SC/UK) in Ethiopia, Save the Children US (SC/US) in Ethiopia, and Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (VSF) Suisse in Kenya and Somalia. By November 2007, shortly after the ELMT/ELSE launch meeting in Nairobi, all Sub-Grant Agreements were finalized with the Consortium partners. The Consortium represented a partnership of four very competent international NGOs with considerable experience of working in areas of community development, conflict resolution, early warning, contingency planning, natural resource management, livestock production, health and marketing and all very familiar with the particularly challenging environment of the arid lands border areas - and resident communities - of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

The six Consortium partners then started the process of negotiating **agreements with Sub-Grantees** in accordance with the conditions of the USAID Request for Applications (RFA). The number of Sub-Grantees was reduced from the 40 “local partners” identified in the Consortium’s Technical Application (TA) to the 16 with which contracts were eventually finalized. These agreements (which were long and complex documents conforming to CARE’s own long-established contract guidelines) had to be cleared through the USAID Regional Agreement Officer (RAO) to ensure that all Sub-Grantee organizations complied with USG funding regulations and that the terms of the agreements incorporated the conditions stipulated by USAID for different levels of funding<sup>23</sup>.

This prolonged effort by USAID to approve the sub-grant template and approval process contradicted the spirit of the Cooperative Agreement in which CARE SSS is accorded the responsibility to administer the full program funding according to standard provisions<sup>24</sup> agreed by both parties. Furthermore, the process became protracted and led to very substantial delays in the awarding of Sub-Grant Agreements by the Consortium partners because the USAID RAO was often busy or travelling. The first Sub-Grant Contract was awarded to Oxfam GB (Kenya) in March 2008, while the majority of contracts were then awarded between July and September 2008 (one year into the program).

The last contract to be signed was with SOS Sahel (Ethiopia) in March 2009<sup>25</sup> because of administrative complications of one Sub-Grantee being contracted by two Consortium partners. The situation was further exacerbated by CARE closing its program in Somalia in October 2008 due to increasing hostilities and direct threats to the organization by insurgency groups. DFCS, a Sub-Grantee of CARE SSS, had its agreement transferred to VSF Suisse (effective in May 2009), whilst the other two Sub-Grantees, SADO and WRRS were unable to continue their activities. A schedule of Sub-Grantee contract periods is provided in **Annex Four**.

Against this background, the very short program time-frame was never conducive to the formation of the ELMT/ELSE Consortium which was more preoccupied with negotiations, administration and

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<sup>23</sup> Different templates were required for different levels of funding.

<sup>24</sup> Attachment C to the Cooperative Agreement No. 623-A-00-07-00032-00.

<sup>25</sup> SOS Sahel was in fact subject to two Sub-Grantee Agreements: (i) with SC/US Ethiopia; (ii) with CARE Ethiopia to undertake similar activities across the operational areas of both Consortium partners; this was a very unsatisfactory arrangement for SOS Sahel which entailed double reporting and which it unsuccessfully contested.

award of contracts in the first year than developing a common understanding of purpose and collaboration across the partnership. Quite simply, most partners and sub-grantees were more preoccupied with ongoing project activities, prevailing drought, floods, upsurge in insecurity in the operational area and finalizing contracts, than developing a harmonious team. Consequently the Consortium represented a very “loose-knit” partnership which during the first year was probably more characterized by partners ensuring “territorial gains” and additional resources for their organisation’s activities than adopting a collaborative approach and implementing a true cross-border, regional program. It was particularly noteworthy that not much was achieved with respect to cross-border synergies and “regional” programming during this first year.

Five **Consortium Meetings** have been held since the onset of the ELMT/ELSE program. The ELMT Launch Meeting was the first at the beginning of November 2007 in Nairobi (Kenya); subsequent meetings have been held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Isiolo (Kenya), Arba Minch, Yabello and Negelle (Ethiopia), and Nairobi (Kenya) at which this evaluation mission debriefed (November 2009). These meetings instigated by the RCU (although not in the original program design) have been increasingly important in bringing together the main Consortium partners and to facilitate networking between the partners. The choice of venues has been purposeful and there have been opportunities for other stakeholders (outside the partnership) to participate as well as field visits from these locations (which participants really appreciated). They have provided a common forum for each partner to better understand the achievements and good practice of others and over time have helped in identifying cross-border issues. They have also provided an occasion for a number of actors engaged with the Technical Working Groups to convene and discuss opportunities and priorities, (since the TWGs have effectively had no forum of their own).

However, some participants felt that too much time was spent at these meetings on “housekeeping” and the achievement of “activities” driven by the bureaucracy of the system, (however necessary this was), and would have preferred more time ‘stepping back’ and focusing on impact and outcomes within the broader regional program context. Inevitably some of the meetings have been long and tedious in view of the agenda which is determined by the ambitious nature and scope of the program. Furthermore, lack of clarity on the “management” role of the RCU has been an issue at these meetings, leading to dissent and undermining the collaborative spirit of the forum (this is discussed further in the next section). One participant at the Arba Minch meeting noted that conflict resolution should apply as much within the Consortium as within the region itself!

With respect to **cost-effectiveness** of working as a consortium, the evaluation undertook a brief review of the ELMT/ELSE budgetary provisions and cumulative expenditure to date. Across the board the NICRA contribution (to cover overheads of the headquarters of the INGO partners) represented 12.5% of the budget<sup>26</sup> (although the contribution to each INGO varies<sup>27</sup>). The following table represents how the cumulative expenditure (including NICRA) had been spent at the time of the evaluation after more than two years of ELMT/ELSE operations:

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<sup>26</sup> The actual ELMT/ELSE budget amounted to \$9,999,239.

<sup>27</sup> VSF Suisse has no institutional agreement with USAID so it does not receive a NICRA contribution.

Consortium Partner	Cumulative Expenditure to	Cumulative Expenditure	Actual NICRA	Salaries and Admin	Contracts through sub-grants	Community Activities	Other Stakeholder Activities
RCU	31 Dec 2009	1,369,705	117,578	1,126,391			125,736
CARE Kenya	30 Nov 2009	1,143,054	102,116	612,793	171,771	256,374	
CARE Ethiopia	31 Aug 2009	888,461	79,371	436,429	151,502	221,159	
CARE Somalia	31 Dec 2009	679,323	60,547	488,082	88,695	41,999	
VSF Suisse	31 Aug 2009	1,143,248		742,019	18,590	382,640	
SC/UK	31 Aug 2009	296,796	33,702	216,7034			46,391
SC/US	30 Nov 2009	1,703,954	254,274	896,481	46,586	506,613	
<b>Total:</b>		<b>7,224,541</b>	<b>647,588</b>	<b>4,518,898</b>	<b>477,144</b>	<b>1,408,785</b>	<b>172,127</b>
% of Total:		100%	9%	62%	7%	19%	3%

It is clear that the a very significant proportion of the cumulative expenditure to date relates to both NICRA, salaries and administration (over 70%) and that costs relating to capacity-building and service delivery at the community level are well under 30% of the expenditure<sup>28</sup>. Compared to other projects operating within the region with which the evaluation team is familiar, this proportion of direct costs to communities is low. It begs the question whether the value of working as a Consortium justifies the proportion of indirect costs associated with complex cross-border and regional programming such as ELMT/ELSE. It can, provided ELMT/ELSE demonstrates that it is performing a distinct and combined function which cannot be achieved in other ways and attracts additional investment (from a diversified funding base) to the operational area and the target groups. It is this role that the Consortium has to perform in any future phase to demonstrate its value (see recommendations).

## 7.2 The Regional Coordination Unit (RCU)

“The Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) administers and coordinates ELMT/ELSE as well as to promote program quality, facilitate regional-level networking, and promote shared-learning throughout the ELMT/ELSE Consortium”<sup>29</sup>. The RCU headed by the Chief of Party (CoP) also comprises a Deputy Chief of Party (DCoP), Learning, Monitoring & Evaluation Advisor, an Operations Manager, a Program Officer, a Technical Advisor, (for Somalia after the CARE Somalia withdrawal) and a Communications Advisor (short-term). The RCU was **instituted within CARE Somalia/South Sudan (SSS)**, but was at pains to be as independent as possible, working on behalf of the Consortium and not simply as a unit of the CARE SSS program, (although the RCU did ultimately operate under the direction of the CARE/SSS Country Director). This it achieved quite effectively because the staffing of the RCU was recruited from outside CARE SSS and the office had its own distinct premises within the CARE SSS compound in Nairobi. Nevertheless, the RCU itself required time to complete the recruitment process, to clarify roles and determine lines of communication which meant that it did not always function as efficiently as it should.

Furthermore, it was never clear what “management” function the RCU could assume over the Consortium partners, since the Sub-Agreements with Consortium partners were signed off by the Country Director for CARE SSS and the contracts were effectively administered by the Program Support Unit of CARE SSS<sup>30</sup>, not the RCU. The role of the RCU was not explicit within the Sub-Agreements with Consortium partners. Attempts were made (within the first six months) to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the RCU in the Consortium Agreement for the ELMT/ELSE Program with respect to representation, donor liaison and consortium management through the development of a

<sup>28</sup> It should be noted that there are also staff and administrative costs incorporated within the Sub-Grantee Agreements.

<sup>29</sup> Consortium Agreement for ELMT/ELSE Program (2008).

<sup>30</sup> ELMT/ELSE contributed about 30% of CARE SSS program support (administration) budget to provide administrative, human resource and financial support to the program.

“memorandum of understanding” that all partners signed up to (the ELMT/ELSE Consortium Agreement is attached in **Annex Five**). However, this did more to foster collaboration and create an environment of “mutual support” than to provide the RCU with clear “management authority”. It was in no way explicit about levels of responsibility and accountability within the structure of the ELMT/ELSE Consortium. The RCU often found that the expectations and responsibilities imposed on it (generally from USAID or CARE SSS) were not commensurate with its own understanding of its role.

Consequently, when there were issues concerning the performance of the Consortium partners (for example, quality of programming, collaboration across the partners, leadership of the TWGs and burn rates), the RCU lacked the requisite authority to enforce the terms and conditions of the agreements and the CARE SSS at senior levels was too preoccupied with other commitments<sup>31</sup> to engage effectively, which proved very unsatisfactory for the overall management of the program.

When the RCU “pushed” on certain issues, this was perceived negatively by the Consortium partners who understood the RCU to be fulfilling a “support and coordination” role rather than a “management” role. A particularly difficult episode was when the RCU took a lead on reallocating ELMT/ELSE funds that became available after CARE had to close its program in Somalia; there was contention<sup>32</sup> within the Consortium as to how these funds should be used.

Another area where the RCU has adopted a more pro-active role is to initiate or facilitate “regional” initiatives that were not emerging through the regular activities of the ELMT/ELSE Consortium, but which it felt complemented the activities of other components of RELPA and/or supplemented the agenda of the ELMT/ELSE Technical Working Groups (TWG). Good examples of this emerged in the second year of the program such as the Moyale Peace Conference, a Rangeland Monitoring Manual, a Guide for Bio-Enterprise Development, the Livestock Marketing Symposium and the introduction of Holistic Management for rangelands and improved decision-making. These were important developments within the program and now recognized as substantive achievements, but in an ideal world should have been initiated and developed through the TWGs rather than driven by the RCU, (with the support of the CTO).

The RCU has also demonstrated flexibility in its way of working by incorporating the CARE SSS Project Manager into the RCU team after CARE was forced to close its operations in Somalia (from October 2008).

One of the most challenging areas within a Consortium is standardizing and coordinating effective **monitoring and evaluation systems**. The RCU has placed considerable emphasis on this by ensuring that Detailed Implementation Plans (DIPS), work plans and common indicators (conforming to USG standards) are developed and constitute the main reference point for Consortium partners to report against. There has been reasonable response in this area to ensure comprehensive reporting. Furthermore, the RCU initiated and developed an “evidence of change” framework to capture key areas of impact by the program. Unfortunately, this framework was not widely embraced by Consortium partners and (as evidenced by this evaluation) has done little yet to capture the results at field level. During the course of the program only one independent participatory impact assessment (PIA) has been conducted out of some six planned within the PACAPS work plan.

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<sup>31</sup> At the outset of the ELMT, the CARE Somalia/South Sudan Program was CARE International's largest program globally.

<sup>32</sup> Documented in the minutes of the 4th Consortium Meeting in Arba Minch, Yabello, Negelle (Ethiopia) March 2009.

The RCU (with support from LVIA) has initiated a web-site and now has most of the ELMT/ELSE **information products** posted on this. The newsletters, monthly e-bulletins, technical briefs and good practice bulletins that are posted on this site and available upon request in electronic or hard copies, are very informative and well presented. However, there was little evidence that there was (as yet) much demand for these information products outside the ELMT/ELSE Consortium membership, although this could usefully be evaluated through an information user survey.

### 7.3 The Technical Working Groups (TWG)

The purpose of the Technical Working Groups (TWG) is “to promote technically sound and innovative activities within the ELMT/ELSE”<sup>33</sup>. Each TWG is expected to encompass membership from across the Consortium to ensure collaboration and cross learning between the TWGs. Membership was intended to include staff from Consortium partners, Sub-Grantees and resource agencies. The TWGs were originally envisaged as the main vehicle for promoting the three strategies of the program:

- Consolidate the evidence base from consortium members experience, other organizations and development thinking to understand best practice;
- Scale up best practice from the evidence base by extending activities, leveraging additional funds and influencing other stakeholders; and
- Develop policy and roadmaps to feed into the ongoing range of policy initiatives in the Horn of Africa and guide investment in the region in future.

Generic Terms of Reference (TOR) were developed for the TWGs. Each of the Consortium partners assumed the lead for a TWG to which they could contribute some degree of expertise and commitment. This was agreed as follows:

1. Livelihood Protection (LP)	Save the Children UK (Ethiopia)
2. Livestock Services (LS)	VSF Suisse (Kenya & Somalia)
3. Natural Resource Management (NRM):	Save the Children US (Ethiopia)
4. Livelihood Diversification & Marketing (LDM)	CARE Kenya
5. Conflict Sensitivity and Peace Building (CSPB)	CARE Somalia
6. Social and Gender Equity (SAGE)	CARE Ethiopia

The first four TWGs were linked directly to the first four intermediate results of the ELMT/ELSE program, the last two were considered more cross-cutting. However, the establishment of a CSPB TWG inevitably led to some overlap with the Regional Conflict Prevention & Mitigation (RCPM) component of RELPA which was administered by PACT Kenya. PACAPS was intended to participate in the TWGs to ensure that best practice defined by the TWGs contributed to policy formulation, but this link was never sufficiently achieved, and in part was a symptom of the very “fragmented” approach practiced by RELPA<sup>34</sup>.

A Regional Technical Adviser (RTA) from Save the Children/US was appointed as an *ad hoc* member of the RCU to support and coordinate the TWGs on behalf of the unit. A TOR was developed for the position that primarily was intended to perform a support, guidance and quality control function. However, this function never worked work effectively despite it being well resourced, (particularly in the first year) because the RTA was distracted by many other non-ELMT responsibilities. The TWGs were themselves “networks” more so than physical entities that met periodically<sup>35</sup> and the Technical

<sup>33</sup> Consortium Agreement for the ELMT/ELSE Program (2008).

<sup>34</sup> The one exception was the work contracted with FEG which complemented the early warning/contingency planning initiatives of the Livelihood Protection TWG.

<sup>35</sup> The one exception being the NRM TWG, which did meet on a number of occasions in Ethiopia.

Advisers (TA) to the TWGs were also geographically disbursed, so their only chance to meet up was at the ELMT/ELSE Consortium meetings held bi-annually. There was only one dedicated meeting for the TAs at the RCU in March 2008. The objectives that the TWGs were set were very ambitious and unwieldy. Furthermore, the TAs were only part-time<sup>36</sup> (some as little as 8% of their time, none exceeding 50% in the second year) which meant that none were ever likely to fulfill their role and expectations were unrealistic from the start.

Inevitably, the TWGs have only worked where the TA had the appropriate technical background, experience and could commit a sufficient amount of time to drive and inform the process as well as a pro-active engagement and interest from the membership of the group. A lot has depended upon individual motivation<sup>37</sup> and probably less on the institutional support from the partner organization. The two most active TWGs are Natural Resource Management (NRM) and Livelihood Diversity & Marketing (LDM). The Livelihood Protection (LP) TWG operated sporadically the first year, but dropped off the scene once the TA left (April 2009) and has been relatively inactive since<sup>38</sup>.

The Livelihood Services (LS) TWG has been less active and the TAs changed hands three times, although VSF Suisse through its program of work has contributed significantly to better understanding across the Consortium of animal health services, with a strong focus on camels, most notably through more effective engagement with the private sector and fodder production. The two cross-cutting TWGs (conflict sensitivity and social & gender equity) have had little impact (in large due to ever-changing TAs with little time dedicated to the position) and have depended considerably on the services of external consultants, which has not proved an effective way of working.

Generally, the main failing of the TWGs, (even those that have been more active) has been to achieve the “horizontal and lateral weave” that promotes learning, exchange of experiences, cross-border working and an interface with other disciplines across the Consortium. If this had worked then the TWGs would have contributed more significantly to the cross-border agenda of ELMT/ELSE. Instead, the TWGs tended to operate in their own “silos”, linkages between TWGs were weak, (because in reality there was no inter-TWG coordination function), and their accountability to other Consortium partners and Sub-Grantees has been limited. Many respondents point out that each TWG being “institutionalized” in a partner organization was a major constraint to information sharing across organizations, as was the inability of the RTA’s role to be effectively fulfilled. It could also justifiably be argued that such synergies between six very diverse groups were unrealistic in a two year program, which then was as much a “flaw” in the Consortium’s technical application as it was the time-frame established by the donor.

## **7.4 The Program Steering Committee (PSC)**

The Technical Application from the CARE led Consortium indicated that a Steering Committee, (with the RCU acting as secretariat) would provide oversight and guidance to the ELMT/ELSE program. It was to be comprised of “the Heads of Agencies, (or their designates), as well as key external stakeholders including representatives from PACAPS, COMESA, USAID and implementing organizations”<sup>39</sup>. The Steering Committee was intended to strengthen the regional dimension of the program with representation from the three countries.

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<sup>36</sup> The TAs were either employees of the Consortium partner organization who were allocated a specific amount of time to ELMT/ELSE or consultants working on a part-time basis.

<sup>37</sup> The most successful TWGs benefitted from extra, (often unpaid) time committed by the TAs reflecting the unrealistic expectations in the project design.

<sup>38</sup> A new TA for LP has now been appointed (October 2009) by SC UK in Ethiopia.

<sup>39</sup> See section referring to the Project Steering Committee in the ELMT Technical Application submitted by CARE on behalf of the Consortium.

The PSC was never constituted and this was almost certainly a lost opportunity.<sup>40</sup> It would have served the program in four key areas:

- i. It would have more effectively engaged the Country Directors (CD) of the six Consortium partners, instead of which (with the exception of one or two CDs), knowledge and understanding of the ELMT/ELSE was really only achieved at either middle management or senior technical level staff;
- ii. It would have provided a key point of reference to discuss and resolve the RCU “management” role for which a lack of clarity fuelled tensions within the Consortium;
- iii. It would have strengthened the cross-border and regional perspective of the program which certainly in the first year was lacking; and
- iv. It would have embodied a stronger cross-institutional lobby for longer-term resources to the program.

It should also be noted that the Core Regional Committee on Pastoralism and Rural Development (CRC), which was intended to be a consultative forum for RELPA was never constituted either, and the RELPA Technical Steering & Coordination Group which was convened as a “steering group” never rigorously examined or accounted for strategic linkages between components across the RELPA framework. Throughout RELPA there was regrettably a lack of effective high-level advisory and coordination functions.

## **7.5 USAID**

The RELPA program was managed by the USAID East Africa Regional Mission in collaboration with the bilateral USAID missions in Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as the program desk supporting operations in Somalia. The Contracts Agreement Officer (AO), delegating to the Chief Cognizant Officer (CTO), were the primary officers responsible. During the first year of the ELMT/ELSE the AO assumed considerable direct authority and requested to screen all agreements administered by the RCU to Consortium Partners and all Sub-Grantee agreements administered by the Consortium partners. This was perceived by CARE as outside the spirit of the Cooperative Agreement, and due to limited capacity in the mission, led to considerable delays in the contract awards as described earlier. Furthermore, the crisis modifier facility, which was explicit in the Request for Applications (RFA) and the Consortium’s Technical Application, was not permitted despite the acceptance and success of this facility during the first PLI project in Ethiopia.

The CTO and the CoP ELMT/ELSE developed a very constructive working relationship from the outset of the program and much of the “cohesion” within the program has depended upon this close informal partnership, which probably achieved a lot of the tasks that other institutional arrangements should have fulfilled. However, this did not resolve the aforementioned “administrative” constraints in the first year, nor did it resolve differences in views of what the program should constitute and prioritize between the USAID East Africa Regional Mission and other bilateral missions (most notably Ethiopia) associated with the program. The result of these tensions over time was a reduced engagement and commitment by the other USAID missions in the ELMT/ELSE program, which to some extent has undermined its profile and the opportunity to learn from this innovative approach.

The CTO’s active participation in ELMT/ELSE has been a critical link between the program and USAID. Unfortunately, it has not always generated sufficient interest or engagement with other

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<sup>40</sup> Given the competing demands on senior managers’ time, sustaining PSC members’ engagement in ELMT has also been a challenge.

sections of USAID, most notably OFDA, which originally was positioned to be an integral part of the RELPA program.<sup>41</sup>

## 8. Added Value of RELPA

Like the ELMT/ELSE, the expectations of the umbrella Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas (RELPA) program were considerable and unrealistic within the two year time-frame. The institutional capacity within RELPA was never constituted to provide a strategic “steer” over these ambitious expectations. Furthermore, there was considerable confusion and overlap in both the design and the implementation of the functions being undertaken by different components of RELPA (see section 2.2 of this report). This in itself created tensions and demoralized certain actors within RELPA.

Firstly, a **Core Regional Committee on Pastoralism and Rural Development** (CRC) was never established to oversee and guide the RELPA Technical Steering and Coordination Group. In its absence a tremendous responsibility fell on the shoulders of the CTO who in any case had little other institutional support within USAID.

Secondly, **PACAPS** was supposed to play a “regional coordination” role which was a principal function, but early on in the program, PACAPS dropped this responsibility because contractually the other RELPA partners were not accountable to PACAPS and therefore it felt it had no authority to perform this function.

Thirdly, PACAPS was intended to develop a “common work planning, reporting and monitoring & evaluation system” that seemed to replicate the role of the RCU, which was also focusing on the coordination, monitoring and reporting of field activities. In the event, the RCU was not authorized by the donor to strengthen its M&E capacity (in part because PACAPS was to assume this function). PACAPS only ever undertook one participatory impact assessments (PIA)<sup>42</sup> on animal health services on behalf of the ELMT/ELSE (partly because of delays in identifying suitable interventions), which meant that the program gained very little “learning” experience in this phase.

Fourthly, linkages with the ELMT/ELSE technical working groups was very inconsistent and did not provide the synergies from evidence base to scaling up to policy development that was intended in the program design. A collaboration plan was developed between PACAPS and ELMT/ELSE that specifically identified resource persons that could contribute to each of the TWGs. However, this really only proved effective with the Livelihood Protection TWG where the Food Economy Group (FEG) consultants worked effectively in support of contingency planning and early response activities on the ground.

Fifthly, the role of the **Regional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation** (RCPM) component contracted out to PACT Kenya, appeared to duplicate the mandate of the ELMT/ELSE Conflict Sensitivity and Peace Building (CS&PB) TWG and the distinction was never clear to this evaluation in the program design. However, since the CS&PB TWG was largely inactive, PACT was engaged by the RCU to play the role of ensuring conflict sensitivity was included in ELMT programming. However, ELMT/ELSE partners never really understood the role of RCPM and consequently did not “buy in” to

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<sup>41</sup> The USAID Missions, and internal departments, were also not always in agreement regarding the vision for RELPA.

<sup>42</sup> The Collaborative Plan between ELMT/PACAPS identified that “PACAPS will carry out four to six Participatory Impact Assessments (PIAs) on innovative or interesting activities conducted by ELMT with the aim of developing and producing comprehensive reports and policy briefs for dissemination with RELPA partners and beyond”.



the full engagement with PACT<sup>43</sup>, (an outsider to the consortium); they apparently saw little value in the engagement and as a result PACT, with support from the RCU, had to continually push the agenda. There was also never a strong commitment by ELMT/ELSE partners to use the baseline assessments<sup>44</sup> conducted by PACT, (which focused on conflict sensitivity in the RELPA area), or the training and skills development exercise that was very much at the core of this effort.

Furthermore, PACT was unable to fulfill this function in either Ethiopia, (as it was not able to obtain the necessary USAID-Ethiopia and government approvals, while there also appear to have been difficulties in securing the collaboration of PACT Ethiopia), or Somalia, (due to insecurity) so the regional dimension of their work was also never well captured.

There were in addition issues regarding the timing and therefore **synchronization** of the **RELPA program** which also had detrimental effects on the ELMT/ELSE program.

- OFDA interventions (8 grants) completed December 2007
- RCPM was completed in August 2008 one year ahead of ELMT's original time-frame
- PACAPS started May 2007 and completed September 2009
- ELMT/ELSE started September 2007 with extension until April 2010

The completion of eight OFDA grants *prior* to the effective start-up of the ELMT/ELSE program meant that with no crisis modifier facility within the program budget there was no other facility that the program could leverage to support contingency or early response plans.

The RCPM baseline assessment on conflict-sensitivity within the region was conducted before the full RELPA partner portfolio was known and therefore it was not possible to engage all the Consortium partners in this exercise. Furthermore, and later, the training PACT conducted was (in some cases) ahead of project implementation and perceived as rather "theoretical" by Consortium partners, consequently the engagement of key actors was quite limited.

Overall, the added value of RELPA probably lay with the work being undertaken in the area of policy development (targeting COMESA/CAADP) to which the ELMT/ELSE field experience has contributed through the TWGs (to a limited extent) and the field-based workshops conducted by PACAPS. The collaboration in harmonizing the HEA livelihood profiles across borders and the guidelines for contingency planning were very effective to the program.

Areas which require particular emphasis in any future phase of the program are "learning" from impact assessments and improved knowledge management especially of "good practice" in working with pastoralist communities. Other cross-cutting dimensions of the field program, especially those relating to gender, social equity and conflict-sensitivity, can probably be more effectively addressed within the ELMT/ELSE Consortium than from other actors within a broader program (such as RELPA).

## **9. Lessons Learned from the ELMT/ELSE**

The ELMT/ELSE program design was over ambitious and unrealistic with respect to: (i) a complex, insecure and politically marginalized area of the Horn of Africa; (ii) the multitude of partnerships and resource agencies envisaged through the Consortium; (iii) the broad range of results and cross-

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<sup>43</sup> At one stage CARE Kenya recruited Oxfam GB to undertake peace-building work in the north-east of Kenya which added to the confusion.

<sup>44</sup> The Mandera Triangle Baseline Assessment undertaken by Management Systems International was conducted in May 2007.

cutting strategies incorporated into the scope of the program; and (iv) completion within a two year time-frame. It was never going to achieve the outcomes/results it set itself.

The Consortium constituted a very able and experienced partnership of international NGOs working in collaboration with community-based organizations, institutions and resource agencies who are very conversant with issues affecting pastoralism and dryland environments. However, as a new partnership for all the stakeholders, the Consortium never had the time or the opportunity to determine its own purpose and destiny; it has evolved through a series of meetings and events, but has really only taken form towards the end of the program. It does now generate a degree of cohesiveness and maturity. However, It still does not sufficiently encompass the contribution and participation of local partner organizations and resource agencies contracted through Sub-Grantee Agreements; with longer time the indications are that the Consortium would have become more inclusive in this respect.

The principle of having Technical Working Groups (TWG) associated with the key results and cross-cutting issues of the program was very sound. However, the constraints affecting the output of the TWGs were: (i) they were insufficiently resourced (technically and financially); (ii) they were housed within the organizations that led them and therefore lacked accountability to other partners within the Consortium; and (iii) they were insufficiently coordinated to be strategic. Consequently they did not constitute suitable vehicles for delivering on the three strategies of the program nor did they sufficiently promote horizontal linkages and cross-border programming. As such they only partially contributed to organizational learning across the Consortium.

The ELMT/ELSE lacked the goal/drive of a clear vision/purpose. The program was over-burdened with bridging administrative responsibilities between the Consortium and USAID (including contracts, reporting and compliance on “burn rates”) and scaling up regular activities at field level, rather than working creatively, innovatively and strategically to link effective cross-border initiatives and contribute to a regional agenda on pastoralism (although this improved during the second year).

Insufficient engagement and “ownership” by senior management in the Consortium partners and other departments/missions of USAID has meant that the ELMT/ELSE lost opportunities for deserved recognition and gained insufficient profile for “pastoralist” voice. Furthermore, this engagement would have helped “steer” the program in better defining lines of management, roles and responsibilities between Sub-Grantees, Consortium partners and the RCU to avoid the influence of individual agendas.

RELPA was not sufficiently “joined up” nor coherent to provide the “added value” to the ELMT/ELSE as intended; instead there was overlap, confusion and inconsistencies between the different components resulting in the RCU assuming a number of the functions that PACAPS was intended to perform.

Synergies developed between regional authorities, appropriate government authorities and other donors focusing on pastoral issues in the Horn of Africa were not sufficiently incorporated into the program design and consequently have not been strategic during this phase of the program.

Early warning needs to be systematically linked to early response, otherwise resources are wasted and the effort and commitment that communities and actors contribute to such systems are undermined.

## 10. Recommendations for Future Interventions

### 10.1 Extension and Time Frame

A number of ELMT/ELSE activities/events remain outstanding and should be incorporated into a six month **No Cost Extension** (NCE II) from 1 January 2010. These include: (i) continuation of technical support and consolidation of training in camel husbandry and health and the convening of an International Symposium on camel health to be held in Garissa, Kenya in June 2010; (ii) follow-on activities from the Regional Livestock Marketing Symposium including the formation of an active regional livestock marketing forum; (iii) conduct “scenario planning” and further develop the participatory approach to rangeland management; (iv) develop cross-border NRM and trade maps with customary institutions; (v) develop good practice guidelines for water development in ASAL areas; (vi) organize a regional technical workshop on the promotion of fodder production; (vii) strengthen cross-border peace committees and exchange visits; and (viii) produce outstanding technical briefs on ELMT/ELSE innovative “good practice” including: integrated fodder production; early response planning; support to the privatization of veterinary services; milk marketing and linking the private sector with the Ministry of Northern Kenya. Emphasis during this period (as reflected in the activities/events) should build specifically on cross-border and regional programming.

[The evaluation team understands that an NCE II has been approved by USAID (December 2009) only until the end of April 2010, so these activities will have to be further prioritized]

Any further USAID funding focusing on cross-border and regional activities in support of pastoralist livelihoods must commit to longer term program cycles of at least **five to ten years** to be cost-efficient and effective given the complexity of the environment in which they operate.

### 10.2 Program Design

ELMT/ELSE should determine a program design for a subsequent phase which is **strategic** with respect to **cross-border synergies** and **regional initiatives** based upon the experience of the first phase. Program areas and priorities should be developed through consultations with primary beneficiaries at the field level facilitated by customary institutions and be linked (where appropriate) with the “agendas” of governments (including Ethiopia and Kenya) and regional institutions such as IGAD, AU-IBAR and COMESA.

The program must be more **focused** with well defined links between the different results. Partner organizations collaborating through this initiative should be expected to adopt the program strategy rather than simply scaling up existing activities in order for this focus to be more coherent and effective. Interventions which do not directly contribute to cross-border synergies may still contribute to the broader understanding of “good practice” but should be funded under different funding facilities (for example funding through USAID bilateral missions in country or other donors).

The program should build on existing synergies developed under the first phase of ELMT/ELSE<sup>45</sup> between complementary activities across border which are coordinated within strategic “**zonal hubs**”. These “zonal hubs” should be sensitive to, and build upon, cultural and clan ties across borders. Consensus on program activities should be built from the community level upwards (techniques to achieve this are scenario planning, community dialogue, baseline surveys and stakeholder planning). The RCU should have the capacity to support engagement and facilitate coordination at this level between customary institutions, partner agencies, governments and across border.

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<sup>45</sup> Cross-border peace building activities represent very effective cross-border programming under the first phase of ELMT/ELSE.

The program should work through **strategic relationships** with relevant **government ministries** and **regional institutions** responsible for the economic, technical and policy development relating to drylands and pastoralism. In this respect the program can very usefully build upon the regional events and initiatives it successfully instigated during the first phase, most notably the Camel Fora in Kenya and Ethiopia, the Peace Conference in Moyale, the Livestock Marketing Symposium in Nairobi and the Private Investment Initiative with the Ministry of Northern Kenya. Ultimately the program must represent an opportunity for the “voice” of pastoralists to be heard at local, national and regional levels.

The program must recognize, complement and join forces with other donor (and agency) initiatives<sup>46</sup> focusing on poverty and livelihoods issues affecting pastoralists and drylands populations in the region. There has to be a better informed and more concerted approach to these issues in a complex area and ELMT/ELSE should provide the platform (in the absence of any other suitable body) to achieve this.

The program should be more cost-effective, greater emphasis should be placed on strategic pieces of work, delivering on program outputs and results rather than “burn rates”.

### 10.3 Technical Emphasis

The program should focus on the **principal technical issues** affecting pastoral livelihoods (timely protection of livelihoods and natural resources, improved animal health, production and marketing, and complementary livelihoods) and ensure that it draws on the most effective technical experience and competence to achieve this. The program must demonstrate sound development practice (including social equity, gender and conflict sensitivity).

The program must demonstrate an effective link between **early warning systems** (including traditional systems), **contingency planning** (in concert with other initiatives<sup>47</sup>) and timely **response** to issues affecting pastoralist communities through emergency funding facilities that are inked to the program<sup>48</sup>.

Specifically, the program should take into account (where applicable): (i) empowerment of customary institutions in pastoral areas of Kenya and elsewhere in Ethiopia; (ii) improved beneficiary targeting for fodder production and alternative (complementary) livelihood interventions; (iii) productive management and equitable access to enclosures, in particular in Ethiopia<sup>49</sup>; (iii) the direct participation of customary institutions, government and communities in the holistic management approach; (iv) more considered use of fire for bush management (this should be applied professionally and with the participation of communities); (v) support to pastoralists to diversify into non-livestock and non-moisture dependent alternatives that would enhance or complement the livelihood of pastoralists; (vi) identify appropriate financial intermediaries for the pastoral areas to facilitate livestock trading, savings; and (vii) reduced dependency on “free” inputs (such as hives, seed and farm implements) through the livelihood diversification and marketing interventions.

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<sup>46</sup> Other donors engaged in this area include the World Bank, DFID and EC/ECHO.

<sup>47</sup> For example the Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP) in Ethiopia funded through the Government of Ethiopia by the World Bank.

<sup>48</sup> In Ethiopia a Memorandum of Understanding (July 2009) has been agreed between OFDA and the Ethiopian Mission of USAID (BEAT) to support emergency activities (livestock and livelihood relief interventions are prioritized) that address risks and crises that would otherwise affect the development efforts of the PLI II program.

<sup>49</sup> Drought reserves should not end up being the property of the wealthy pastoralists who have the largest number of animals.

Much more emphasis must be placed on monitoring and **impact assessments** in the next phase to demonstrate achievements of results on the livelihoods of the principal beneficiaries. It is proposed that the focus of participatory impact assessments (PIA) should be of the restocking interventions and the income-generating activities undertaken by cereal groups with support from SC/US in Ethiopia, and the BDS training and income-generating activities supported by CARE Kenya.

#### 10.4 The Consortium

The program should continue to operate through a **Consortium** since the benefits derived from a range of experience and competencies has been well demonstrated in the second year of the first phase of ELMT/ELSE. However, the partnership is not likely to be as broad as the program adopts a much more focused strategy. Consortium partners will be selected on their suitability, commitment and ability to deliver on key components of the ELMT/ELSE strategy (focusing on cross-border and regional interventions) in the second phase. Consortium partners with “regional” facilities and functions that would contribute to the objectives of the program would be at an advantage. There should be a three month “**inception period**” built within the program for the Consortium partners to prepare prior to program implementation and convene a sequence of Consortium workshops to determine: (i) vision; (ii) purpose; (iii) structure; and (iv) roles and responsibilities<sup>50</sup>.

Consortium partners should determine their own contractual arrangements (within the terms and conditions of USG funding) with local partners (Sub-Grantees) whom they select to deliver services and manage within the terms and conditions of their agreement with the principal recipient partner. All technical and management staff of Consortium partners and Sub-Grantees should undergo orientation and induction training by the RCU during the inception period or at the time of joining the program (if at a later stage).

A **Regional Coordination Unit** (RCU) should champion the “vision” and the “purpose” of the Consortium on behalf of the partnership and represent the Consortium at the regional and national levels. Furthermore, the RCU should assume more direct management functions accorded to it by the Country Director of the principal recipient partner and these management functions should be articulated clearly in agreements made with Consortium partners. This would imply that the Consortium partners are directly accountable to the RCU for financial and narrative reporting<sup>51</sup>.

In addition the RCU should assume responsibility for: (i) Consortium staff orientation and induction; (ii) communications across the program; (iii) field coordination of zonal hubs; (iv) assuring technical quality and linkages across the program; (v) monitoring and evaluation (including participatory impact assessments); (vi) regular reporting on the program; (vii) documentation of good practice; (viii) technical networking; (ix) instigation and facilitation of regional events; and (x) donor liaison<sup>52</sup>.

The RCU should include: (i) Chief of Party; (ii) Deputy Chief of Party<sup>53</sup>; (iii) three Technical Advisers; (iv) a Learning, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer; (v) a PIA Officer; (vi) a Program Officer<sup>54</sup> supported

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<sup>50</sup> This process will be more clearly defined in the IMI Guidelines on Consortium collaborative working being produced in conjunction with this evaluation report.

<sup>51</sup> It may be appropriate to re-name the RCU, a Regional Management Unit, although this title is already assumed by the CARE USA Regional Office, so the term has not been applied in this evaluation report to avoid confusion.

<sup>52</sup> These recommendations are assuming that the Consortium will be more a “stand alone” function in a future phase since the outcome of the broader RELPA evaluation is not yet known, nor is the commitment to support other functions of RELPA including most critically, the PACAPS component.

<sup>53</sup> The DCoP will act as the Coordinator for Technical Advisers and Field Coordinators.

<sup>54</sup> The Program Officer should assume responsibility for Consortium staff orientation and induction.

by an Administrative Assistant; and (vii) an Operations Manager responsible for a Program Support Section (structure to be determined<sup>55</sup>).

Furthermore, the RCU should appoint and manage **Field Coordinators** who will be based in at least three strategic “hubs” in cross-border areas to identify, promote and facilitate engagement between partner organizations and sub-grantees. The Field Coordinators should represent the RCU at this level. The Field Coordinators should also provide key reference points to the TAs of the RCU.

The RCU should manage and coordinate the functions of the **Technical Working Groups** (TWG) which will focus on four strategic areas (most probably Livelihoods Protection, Natural Resource Management, Livestock Services and Livelihoods Diversification) and should be led by experienced and competent advisers. The Technical Advisors (TA) should be full-time personnel of the RCU (although they may be seconded to the RCU by a Consortium partner if they are suitably qualified) and provide a support service to all Consortium partners. The TAs will ensure: (i) quality assurance of all project activities; (ii) documentation, sharing and dissemination of good practice; (iii) technical networking and advocacy; and (iv) facilitation at “regional” events. The TAs should also be responsible for promoting the cross-cutting themes of social and gender equity and conflict sensitivity. In many respects it would be advantageous that the TAs continue to be located in different parts of the region (they do not necessarily need to be physically located in the RCU) to avoid the RCU becoming too centralized.

The RCU will manage an “**innovation fund**” to support new initiatives at regional level which are proposed and prioritized by the TWGs to ensure that the program can capitalize on opportunities that might not always be apparent at the design stage of the program.

The recommendation for an additional post of a **PIA Officer** in the RCU is to emphasize the considerable importance of the program having the capacity to assess impact of project activities. This capacity (independent of the TAs and TWGs) should coordinate assessments undertaken by independent consultants in the field.

## 10.5 Program Steering Committee

An ELMT/ELSE **Program Steering Committee** (PSC) should be constituted to provide advice and guidance to the Regional Coordination Unit (RMU). The core PSC should include the ELMT/ELSE CoP, senior representation from the Consortium partners (at Assistant or Country Director level) and donor representation (USAID East Africa Mission). Consideration should also be given to including senior representatives of Consortium partners’ Regional Offices, USAID bilateral missions in Ethiopia & Kenya, other donors engaged in cost-sharing (ECHO) and regional authorities (IGAD, COMESA)<sup>56</sup>.

The PSC should also work to gain broader recognition of the ELMT/ELSE beyond its traditional stakeholders and strive to engage other pastoral and dryland initiatives to the **ELMT/ELSE “platform”** as well as securing longer term multi-donor funding for the initiative (in due course it might consider attaining an independent legal entity). ELMT/ELSE can only be considered cost-effective if it is able to raise awareness of pastoral and dryland issues and be the catalyst to attract additional and appropriate investment into these areas.

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<sup>55</sup> This would have to be determined between the RCU and the lead agency of the Consortium subject to existing capacity available within the INGO that can be fully dedicated to the functions of the RCU.

<sup>56</sup> This recommendation is made assuming that the ELMT/ELSE function is “stand alone” since the outcome of the broader RELPA program is not known at this stage.